Today I returned from a trip to Sydney. As I exited customs and headed for my taxi I kept feeling like I had missed something, some step in security - maybe I had taken a wrong turn?

You see when I flew to Australia I had to fill in a card answering a number of questions about what I was bringing into the country. You know the ones, you just mindlessly fill them in and get on with your trip. This time though the questions around drugs were particularly prominent for me as I had brought with me some prescription pain killers for my neck (hurt it blowdrying my hair recently - long story) and I realised I had to declare them which was a bit of a pain as I ended up getting separated from my colleagues.

On the way home I wondered if I should just not declare them so as to not risk the separation thing again but resolved to do the right thing. Imagine my surprise on filling in the NZ entry card, as I ticked each box and came to the end having answered questions about mud and wood items and fruit only to find that there was no question about drugs at all!

Surely they must ask me in person as I go through customs... I listened intently for my opportunity to confess to the drugs in my handbag, "No, I don't have any fruit in my hand bag, just some eclipse mints and a biscuit I didn't eat on the plane." I was waived on and the next thing I knew I was outside heading for my taxi.

The Aussies want to know about your criminal convictions and the drugs you might be carrying, the US wants to know both of the above and your Nazi party affiliations but all NZ cares about is whether you are carrying any fruit!

I found this last night, I wrote it at the beginning of the US invasion in 2003 at that time I was opposed to the invasion of Iraq and was considering joining the anti-war movement in Dunedin. I posted it up on a newsgroup to get some answers from peace activists. I have edited it slightly and incorporated some of the responses I made to objections in the ensuing discussion into the main text.My views on permissibility the invasion have since changed. However I stand by what I said here:

I was sitting down last night watching the News and pondering whether the doctrine of a Just War ruled out a military intervention by the US in Iraq. While I was doing this an idea came to me. I was struck by the fact that no one has asked whether the Doctrine would justify Iraq defending themselves against the US invasion. It seems odd that no one has asked this. There is after all two sides to a conflict and both sides are required to act according to Gods law. Why were people predominately concerned with the actions of only one of the belligerents? It is almost as if we people think that democratic nations have a duty to refrain from unjust belligerency, dictatorships do not. I submit that this is absurd.

Upon reflection I came to the conclusion that the just war doctrine would not permit Iraq to engage in a defensive war against the US. Just war doctrine states that a war to be lawfully prosecuted must meet 6 requirements 1) it must be fought for a just cause with just aims 2) it must be prosecuted by someone with the lawful authority to do so 3), It must be a last resort 4) one must have a reasonable chance of success in prosecuting these aims 5) The cost one incurs by going to war must not be greater than the evil one is trying to prevent and 6) only force must be used proportionate and discriminate ( aimed only at non combatants) force should be utilized in prosecuting the war.

I will examine each of these criteria in turn.

1) The cause and aim is to prevent a brutal dictator, Saddam Hussein, being removed from power this is hardly a just cause.

Some deny this, they suggest that Iraq is defending it’s oil reserves from foreign annexation. I demur for three reasons

First, “the no blood for oil” argument is a bad one. The aim of the US is to topple the regime, of course Oil could be the motive (just as it could be the motive of Frances decision to veto). But even if it was all it shows is that the US has bad motives. It does not show their actions are unjust. Consider a person can give to charity because he wants others to be impressed by his piety, this would be a bad motive but it does not follow that giving to charity is wrong, or that he should not give to charity. It simply tells us about his character the no blood for oil argument expresses a logical fallacy, attacking a person’s character not their reasons.

Second, Saddam’s aim is not to prevent the US getting Oil. To see this simply ask whether Saddam would settle for a situation where his regime fell, his people liberated but Iraq kept the Oil. Would he stop fighting and surrender on such terms NO. Which shows his aim is self preservation not protecting people from getting oil?

Third even if protection of Oil reserves was Saddam’s aim (which it is not) the question could still be raised over whether this is a just cause. Is maintaining possession of Oil and money is a just cause for war, normally one does not have aright to kill to defend money. If America is not permitted to shed blood for oil why is Iraq?

2) Holds only if one grants that a dictator who ceased power by force and stays in power largely by rigged votes is the legitimate ruler of Iraq. notice the words "if" here I was cautious because I am tempted to think that a de facto regime can be legitimate even if dictatorial, that does not mean that everything the regime did is legitimate. We recognize China's government for example and various others.

The standard response I get to this is that Bush rigged the election in Florida and so does not have lawful authority either. This is not an adequate response. My suggestion is that Saddam lacks lawful authority to wage war. Saying that Bush has no such authority does not address this, in fact it tends to confirm it. If Bush can't wage war because he was not really elected then neither can Saddam why is it acceptable for dictators to engage in wars and yet not unelected leaders of free countries?

3) Clearly does not hold, Saddam could have taken numerous reasonable non violent actions to prevent invasion. He could have stopped oppressing his people. He could have gone into exile. Saddam could have stepped down; he could have allowed his people to have free democratic elections and reformed the regime so that it upheld justice and human rights. These are all perfectly reasonable things that he had a duty to do any way and they would have averted war. Why is the US is being condemned for not exhausting all non violent solutions when Saddam did not either. You can't have it both ways, a rule that says dictators don't need to find peaceful alternatives but free countries do.

4) Does not hold, it is not likely that Saddam can defeat the coalition in a war, he could not beat Iran, was beaten soundly by the US last time and has a weaker army this time.

[note: one response I got to this point was that I was completely brainless if I thought this. I was told that Saddam’s forces would drive the US advance back, another respondent said the Arab world would unite and defeat the US as a response to the invasion. I have not put my responses to this here. I don’t think I need to…]

5) Does not hold the "evil" being prevent is the toppling of a brutal dictatorship and so is not an evil at all. Consequently the costs incurred by the Iraqi people by fighting the coalition are not outweighed by a positive good.

The response I get to this claim is that Saddam is no more of a dictator than George W Bush who signed Bush has signed over 200 death warrants [ Bush is the former governor of a death penalty state see here ]. Again this is beside the point I have not argued that the US or Bush are fighting a just war, I merely said Iraq is fighting an unjust one. Even if one grants that Bush's actions are problematic it does not mean that Saddam’s are not. Taken at face value this argument confirms my claim. I take it that people who make this argument consider these actions by Bush to be wrong if so then Saddam doing the same thing is wrong and I assure you he has executed more than 200 people.

I am surprised anyone takes this argument seriously. There is a world of difference between executing people found guilty by due process of committing first degree murder which is what happens in the US. and executing women and children without trial, often for trivial reasons, or for actions which are not crimes ( such as criticizing the government or being a Kurd).There is also a difference between a lethal injection and being tortured to death in an Iraqi torture chamber. I am at a loss to understand why some who oppose the war cannot draw such basic and obvious distinctions. Is as though any killing by the US, no matter what the circumstances, is murder but when the same action is done by Iraq it’s excusable.

6) Saddam is does not have a track record of using force discriminately. He has a history of massacring civilians. His defenders tend also to disrespect non combatant immunity by a) housing military targets in close proximity to civilian centers and hence effectively using civilians as shields b) executing POW's and disrespecting their rights, c) disguising troops as civilians.

[One peace activist responded to this point by saying that my claim Saddam did these things was simply my biased opinion and hence worthless. He appeared to maintain that Saddam was a democratically elected popular leader. I kid you not]

So Iraq fails on nearly every criterion, except perhaps 2). In fact I am inclined to think that even if the US invasion is unjust it meets more of the criteria for a just war than Iraq’s defense does, making the American invasion less morally problematic than the Iraqi's defense . This means in fact that Saddam had a to not defend himself against the attack. If he had done this the US would not have used force and nearly every adverse effect associated with the war that people are concerned about would not have happened. Saddam therefore is as much responsible (perhaps more so) for whatever happens as the US is. His derelection of the duty to not engage in an unjust wars has lead to these things coming about

These observations lead me to question the tactics and strategy of the Peace movement. This movement is advocating that the U.S withdraw because they are fighting an unjust war. It states that because the US are prosecuting such a war there should be demonstrations against the US. The question needs to be asked are governments allowed to prosecute unjust wars, if the answer is yes then the peace movement has no case , because Bush is not doing anything wrong, if the answer is No then it follows that Iraq also has a duty to refrain from fighting this war and that Iraq has a duty to cease fighting and withdraw its defenses from Bagdad. The peace movement should be picketing Iraq's decision to fight, burning Iraqi flags demanding that Saddam step down, storming Iraqs embassies etc. We should see hundreds of thousands of people marching denouncing Iraq. But we do not.

Consider it this way. The war can be stopped in two ways either by the US ceasing to invade or by Iraq ceasing to defend, It seems to me that putting pressure on Iraq to stop fighting is in fact preferable to demanding a US withdraw. For three reasons first because even if one grants the unjust nature of both wars I suspect that the US will conform to the model of a just war better than Iraq does. Second, because Iraq withdrawing and the US liberating Iraqi people from tyranny without violence is surely a better outcome than the US withdrawing and liberated people being crushed with violence, reprisals etc And Third because if it did this it would also gain support of those who support the US invasion and hence represent a broader base of people and gain more popular support.

Why then is the peace movement most of its efforts on denouncing the coalition? If the peace movement wants to credibly pass itself of as concerned with justice for the people of Iraq rather than a simply a movement that is committed to anti Americanism while turning a blind eye to dictatorships It should focus most of its efforts protesting the actions of the Iraqi leadership. It should call for the Iraqi leadership to put down its weapons and cease fighting an unjust war. Until it does many people even those who have doubts about the justice of Americas actions will remain skeptical of its goals. If not morally appalled at its selective blindness and lack of concern for the Iraq people.

RELATED POSTS:
More on Iraq and the Just War Theory

Craig Young is shocked by statistics about “bare backing” being prevalent in the Gay community. Bare backing in case you don’t know is the name Craig gives to un-protected anal sex. Young is shocked because it suggests there exists a “parallel world where Paul Cameron tells the truth.”

To understand this you need to understand something of Craig’s methods. Many critics of homosexual conduct have been for some time citing studies and evidence which suggests that homosexual conduct, as typically engaged, in is dangerous. Craig Young’s standard response has been ad hominem; he notes that one source sometimes cited in support of these claims is Paul Cameron and, according to Craig, Cameron was kicked out of the American Psychological Association for falsifying one of his studies. Craig fails to see that this is not an adequate rebuttal. First, even if Cameron’s work lacks credibility he is often only one of many sources these authors use. Contrary to what Craig seems to think you do not refute numerous studies by showing that one of them is false. Second, the fact that Cameron was kicked out of an organization for falsifying his research in a particular a study does not mean that every study he wrote or authored was shonky or bad.

Despite his initial shock at discovering that merely attacking the character of one scholar does not establish the falsity of a thesis. Craig attempts a predictable save. The prevalence of unsafe sex amongst homosexual men is actually the fault of evangelical Christians not of the bare backers who actually do it.

[T]he US Christian Right has had some dark successes in curtailing LGBT rights and mainstream HIV/AIDS prevention programmes. This has meant that the US LGBT communities are far more ghettoised than most other international LGBT communities, so it tolerates distorted antisocial behaviours that are one response to segregation from the rest of one's society. What else could one call the cowboy bareback DVD producers that prey on young gay men barely past the age of consent that appear to be the backbone of barebacking?

Craig here argues as follows: dangerous sexual practises are a response to segregation from society and segregation from society is the result of moral condemnation from Christians in that society. Ergo these Christians are responsible for the dangerous practises. Now something like this argument is common, like many common liberal arguments I reject it. Here is why:

This argument suggests that people (in this case certain Christians) are responsible not just for the foreseeable causal consquences of their actions. But also for other peoples free responses to these actions (or at least such responses which one can be expected to predict) Young suggests that because it’s foreseeable some people choose to respond to Christian condemnation of homosexual conduct by forming a segregated culture, and its foreseeable that this culture will respond to segregation by condoning and engaging in “anti social behaviour”. It follows Christians are responsible for the behaviour.

I think this understanding of scope of moral culpability is false. Consider the following example from Augustine. Suppose a man approaches a woman and tells her that he will kill himself if she refuses to have sex with him. Does that mean that she is a murderer if she refuses?[1] Her refusal would not constitute homicide even though his death is a foreseeable result of her choice. Although she foresaw his or her death, she did not cause it. It was caused by the free decision of the tempter to commit suicide.

In an excellent article, Alan Donagan notes that historically Christian and Jewish casuistry agrees with Augustine on this point. Christian ethicists typically…

limit an action’s effects, and a fortiori what its agent intends to bring about in doing it, to those that follow from it in course of nature and the ordinary operation of social institutions, and not from the free reactions of others to it.
(Thus actions in the ordinary course of business, for example, those of postal officers in delivering a letter that has been mailed, are not counted as free reactions.) The principle on which they do is that a free reaction to an action, is a ‘new action’ (‘novus actus’), the effects of which are their effects, and not those of the action to which they are reactions.[2] [Emphasis added]

If we apply this point to Craig’s analysis his argument falls down. Christians who condemn homosexual conduct do not cause people to engage in bare backing. In fact by condemning homosexual conduct they are explicitly telling them not to engage in it. If a person does it anyway, then they doing so in defiance of their will and hence without their consent consequently any negative consequences that follow are the responsibility of the “bare backer” not the person opposed to bare backing.

I think the same line of argument addresses Craig’s second argument,

And how could the blanket censorship of targeted adolescent gay HIV/AIDS prevention education not have resulted in a situation where there are young men who see nothing wrong in having unsafe sex- possibly because they've been isolated from metropolitan gay communities where they would have gotten that message?

Putting to one side Young’s mistaken definition of censorship, here the same problem arises. The Christian expresses a volition that people not engage in homosexual behavior they believe that such behavior is wrong. Because they believe this they also refuse to help people engage in such conduct, that would make them complict in wrongdoing. A group of adolescents refuse to listen and do it anyway as a result they die. Craig suggests that this means that Christians are responsible for these deaths. This follows only if people are responsible for and culpable for the foreseeable actions of other people even when these other people are acting contrary to their expressed desire and as I argued above this is false.

There is something even worse about this line of argument however: if it were true it would mean that any person can require me to assist them in any behavior they wish merely by threatening to do something worse if I do not. Such a principle essentially sanctions black mail and creates an obligation to collaborate in any wrong no matter how grave in response to a threat to a third party. Even worse, if the blackmailers carry out the threat they make us responsible what happens and not them. I can help but think this is a terrible distortion of ethical analysis

I think it’s clear then that Craig’s analysis is mistaken. I will add a final note: Barebacking is an activity that occurs between consenting adults. Both parties agree to engage in causal unprotected anal sex. Now people like Craig have been arguing for some time that homosexual sex is permissible, precisely because it’s engaged in by consenting adults. Denials of this principle have been denounced by Craig’s news group Gaynz as bigoted, oppressive etc. Hence it’s hard to see how they can consistently oppose barebacking. Of course they may believe that barebackers need to be informed of the dangers of the practice. Such things as the fact that their partner is likely to have had hundreds of previous ones, that there are dangers associated with anal sex etc. The problem is that Craig and Gaynz have decried claims like this as false, as scaremongering etc. So I guess the question we need to put to Craig is this. If people who engage in same sex behavior are typically not promiscuous but enjoy relationships as stable as their heterosexual counterparts. If homosexual sex is not dangerous and there is nothing wrong with any sexual activity between consenting adults. What’s wrong with bare backing?

Craig should stop being bigoted and be celebrating the sexual diversity that exists within his own community. The fact he is not celebrating shows that he cannot consistently live with the ideology he expounds.

[1] Augustine, On Lying, 9.
[2] Alan Donagan, “Moral Absolutism and the Double-Effect Exception: Reflections on Who Is Entitled to Double-Effect?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (1991): 498.

An interesting discussion of Islam has been occurring at Kiwiblog. Up until now I have merely chipped in to correct inaccurate claims about Christian beliefs and practices. However, for what its worth I’ll add my two cents worth here.

Here is what I think the issues are.

We are familiar with Christian teachings on the morality of violence. The just war theory of Augustine, Aquinas, Gratian, Vitoria, Calvin, Luther and Grotius have been pretty much codified into international law and things like the Geneva accords. They are now at least held up as the correct rules ( even if they are not always followed in practice) by liberal democratic societies. We are also familiar with various other ideas which come from Christianity the idea that individuals have inalienable rights which the state cannot transgress. Those non believers should be tolerated. That Government should be limited. That Church and state are separate institutions with degrees of autonomy from each other. That the state should be concerned with the temporal welfare of its citizens and not their welfare in the life to come. While it’s fashionable for people to attribute to these things to the enlightenment, in reality, much of this in is found in Medieval Theology and even in earlier writers like the Church fathers. The basic premises of course come from the scriptures.

Now when we confront Islam we confront (a) a religion we know less about (b) a religion which historically has threatened parts of Europe with invasion and hence has been feared and (c) whose high profile practitioners seem to have very different understandings of these things. Some of them appear to believe direct killing of non combatants is permissible and they seem to not respect the Geneva accords. They appear to have more absolute governments. Have clerics exercising vetoing legislation and they seem to threaten people with death if they don’t convert etc.

I guess the question is this: does this historically feared tradition have the same moral teachings about these things Christianity does? And if it does not what does that mean for religious tolerance? How far can a religion disagree with our current consensus on these types of questions before tolerance is no longer acceptable? And finally, if we tolerate it and large numbers of the population embrace this religion how will that change the cultural values and assumptions which our liberal institutions are based on?

I do not know the answers to these questions. but I think they need to be asked and debated. Not dismissed as Islamiphobia. I also think that the debate should be informed not a banding about of stereotypes and caricatures about either religion.

This latter point requires emphasis. If we see the discussion as it occurs today one side dregs up stereotypes of Muslims and attempts to quote the Koran out of context without examining the tradition, critical commentaries that responsible study of this document requires. Another side dregs up stereotypes of Christians and argues they are the *real* problem and predictably do the same thing. They argue that the scriptures support rape, torturing heretics we are told. Any debate on the question of religious tolerance which relies on slander, ignorance and prejudice towards religious minorities scares me. The alternative to tolerance is supression; which involves violence. If it comes to that then lets make sure we have been informed enough to make the right decision.

I would also add that these questions are not new. Medieval Theologians like Aquinas supported religious tolerance for Jews and Muslims but and not for Heretics. This is because he perceived heretics to threaten the institutions of society whereas other monotheistic minorities did not. Latter, John Locke suggested that religious dissenters (what Aquinas would have called Christian heretics) should be tolerated provided they did not challenge the moral values essential to a free and just society. Locke advocated suppressing Christian groups that taught contracts could not be kept with heretics because that would undermine the co-operation needed to maintain a free and just society. He also supported the suppression of atheists because he felt belief in a moral law giver was a necessary foundation for such a society. Some contemporary Gay rights advocates seem to believe we should not tolerate evangelical Christianity because opposing homosexual conduct inevitably incites violence. Or is opposed to certain understandings of equality which they think justice requires. Libertarians draw the line at aggression, because they believe freedom needs to be based on everyone refraining from the initiation of force.

The irony of this, of course, is that many of defenders of one position view the others as being opposed to tolerance. As though tolerance did not come in degrees. Everyone is for tolerance of some religions and no one to my knowledge tolerates all religions. Because we have conducted the debate in this manner few people have been able to ask the real question : How far should tolerance extend?

Aquinas's question is still with us. When does error in Theology become serious enough for the state to step in?

Texas is about to perform it’s 400th execution since capital punishment was reinstated in 1982. Stuff has an interesting article on this entitled “Religion, Culture Behind, Texas Execution Tally”

The article suggests that outsiders find it puzzling that evangelical Christians support capital punishment. This surprise, I suggest, reflects the theological and historical ignorance of these outsiders. Historically most Christian Theologians supported capital punishment as does mainstream historical Christian tradition. I suspect the reported puzzlement often comes from facile “if you oppose abortion you must oppose capital punishment” arguments which I have critiqued previously.

Like many media accounts of religion and morality the article resorts to caricature

Like his predecessor, Governor Perry is a devout Christian, highlighting one key
factor in Texas' enthusiasm for the death penalty that many outsiders find
puzzling – the support it gets from conservative evangelical churches.
This
is in line with their emphasis on individuals taking responsibility for their
own salvation, and they also find justification in sripture.
"A lot of
evangelical Protestants not only believe that capital punishment is permissible
but that it is demanded by God. And they see sanction for that in the Old
Testament especially," said Matthew Wilson, a political scientist at Southern
Methodist University in Dallas

A lot could be said here. First there is a subtle reductio ad bushium hinited at in the first line. Second, note that when the journalist wants to gain an understanding of the scriptural and theological justification evangelicals rely on to defend capital punishment he turns not to an evangelical ethicist who supports the death penalty but to a political scientist.

Third, what is said is questionable at best. In North America many evangelicals are Dispensationalists and hence do not consider Old Testament moral norms to be binding on believers and so would not appeal to the Old Testament. Their scriptural justification is drawn from the New Testament particularly Romans 13.

Third, contrary to what the article confidently asserts evangelicals do not believe people are responsible for their own salvation. Whether they are Arminians or a Calvinists evangelicals believe that salvation is given by grace. One cannot earn it through works and hence one is not responsible for it God is. What some Christian writers ( Kant and CS Lewis) have argued is that respect for human dignity requires that punishment be retributive as opposed to therapeutic or deterrent One is justified in depriving a criminal of his right to life or liberty by punishment only if he deserves it, he has by his own voluntary actions and done something he as a rational agent knows is wrong. To subject people to treatment without their consent or to punish one person for the future crimes of others is degrading. This argument may be mistaken. But the first step to refuting it is to actually understand it, not to attribute to evangelicals views they in fact reject.

Not content with stereotyping and caricature. The article goes on to repeats the objection that that capital punishment is applied in a racist manner the article states.

blacks more likely than whites to be condemned –…Over 41 per cent of the
inmates currently on death row in Texas are black, but they account for only
about 12 per cent of the state's population.

Now there are several problems here:

First, the while its true that blacks make up only 12 of the states population its also true that in the United states around 52% of all homicides are committed by Blacks. Hence the statistic provided is misleading at best and outright deceptive at worst. To asses wether capital punishment is applied in a discriminatory manner or not the issue is not the percentage of blacks executed relative to the number of blacks in society the issue is the percentage of blacks executed relative to the number who commit homicide.

Second, this whole argument has been exploded by Ernest Van Der Haag in the Harvard Law Review Association ( 1983)

Maldistribution of any punishment among those who deserves it is irrelevant to
its justice or morality. Even if poor or black convicts guilty of capital
offenses suffer capital punishment, and other convicts equally guilty of the
same crimes do not, a more equal distribution, however desirable, would merely
be more equal. It would not be more just to the convicts under sentence of
death.

Van Der Haag’s point is this: If capital punishment is just and those executed deserve to be executed then the fact that a disproportionate number of blacks are executed can not change this. To say otherwise is essentially to argue that because some people escape justice every one should.

On the other hand if capital punishment is unjust and those executed do not deserve to die then applying capital punishment equally would not be an improvement. This is like arguing that all people should be treated unfairly because some are. The appeal to unequal distribution then is a red herring; the question is whether capital punishment is just.

Of course none of this is surprising, to expect the media to accurately report the views of religious conservatives or actually give a competent treatment of a moral or ethical issue is asking to much. That might require getting people to actually hear reasoned theological dissent to the current liberal left orthodoxy.

The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. [1] [Emphasis added]

[T]he plain fact is that none of us is a complete civil libertarian. We all believe that there is some point at which the public authorities ought to step in to limit the “self-expression” of an individual or group even where this might be seriously intended as a form of artistic expression, and even where the artistic transaction is between consenting adults. A playwright or theatrical director might, in this crazy world of ours, find someone willing to commit suicide on stage, as called for by the script. We would not allow that-any more than we would permit scenes of real physical torture on the stage, even if the victim were a willing masochist. And I know of no one, no matter how free in spirit, who argues that we ought to permit gladiatorial contests in Yankee stadium, similar to those once performed in the Coliseum of Rome-even if only consenting adults were involved.[3]

Feinberg’s response contains the disturbing suggestion that a state-regulated version of Kristol’s gory spectacles would be acceptable to the liberal … so long as some analogue of the Marquis of Queensberry rules is enforced (no bludgeoning your opponent when he is down; no slashing below the belt; no disembowelling your opponent once he surrenders), commercial combat with lethal weapons should in principle be tolerated by a liberal society. Many would consider this a reductio of the liberal position.[8]

There could be a presumption that such a person doesn’t fully understand what he is doing, or is not fully free of neurotic influences on his choice, but these hypotheses are rebuttable in principle, and in some cases that we can easily imagine, only with minor difficulty and expense rebuttable in fact. The liberals second and third responses then are the more pertinent ones.[9]

We cannot hold an image of these wretches in our minds without recoiling, for each of them alone will seem threatening or dangerous, and thousands or millions of them together will be downright terrifying. … When the bloody maiming and slaughtering of a human being is considered so thrilling and enjoyable that thousands will pay dearly to witness it, it would seem to follow that thousands are already so brutalized that there is a clear and present danger that some innocent parties (identities now unknown) will suffer at their hands.[10][Emphasis original]

The effectiveness of Hitchens’ book is also undermined by the large number of errors it contains, many so glaring that they will be picked up by even a casual reader with some knowledge of history and theology. The Gnostic gospels are not of the “same period and provenance” as the canonical Gospels, but were written several decades later; the “synoptic” Gospels are not synonymous with the “canonical” Gospels; “Q” is an assumed source for the Gospels of Luke and Matthew, but not Mark and John; the process of deciding which books to include in the New Testament was not one in which “many a life was horribly lost;” “the Vulgate” was what the Reformers were trying to get away from, not what they were attempting to translate the Bible into; Luther declared “Here I stand, I can do no other” at Worms, not Wittenberg; John Adams was not a slaveholder, nor was T.

S. Eliot a Catholic; the amount of wood from relics of the True Cross would not be sufficient if gathered together to recreate the Cross, much less create a “thousand – foot cross;” Christians have never practiced animal sacrifice, nor did the Arian heresy teach that the Father and the Son were “two incarnations of the same person;” the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption were promulgated in 1854 and 1950, not 1852 and 1951; the Lateran Treaty was signed seven years after Mussolini marched on Rome, not after he “had barely seized power;” Maryland never prohibited Protestants from holding office, and condoms are not a “necessary” condition for preventing the transmission of AIDS, or else celibates would all be infected. Given all these errors (and many more), there is no reason to accept anything Hitchens writes on his own authority, and he offers no authority other than his own for most of what he writes.

I am so sick of listening to everyone's two cents of the causes of violence in our families, in our communities, sick of it because they are complicating the simple and putting band aids on broken legs.

Responsibility for ones actions - that is what is missing in this 'whats the cause of violence' blather. Its not your skin colour, your culture, your colonisation, your government benefit - its your decision to put your fist in someone elses face that is the problem. Violence is a choice. People need to stop making excuses.

All this talk of the root cause of violence is a crock. If violence has a cause, if it is some disease then actions are not free. No matter how crappy you feel, no matter how broke you are, how colonised you might be, no matter what your skin colour, no one makes you pick up your fist, you decide to do that.

Plenty of poor, colonised, maoris on benefits do NOT beat their kids and plenty of rich, liberated, employed europeans do. The fact that there is more in one racial group than another is irrelevant. The demarcation lines need to be drawn down ethical lines and not skin colour or income type.

Some people choose to beat their kids, other people wouldn't dream of it no matter what - its a lack of character, a lack of responsibility, a lack of desire or inclination to do the right thing, to be the kind of parent that they know they should be.

I don't think many people who physically hurt the people they love actually think what they are doing is right, I would think most would know that it wasn't even if they deceive themselves at times, but they just don't care about doing the right thing enough to stop, seek help or control themselves.

The solution to this problem is that people need to develop character. They need to commit to doing the right thing and to expressing censure on those who do not. Our government and our society has privatised morality and then fails to hold people properly to account - if everyone who beats a child to death was executed, if every parent found guilty law for beating their child had every one of their children taken off them and were thrown in jail for life, if people got that we took this seriously, that we expect a higher standard and that we value children it might start making a dent.

Madeleine

In a previous post I criticised an argument made by Paul Litterick for the conclusion that theological arguments should not affect public policy. Paul has responded saying that this post consisted of a “lengthy misrepresentation of [his] views”

Now I do not wish to caricature anyone’s views. I would rather refute Paul's actual arguments than ones he did not make. That way I have actually refuted them. So let’s look again at what Paul stated. The statement to which I was responding is the following:

“The only way it [theological moral arguments] matters to me is in the public
political sphere. I am more of a secularist than anything else, I just think
these sorts of arguments shouldn’t be effecting the vast majority of people who
don’t share them and there is always a difficulty with arguments that are put
over as being matters of faith, or matters of, say Christian Heritage of the
nation and so and therefore we must do these things that they will take
precedence over the views and the freedoms of everybody else”

Here, Paul appears to express two concerns about theological arguments in the “public political sphere” (i) laws enacted on the basis of such arguments will take precedence override everyone else’s freedom and (ii) the majority affected by these laws do not share the beliefs to which the arguments appeal.

Now that sounds very much like the objection is that laws enacted on the basis of theological premises will restrict the freedom of the majority who do not accept these premises. Certainly it’s a reasonable construal of Paul’s claims. And, as I pointed out in my previous post, this objection is problematic. Laws based on secular ethical theories also restrict people’s freedom and most people affected do not hold to the theories in question. Hence if this argument were sound it would exclude almost all philosophies from public discourse wether they were secular or religious.

Nether the less, I accept that that may not be what Paul really meant. He has generously clarified his position. His view is rather that “a secular society is the best means of guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of all, regardless of their differing beliefs.”


That is an interesting thesis. Unfortunately Paul only states it and provides no argument for it. That of course is not Paul’s fault he can hardly be expected to lay down all his reasons in a short comments section. But, it is also true that, in the absence of any argument, those who do not already hold this belief have no reason at all to accept it.

It also seems to me that there is an ambiguity in Paul’s claim. One problem is that the truth of his thesis depends on what one considers to be “the rights and freedoms of all” another is that there are various different models of a secular society.

Some examples will illustrate this. Take the model of a secular society proposed by Ayn Rand. It’s clear that on certain libertarian understandings of “the rights and freedoms of all” this model of a secular society will guarantee these rights and freedoms better than one which follows the premises and arguments proposed by religious conservatives. On the other hand, on the same understanding of “the rights and freedoms of all” listening to religious conservatives will guarantee our rights and freedoms much better than listening to the secularism of Karl Marx, or Chairman Mao.

A further and related problem is that any attempt to compare the beneficent and malevolent effects of religion will depend in part on ones secular or religious philosophy in the first place. If the rights and freedoms of all includes a right to life, and fetuses posses this right, listening to religious conservatives will greatly decrease the abuse of human rights in this country. On the other hand if a woman has a right to an abortion, then it will not. However, it is not unlikely that some secularists and theologians may differ on the moral status of feticide or numerous, other substantive moral questions that affect the conclusion.

It seems trivial to say that a Marxist society will guarantee rights and freedoms as understood by a Marxist and that a theologically conservative society will better embody the ideals of religious conservatives. It would also be question begging to exclude religious premises from the arguments from which one derives an account of rights and freedoms if this account is to be used in a premise for the conclusion that such arguments should be excluded from public policy debates.

To substantiate Paul’s thesis what is needed is some: (a) account of the freedoms and rights of all (b) some non question begging argument as to why this account is correct as opposed to its rivals (c) some argument as to why secular philosophies always guarentee these rights and freedoms as opposed to religious ones. I am sceptical such an argument can be made. Of course I could change my mind if a compelling argument is forthcoming, but I am not holding my breath.

I received the following last night:

Dear Matthew

Thank you telling your readers you apologised for not
seeking my side of the story with regard to the Visiting Associate
Professor imbroglio. I appreciate your honesty there.

However, I
was dismayed to read a new litany of innuendo about this. I am depressed that
you should spend so much time on ad hominem attacks. Surely we can communicate
in a more civil way?

Having read your accusations I am not even
sure what crime I am supposed to have committed this time. I am a philosopher in
the same way you are. Your PhD is in theology, is it not? We are both
philosophers in the sense of being interested in how the world works and
seeking coherent answers. I have never made any other
claim.

I recognise fully that the Visiting Associate
title was entirely honorary, and have never used it inappropriately. I have
mentioned it on my CV and in publications written during the timespan of the
Visiting Professorship. All this is perfectly normal use of a title like that. I
have certainly never described myself as a Professor, let alone a Professor of
Philosophy in the formal sense. And once the lifespan of the position expired, I
stopped using it. Where is the crime in any of
this?

The way you spun the
story allowed some of your readers (hiding behind pseudonyms) to jump to their
own conclusions and decide beyond reasonable doubt as to my
dishonesty.

I'm not making any specific request of
you beyond asking that this ad hominem campaign come to a close. Please,
let us converse, and contest ideas if it comes to that. But this muck-raking is
a waste of our time and does your cause little credit. We may not agree on how
the world works, but that does not mean we have to dispute in an
uncivil manner, does it?

If you want to add this letter to
your blog, feel free.

Yours sincerely

Bill
Cooke

I need to thank Dr Cooke for his civil and conciliatory tone in sending this. I will make only a couple of comments about this.

First a clarification, Cooke notes that my PhD was in Theology that’s correct. As I note in my profile my area of specialisation within Theology is ethics and philosophical theology. These subjects are subfields of both Philosophy and Theology and hence areas where the two disciplines overlap. In this respect I am like a law lecturer who works in the area of philosophy of law, or a physicist who works in philosophy of science. Moreover, my master’s degree was in Philosophy and I have taught philosophy at both Waikato and Otago University and my PhD thesis was on a Philosophical topic and examined by Philosophers.

This aside however, I agree with Cooke that dialogue between evangelical theologians (like myself) and Humanists (like him) should be civil and not a series of ad hominem arguments and muck raking. The reason I posted on the whole “professorship issue” was because I perceived the debate was not being conducted in this way. A few years ago NZARH published a newsletter, which was circulated in the media, this letter stated following “We will pass over Flanagan's rather odd notion of the 'law of nature;' he is, after all, a PhD candidate in Theology, not a real subject like Law or Biology". This was an unprovoked attack upon my academic credentials. NZARH also published attacks on Bernie Oligvy because he used the term Dr and yet only had an honorary doctorate and NZARH attacked Maxim because one of its members engaged in plagiarism. I could cite other examples.

The point I wanted to make regarding these comments was that if this line of argument is valid (which it is not) then Cooke's claim to being a professor and Litterick’s continual reliance on the research of Craig Young provide an argument for rejecting the position of NZARH. I was reluctant to post any more on this question and only did so because one of Cooke’s supporters stated I was “a cheap blogist who has disinterest in nor sought counter argument in defence of cheap accusations that fact would spoil his pitch” when I did not respond to Cooke’s counter argument .

Cooke however clarifies his position, he is a religious historian with an interest in the philosophical debate regarding religion and he has received an honorary professorship and never been on faculty. Moreover, he like I, is committed to civil dialogue and is interested in discussing issues of philosophy and religion. In light of this I will take up his offer and post no more on the issue of his professorship. I hope that under Cooke’s guidance NZARH will lay off similar attacks against me and other Christians . I look forward to dialogue with NZARH on these more civil terms in the future.

Paul Litterick was recently interviewed by Russell Brown on Public Address. The topic predictably is his criticism of conservative Christian groups whom Russell appears to have no time for. Here I will make to criticisms of this broadcast, first one of Russell Brown and the second of Litterick.

Turning first to Russell Brown; Brown mentioned in detail the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanist's (NZARH) exposure of Bruce Logan’s plagiarism, elaborated how this damaged Maxim’s credibility and meant they had little media respectability as a result. It was also stressed on the show that this incident showed that they were a bogus think tank.

However, Brown seemed almost silent about NZARH’s own apparent deception that both Litterick and I have discussed. Yet it is clear from what Brown does say that he does know about it but he omits to mention it - even in contexts where it is relevant.

For example, Brown mentions that there was an interesting story about Littericks falling out with NZARH but will not go into the details and he queried why Litterick even made the issues of the falling out public but he never ventures to state what they were.

There seems to me to be a clear double standard here. NZARH make media comment about religion and public issues, so do Maxim. If Logan’s deception is newsworthy and calls into question Maxim’s media credibility then why is this not equally true of NZARH?

Moreover, if Brown feels it is acceptable to make Logan’s alleged plagiarism public, which he does on his show, why then does he query the appropriateness of bringing up NZARH’s actions on air? Is privacy something that applies only to secularists perhaps?

Turning now to Litterick; Litterick states he has no issue with private faith but is opposed to religious values guiding public policy. This is because he is concerned that the views of one group of society (those with a religious faith) are being used to restrict the freedoms of everyone else in society, many of who do not accept the religious beliefs in question and may in fact openly reject them.

Now this is a common line of argument. However, despite its pervasiveness, this argument is erroneous. In the literature on Religion and Public Life Christian Philosophers like Nicholas Wolterstorff, Christopher Eblerle and Philip Quinn have published cogent rebuttals of it. Here I can summarise the issues.

The main problem with this criticism of using religious beliefs to guide public policy is that exactly the same thing can be said about secular, non-theological beliefs. Beliefs that Litterick and Brown hold to and would advocate public policy changes on the basis of. Phillip Quinn articulates this point,

... if the fact that religious reasons can not be shared by all in a religiously
pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for
advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in
fairness also be excluded on the same grounds.[1]

Quinn notes correctly that secular moral theories such as Utilitarianism or Kantianism, Intuitionism, Socialism, Libertarianism, can all be reasonably rejected in a philosophically-pluralistic society.

Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory,
including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the
grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a
pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can
be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic
democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours
very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified, a conclusion
that would, I suspect, be welcome only to anarchists.[2]

Quinn is substantially correct here. There is special pleading going on whereby theological beliefs are rejected on certain grounds while secular ones are not, even though the same grounds and reasons should lead to their rejection as well. If it’s unjust to restrict a person's freedom on the basis of beliefs held by only some members of the community and which are rejected by others then all laws are unjust.

It could be added that such arguments are frequently incoherent. After all, such beliefs propose a moral viewpoint that many reject, the view that theological beliefs are not to be appealed to in public. Given that many reject this view, some people think that they should be appealed to in public, it should not be appealed to in public debate about policy. Moreover, since this position is generally defended by appeals to normative principles about freedom or pluralism or conceptions of equality that many reject, many of the arguments for this conclusion should not be utilised in public debate either.

Perhaps, however, I am being uncharitable here, perhaps what Litterick means to assert is not that the religious beliefs can be reasonably rejected by some people - that would, as I note above, lead to anarchism - rather, his point is that a majority of people reject them. This too, however, is problematic.

Implicit in this argument is the claim that a necessary condition for any principle to be utilised in public debate is that the majority accepts it as true. However, this is subject to numerous counter-examples. Consider a culture where the majority believes that a husband has the right to beat his wife. Would an advocate of majoritarianism contend that in such a society criticism by a feminist minority of this practice and the advocacy of norms forbidding spousal abuse is an unacceptable imposition of a narrow, feminist perspective in a pluralistic society? Would it be true that in such a society public policy could not be based on the moral principle that it is wrong for a man to beat his wife?

Consider an Islamic society where the majority believe that conversion to a rival, trinitarian monotheistic religion is immoral and should be a capital offence. Not to execute converts to Judaism or Christianity in such a society would, by this reasoning, be unjust. In societies where a racial majority thinks a racial minority is sub-human, it would be unjust to grant equal human rights.

There is a further objection to this argument. Many normative positions that are currently supported by the majority or a wide section of the populace were once minority views. Over time, however, the minority has persuaded others and or converted them to its cause. If “narrow” views are to be excluded, this type of reform is not possible. A minority would never be able to propose its ideas until it was no longer a minority view. However, it cannot cease to be a minority view unless it is proposed in the first place. Consequently, this stance freezes societies in whatever popular prejudices currently exist. The reforming minority that critiques contemporary culture would be effectively silenced if we were to hold that only the views of the majority are the just ones.

So in sum: It seems to be that Russell Brown is inconsistent in his treatment of the issue and Litterick uses common but erroneous and, I think, discredited arguments to justify his secularist stance.




[1] Phillip Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. Paul Weithman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 144.

[2] Ibid.

[1] Beverly Wildung Harrison, Our Right to Choose: Toward a New Ethic of Abortion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 35.
[2] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 35.
[3] In this discussion of formal and implicit contradictions I am influenced by Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1974) 14-16.
[4] This argument was suggested to me in private correspondence.

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As a person who studies theology and philosophy I have, over the years, read some brilliant skeptics; John Mackie and Paul Draper come to mind. I also have become reasonably informed about the debate over theism in the literature. Consquently, I have a good idea when the issues are being caricatured.

Unfortunately rebuttal of a theological position by caricature is all too common in New Zealand. A good example is the blog no god zone this claims to be a site devoted to critiquing theism. However, after briefly examining the site, there appeared to be no discussion of the arguments of Plantinga, Swinburne, Craig, Alston, Van Inwagen or any other representative proponents of theism. Instead what exists is mostly caricature and what’s worse the caricatures are usually responded to not by robust counter argument but by vitriolic abuse.

A good example of this is an attack on my wife, and fellow MnM blogger, Madeleine. Here is what the blogger godlesszone writes:

A Madeleine Flannagan repeats the same rot saying “Hell Pizza will never again
see a cent of my family’s money for their utter disregard of parental rights.”
Again the Christianists seem to think that there is a right which controls the
actions of others to prevent anything they find offensive. I’m sure people find
this woman offensive so would her waddling down the street violate the “parental
rights” of others? Of course not. Once again this moron has no idea as to what
it means to have a right.

Note godlesszone's argument here; he quotes a portion of what Madeleine said on a forum and then asserts, on the basis of this quote, that Madeleine believes there is a parental right to not be offended. He then offers an insulting counter example to the existence of this right, calls her a moron and then concludes that Madeleine, therefore, does not know what a right is.

Now even if Madeleine believed that there was a right to not be offended, this would not show she does not know what rights are, merely that she mistakenly believes in one that does not exist.

Moreover, even if Madeleine did not know what a right is that would not make her a moron. There is vigorous debate about the nature of rights and what exactly they are, if they exist, in contemporary philosophical literature. Many intelligent people disagree on this issue. Hence we have two clear non-sequiturs in this argument.

It is worth noting that this non-sequitur attacks a straw man, because nowhere did Madeleine claim that there is a right to not be offended. If one turns to the quote (to which godlesszone actually links). You will see what Madeleine actually said is in its entirety:

No one has the right to tell me how to educate my kids. Not the state, family
planning and not the local pizza company. I am not catholic, I am speaking as a
parent. Hell Pizza will never again see a cent of my family's money for their
utter disregard of parental rights. We used to buy their pizza, we never will
again. I encourage every person who believes in parental rights to boycott Hell
Pizza. We have a big enough Nanny State in New Zealand without them adding to
it. My kids reckon Pizza Hut tastes better than Hell Pizza anyway.

Nowhere in this citation does Madeleine claim that there is a right to not be offended. What Madeleine claims is that there is a parental right to educate ones children. Hell Pizza had attempted to educate people’s children’s about sex and contraception without parental consent. That was the basis of her complaint, a simple reading of what she actually wrote makes this clear. Now of course Madeleine was not claiming here that the state can never step in. In cases where there is clear evidence of abuse the state has a right and a duty to step in but nothing like that was involved in this situation being discussed.

Two things are worth noting here, first godlesszone is a Libertarian and hence actually believes in a parental right to educate ones children, in fact he probably holds to a stronger conception of parental right to educate one's children than Madeleine does. Hence nothing she actually said about the existence of such a right would be objectionable to him.

Second, by linking to this quote and citing it godlesszone shows he had in fact read this quote and hence knew what Madeleine actually said. And by snipping out the first few sentences, and asserting she was referring a parental right to not be offended, godlesszone deliberately attributes to Madeleine a thesis that he knows she did not assert.

So here the blogger at no god zone sees a person appeal to a principle he actually agrees with. However, because he dislikes the persons religion he lies about what they said, makes up something else and then ridicules them for making this made up claim, and finally make fallacious jumps to accuse them of ignorance of basic concepts in ethics.

I suspect that no god zone is not actually interested in rational critique. All we have is hatred of Christians, a hatred that burns to such an extent that simple basic prima facie moral obligations such as don’t lie about other people and don’t insult other people are considered not to apply when dealing with them.

There is an irony here the author of no god zone was until fairly recently a writer for a respected internet news outlet which claims to stand for tolerance. He also is a contributor to a liberal institute which proposes tolerance as one of its core values. Unfortunately this sort of thing is becoming far too common. We see the banner of tolerance and reason used as a vehicle by which to promote irrational intolerance of Christianity. Orwell parodied a world which stated “War is Peace” today, perhaps, the parody should be “irrational bigotry is tolerance”.