tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5710845602477644495.post7955494994912642352..comments2023-09-23T05:56:35.265+12:00Comments on MandM: Euthyphro Objection III:The Redundancy of God is GoodMandMhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02694636663826784480noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5710845602477644495.post-7486952419706723872008-02-19T18:51:00.000+13:002008-02-19T18:51:00.000+13:00I am sorry about your recent loss, Matt. When you ...I am sorry about your recent loss, Matt. When you get a chance to answer my 3 questions above, please let me know. Best wishes.Deanehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15332464950652540647noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5710845602477644495.post-3490544935003251682008-02-01T21:37:00.000+13:002008-02-01T21:37:00.000+13:00mandmwrote:Some, like Robert Adams, and to some ex...mandmwrote:<BR/><BR/>Some, like Robert Adams, and to some extent Linda Zagzebski state that the relationship between a good character trait and God’s character is one of identity; the property of being a good trait and the property of being a divine trait is are identical properties.<BR/><BR/>This seems like a very strange view. Since the claim is not plausibly analytic, the identity has to be a Kripke-type a posteriori identity (like "water = H2O"). But those necessary a posteriori identities all seem to break apart into a necessary a priori component (water = [rigidly] whatever actually plays the water role) and a contingent a posteriori component (H20 actually plays the water role)? Is there a similar analysis for identity between goodness and being a characteristic of God?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5710845602477644495.post-75357738064193061972008-01-31T17:44:00.000+13:002008-01-31T17:44:00.000+13:00Hmmmm... let me rephrase that last question. It's ...Hmmmm... let me rephrase that last question. It's a bit ambigous, not least because it could be taken (wrongly) as a question about God's sovereignty, human free will and sin. Rather:<BR/><BR/>'Lastly, assuming God is a perfectly good being, is there any action (or inaction) that God would not command of a human?'Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5710845602477644495.post-63481427471806721622008-01-30T11:28:00.000+13:002008-01-30T11:28:00.000+13:00Matt wrote:It remains doubtful whether a logically...<B>Matt wrote:</B><BR/><I>It remains doubtful whether a logically-possible situation in which God commands an action and that action is wrong could exist. This is because a perfectly-good being would not command wrongdoing.</I><BR/><BR/>Hi Matt,<BR/><BR/>I had a read through your 3 posts on the Euthyphro dilemma, and was just wanting a few clarifications, if you would. Is it your view that God's goodness is an analytic fact, that is, a matter of definition that God is good--as 'the perfectly good being'?<BR/><BR/>You reject any reliance of God on some ontologically prior principle of goodness. But would you say that God's goodness is logically prior to any analysis of God's acts?<BR/><BR/>Lastly, if God is a perfectly good being, is there any action carried out by any person that could <I>not</I> be ascribed to the will of God?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5710845602477644495.post-31166172623066855952007-11-08T12:05:00.000+13:002007-11-08T12:05:00.000+13:00Mark Good questionFirst, as phrased you asks why "...Mark <BR/><BR/>Good question<BR/><BR/>First, as phrased you asks why "we" "consider" these traits good. That’s question about a persons reasons for a conclusion and I think the answer depends on who “we” is. I imagine different people will have different reasons for why they endorse these traits some of these reasons will be good others bad. <BR/><BR/>Second, I think what you mean to ask is a metaphysical question, what makes these traits good. You suggest either these traits are good traits because God posses them or they are good because of some standard of good traits independent of God. Here I think the question makes a false dichotomy. You assume that that the relationship between goodness and God is an asymmetrical, dependence relationship that leaves two mutually-exclusive possibilities; either being right is ontologically prior to God’s commanding or God’s commanding is ontologically prior to what is right.<BR/><BR/>However, from reading the literature it seems that some important theists deny that the relationship is asymmetric in this way. Some, like Robert Adams, and to some extent Linda Zagzebski state that the relationship between a good character trait and God’s character is one of identity; the property of being a good trait and the property of being a divine trait is are identical properties. This does not expound an asymmetrical relationship but one of identity. Identity relations are symmetrical and the proposed dilemma simply does not apply to a relationship of identity. To ask which of two identical things was ontologically prior to the other is to ask whether something was prior to itself.<BR/><BR/>MattMandMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02694636663826784480noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5710845602477644495.post-73881365348244152342007-11-07T08:44:00.000+13:002007-11-07T08:44:00.000+13:00You say that God is good because he posseses certa...You say that God is good because he posseses certain character traits that we regard as good. But why do we regard them as good? Is it because God possesses these traits or because they conform to some external standard of goodness?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com