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Wednesday, 31 October 2007

The Euthyphro Objection II: Arbitrariness

In his work Practical Ethics Singer proposes a version of the Euthyphro dilemma to criticise Voluntarist (a Divine command theory) views of ethics

Some theists say that ethics cannot do without religion because the very meaning
of “good” is nothing other than “what God approves”. Plato refuted a similar
view more than two thousand years ago by arguing that if the gods approve of
some actions it must be because those actions are good, in which case it cannot
be the gods’ approval that makes them good. The alternative view makes God’s
approval entirely arbitrary: if the gods had happened to approve of torture and
disapprove of helping our neighbours, torture would be good and helping our
neighbours bad.[i]

In my previous post pointed out that his version of the Euthyphro argument relies upon a straw man. Voluntarism is not typically proposed as a theory about what is good but is usually restricted to deontic properties such as right and wrong. Its worth noting however that, this fact is not fatal to Singer’s position; it is possible to develop analogies to the Euthyphro that do not rely on this straw man. James Rachels is an example In The Elements of Moral Philosophy James Rachel’s suggests that an action is right either because God commands it or he commands it because it is right. He then offers the same arguments Singer does to suggest that only by embracing the second horn of the dilemma which amounts to giving up Voluntarism, can one escape absurdity.[ii]

The key argument Singer raises against Voluntarism is, “if the gods had happened to approve of torture and disapprove of helping our neighbours, torture would be good and helping our neighbours bad”.[iii] Singer couches this objection in terms of goodness and badness but the same objection can be raised with regards to claims that Gods commands constitutes what is right and wrong. Rachels for example states that Voluntrism “leads to trouble” because “it represents Gods commands as arbitrary. It means God could have given different commands just as easily. He could have commanded us to be liars, and then lying, not truthfulness would be right”[iv]

The objection is that Voluntarism entails a certain, counter-factual conditional; to use Singer’s example, if God commanded torture then torture would not be wrong. While Singer does not state that this conditional is false, he appears to take it for granted that it is. After all, if the conditional were true then the fact that Voluntarism entails it would not constitute an objection to Voluntarism. Unfortunately, Singer provides no reason for thinking this conditional is false. He appears to think that it is obvious.

Phillip Quinn has given reasons for questioning this assumption. Quinn notes that a counter-factual conditional such as ‘If God commands torture then torture is not wrong’ is false only if the antecedent is true and the consequent false.[v] In other words, the conditional is only false in a situation where God in fact does command torture and torture in that situation is wrong. In order for Singer’s objection to be sound there needs to be a logically-possible situation in which God does offer the command in question and the action he commands is wrong. Is such a scenario logically possible?

It is doubtful it is. God is perfectly and maximally good. Hence, the first premise is true only if a perfectly-good being would command an action such as the torture of children. This is unlikely. The claim that a perfectly-good being would command something morally abhorrent is on the face of it incoherent. Hence, it is unlikely that such a situation is possible.

A former teacher of mine, Mane Hajdin, suggested to me that this assertion is too hasty a few years ago he offered me the following criticism.

[I]t is assumed that being good involves being loving, forgiving, etc, in all
possible worlds. But why should we assume that? Why aren’t there worlds in which
being good involves being cruel, ruthless, etc? To simply assume that, in this
context, may leave the impression of begging the question

Roy Perett suggested to me that that there are possible states of affairs where the contingent and factual structure of the world would be so different that what we take as paradigms of virtue in fact are not. In such a world, torture may be conducive to human flourishing or be, in fact, a virtuous activity.There may be something to this response. The problem with this response is that it still fails to provide reasons for thinking that the above-mentioned conditional is false. In order for this conditional to be false it must be logically possible not just for God to command an action but for that action to be wrong in the given situation. Perett and Hajdin provide us reasons for thinking that it is possible for a perfectly-good being to command actions such as torture or creulty. However, the situations envisaged are ones in which torture is not, in fact, wrong. In the situation Perett envisages, torture is, in fact, virtuous and in Hajdin’s torture is good. In such examples it is the virtuous nature of torture that makes it plausible to assume that a perfectly-good being could command it.

It remains doubtful whether a logically-possible situation in which God commands an action and that action is wrong could exist. This is because a perfectly-good being would not command wrongdoing. To the extent that we think a perfectly-good being could command a particular action, we have reasons for thinking the action permissible. On the other hand, to the extent that we think it is impossible for the action to be wrong we find it impossible to envisage how a perfectly-good being could command it.


[i] Singer, Practical Ethics, 3.
[ii] James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) 42.
[iii] Singer, Practical Ethics, 3.
[iv] Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 42
[v] Phillip Quinn, “Divine Command Theory,” in Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. H Lafollette (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 70.

Sunday, 28 October 2007

The Euthyphro Dilemma Against Divine Commands I: Avoiding Strawmen

Perhaps the most common argument against an appeal to divine commands in ethical reasoning is the Euthyphro dilemma, first articulated by Plato and utilised by numerous critics of divine commands ever since. A representative example of this line of argument occurs in Peter Singer’s widely-acclaimed monograph Practical Ethics. In the first chapter of Practical Ethics Singer offers the following argument.

[E]thics is not something intelligible only in the context of religion. I shall treat ethics entirely independent of religion.

Some theists say that ethics cannot do without religion because the very meaning of “good” is nothing other than “what God approves”. Plato refuted a similar view more than two thousand years ago by arguing that if the gods approve of some actions it
must be because those actions are good, in which case it cannot be the gods’ approval that makes them good. The alternative view makes God’s approval entirely arbitrary: if the gods had happened to approve of torture and disapprove of helping our neighbours, torture would be good and helping our neighbours bad.[i]


Several features of this critique are noteworthy. Singer attacks a position known in the literature as Voluntarism (also called the divine command theory of ethics) that he construes as the view that “the very meaning of “good” is nothing other than “what God approves.” He bases this on the testimony of “some theists”. Singer’s argument here consists of three stages. He proposes the famous dilemma proposed by Socrates in Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro. He then claims that Voluntarism makes God’s commands arbitrary. He asserts that acceptance of Voluntarism entails that paradigmatically-evil actions such as torture could be good. He concludes that Voluntarism makes God’s goodness redundant,

Some modern theists have attempted to extricate themselves from this type of dilemma by maintaining that God is good and so could not possibly approve of torture; but these theists are caught in a trap of their own making, for what can they possibly mean by the assertion that God is good? That God is approved by God?[ii]

In the next few post I will respond to the Euthyphro dillemia, In this post I will comment upon Singer’s description of his opponents’ position and suggest it is a straw man. In the next few posts I will asses the arguments he proposes and argue they are unsuccessful. Contrary to what is commonly asserted in ethics textbooks and first year philosophy lectures, I do not think the Euthyphro dillemia is sound


As I stated above, Singer’s argument is an attack upon a position known in the literature as ‘Voluntarism’. Schneewind notes that in the late Middle Ages two schools emerged as to the relationship between God and the existence of an objective law. The first and older position is known as Intellectualism. In this view, God does not create morality; rather, God’s will is guided by his intellectual knowledge of eternal moral standards. The second position is Voluntarism. Voluntarism grounded the moral law not so much in God’s intellect but in his will. God himself creates the moral law.[iii]

It is worth noting at this juncture that Voluntarism is only one possible way of construing the nature of divine law and since Singer only offers an argument against this position, even if his argument is sound it fails to establish that the idea of divine law is problematic. Nevertheless, even as a critique of Voluntarism the argument appears to attack a straw man.

Singer construes Voluntarism as claiming “the very meaning of ‘good’ is nothing other than ‘what God approves.’” It appears then that Singer characterises Voluntarism as a theory about the meaning of the evaluative term “good”; however, this is a caricature of Voluntarism.

Few, if any, notable defenders of Voluntarism propose it as a theory about the meaning of the term ‘good’. This is demonstrated by examining the literature of those contemporary theists who do defend versions of Voluntarism. A notable, contemporary defender of Voluntarism is Robert Adams. In Divine Command Ethics Modified Again and later in his monograph Finite and Infinite Good, Adams puts forward the view that “ethical wrongness is (i.e., is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God”.[iv] [Emphasis original]

Note two things here; firstly, Adams does not offer a theory about ‘the good’ but explicitly limits his theory to deontological properties such as wrongness. Secondly, his theory is not about the meaning of terms; rather it is a metaphysical claim about identity.

This last distinction is important. Contemporary philosophy of language offers several examples of this distinction between two terms having the same meaning and two things being identical. One of the most famous is the relationship between water and H20. Water is H20. This is a claim of identity. The liquid on earth that we call water is hydrogen hydroxide. However, this is not a claim of meaning. The claim that water is H20 is not an analytic truth that is true in virtue of the meaning of the words, rather it is a claim discovered by empirical investigation. Moreover, a competent language user could refer to water and understand the meaning of this term without needing to know about the atomic structure H20. Similar examples are available with such claims as ‘the morning star is the evening star’ or ‘Superman is Clark Kent.’ In each case, we have a statement of identity that is distinct from the claim that two words have the same meaning. Adams then explicitly denies he is proposing the position Singer attributes to modern theists.

Similar things can be said about the other major defenders of Voluntarism. William Alston holds that divine commands are constitutive of deontological properties and notes Adam’s identity claim as a paradigm of the type of relationship he is defending.[v]

Philip Quinn defends a version of Voluntarism that is limited to the deontological status of actions.
In speaking of the deontological status of an action, I mean to refer to whether it has such properties as being morally permitted, being morally forbidden or prohibited, and being morally obligatory or required.[vi]
Quinn argues that God’s commands cause or bring about these properties. He specifically denies that he is offering a theory of ‘the good’ in general or that the relationship between God’s commands and moral properties is one of meaning. In fact, he argues against such a view.[vii]

Edward Weirenga defends a similar theory proposing that divine commands are those properties of actions that make them possess deontic properties such as right and wrong. He does not affirm that the word ‘good’ means commanded by God.[viii] Similarly, John Hare argues, “that what makes something obligatory for us is that God commands it”.[ix]

This is not just true of contemporary defenders of Voluntarism. In a survey of the historical literature, Janine Marie Idziak notes that, historically, Voluntarism was usually understood as a theory about what makes actions right and wrong and not a theory about the meaning of moral terms.[x] Moreover, historically, Voluntarists such as Locke[xi] and Puffendorf limited it to deontological properties and not to broader axiological properties such as goodness.

Robert Adams did defend a semantic theory in some of his earlier writings but, as noted, he later rejected his theory in favour of the one I sketched above. Moreover, the semantic theory Adams did initially defend bears little resemblance to the interpretation of Voluntarism made by Singer. Adams explicitly asserted that his theory was limited to analysing the meaning of the word wrong and not broader notions such as goodness. Moreover, it was limited to an analysis of what the word means in Judeo-Christian discourse not what the word meant in general.[xii]

It is difficult then to ascertain to whom exactly Singer is referring when he states “Some theists” hold this view and he fails to provide any citations as to whom he is referring. He appears to attack a straw man that has little resemblance to the theory as it has usually been articulated and defended in both historical and contemporary literature.

Not only does Singer attack a straw man but attention to the arguments he uses reveals that in the very next sentence he changes his interpretation from a theory of meaning to a dependence or causal theory. Immediately after stating, “the very meaning of “good” [is nothing other than] what God approves”, Singer follows Plato in suggesting that either something is good because God approves of it or God approves of it because it is good.[xiii] However, this presupposes that the relationship between divine approval and goodness is some kind of asymmetrical relationship where one entity in the relationship is temporally or ontologically prior to the other.

If, as Singer maintains, Voluntarism is the claim that “the very meaning of ‘good’ is nothing other than ‘what God approves’,” then the relationship between divine approval and goodness is not an asymmetrical relationship but rather a relationship of meaning so this dilemma simply does not apply.

Consider the following example. A person tells you that a bachelor is an unmarried man because the word bachelor means unmarried man. It would not make sense to respond to this claim ‘yes, but is he a bachelor because he is unmarried or is he unmarried because he is a bachelor?’ A person’s unmarried-ness is not prior to or the cause of his bachelorhood nor is his bachelorhood the cause of his being unmarried. His being unmarried is just a different way of referring to his bachelorhood. The relationship between a bachelor and an unmarried man is not causal; the relationship is one of meaning.

Immediately after stating that Voluntarism is a theory about the meaning of terms, Singer offers an objection that presupposes it is not a semantic theory but a causal one. However, only a few lines later he offers the following objection to Voluntarism “what can they [theists] possibly mean by the assertion that God is good? That God is approved by God?”[xiv] Here Singer’s objection relies on the claim that good means approved by God in order to generate the trap he refers to. Not only does Singer attack a straw man but also his target appears to change throughout the discussion. In fact, it appears to change in order to fit the objections raised.

[i] Singer,Practical Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3.
[ii] Ibid., 3-4.
[iii] Jerome Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8-9.
[iv] Robert Adams, “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979): 76.
[v] William Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 303-304.
[vi] Phillip Quinn, “An Argument for Divine Command Theory,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 291.
[vii] Ibid., 293.
[viii] Edward Weirenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 215-27. See also “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory,” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984): 311-318 and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory,” Nous 17 (1983): 387-408.
[ix] John Hare, God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands and Human Autonomy, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 49.
[x] Janine Maree Idziak, “In Search of Good Positive Reasons for an Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of Arguments,” Faith and Philosophy 6:1 (1989): 60.
[xi] For a defence of the claim that Locke was a voluntarist see Francis Oakley & Elliot W. Urdang, “Locke, Natural Law and God,” Natural Law Forum, 11 (1966): 92-109.
[xii] Robert Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness” In Divine Commands and Morality, ed. Paul Helm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 83-108.
[xiii] Singer, Practical Ethics, 4.
[xiv] Ibid., 3-4.
[xv] Ibid.
[xvi] Ibid., 40.

Thursday, 25 October 2007

Abortion and Capital Punishment and Craig Young

An acquaintance of mine sent me a copy of this article at Gaynz.com by Craig Young. Craig and I have a kind of knack at studying the very same topics at the same time. He wrote a PhD thesis criticising conservative Christian views on abortion around the same time I started writing my PhD thesis defending such views. With this article the timing is somewhat uncanny. One of the main burdens of Craig’s article is to argue for the conclusion that it is not inconsistent to both oppose capital punishment and support abortion "rights". Craig bases this conclusion on the contention that fetuses are not human because they lack sentience. Intriguingly I have just submitted an article for publication rebutting the claim that fetuses are not human until sentient and I have just had word that another article, where I discuss the relationship between feticide and capital punishment, has been accepted for publication. Since Craig has put his thoughts on these issues before the public, I will respond to them here.

Before getting to the nitty gritty is worth noting the deceptive slips in Craig’s post. Craig writes:

Amnesty International opposes torture, harassment organised homophobic violence and the death penalty when performed on the basis of homosexuality. Saudi Arabia demonstrates the complexity of the issue, with formal sharia law but co-existing cruising grounds and private indulgence of what is legally forbidden. However, Nigeria, Sudan, Iran, and Iraq's Mahdi Army all penalise male homosexuality, while Iran also mandates capital punishment for persistent lesbianism, Hezbollah and Hamas also believe that their version of fundamentalist Islamism, whether Shia or Sunni, has no place for homosexuality. They base this on their arguable interpretation of the Qu'ran and particular traditions of interpretation of attributed sayings of the Prophet Muhammed, although the Hanafi school of interpretation is more liberal than others….

Surely no-one could object to the above, especially given that the Christian Heritage Party, which alone supported reintroduction of the death penalty in New Zealand, died after Capillgate in 2005.

Now a couple of things to note here. Craig states that Amnesty opposes capital punishment when "performed on the basis of homosexuality." He then insinuates that only the Christian Heritage Party opposed Amnesty's stance because it supported the reintroduction of capital punishment.

This is deceptive. As Craig knows, Amnesty does not just oppose capital punishment for homosexuality, it opposes it for any crime including murder. It is this aspect of Amnesty that the Christian Heritage Party opposed. As Craig knows, the Christian Heritage Party did not support the death penalty for homosexuality, it supported it only for pre-meditated murder when there were multiple eyewitnesses. Craig is trying to conflate support for Capital Punishment per se with support for executing Gays.

Craig also seems to think that because some countries execute homosexuals it follows that people should support the abolition of the death penalty for any crime. This is a very weak argument. After all,many countries imprison homosexuals so an analogous line of argument would suggest that Craig should oppose imprisonment for any crime yet strangely he advocates imprisonment for murder later on in his article. This demonstrates Craig is quite capable of drawing distinctions between the morality of a practice and the morality of a specific application of the practice.

It is also a weak argument to suggest that because an organisation like Amnesty supports some worthy causes, such as opposition to torture, it follows it should not be subject to criticism for other causes it supports, such as abortion rights. If abortion is homicide then for every person saved by Amnesty thousands, if not millions, are killed with its tacit support.

However, what I really want to comment on is Craig’s argument for the consistency of a pro-abortion stance with an anti-death penalty stance. Craig writes:

However, the Christian Right has piped up with references to embryos and fetuses. There's a vast difference between pre-sentient potential humans and actual, flesh and blood biographical human subjects, not that that troubled Right to Life New Zealand throughout the nineties when it had Graham Capill as one of its patrons, or when Voice for Life Vice-Presidnet Annetta Moran stood on the same Christian Coalition party list as Capill in 1996. And as Amnesty International is a pluralist organisation, why should it support an essentially religious campaign against women's reproductive freedom, in any case?
Now several things are worth noting here; Craig’s key claim is that, unlike capital punishment, abortion does not kill an actual human being. This is because fetuses (up till around 28 weeks) are not sentient and hence not "biographical subjects." There is a serious problem with this argument. It presupposes that a being must be a "biographical subject" to be a human being.

Now while it is true that prior to sentience fetuses are not such subjects, neither are they such subjects for some time after sentience. In fact, for some time after birth infants are not "biographical subjects" either. This point was vigorously demonstrated by Michael Tooley in his monograph Abortion and Infanticide. Sentience is a necessary condition for being a "biographical subject" but it is not a sufficient condition.

To be a biographical subject one needs more than just sentience. One needs to have a concept of an enduring self and to have this, a certain level of cognitive development is necessary. As Tooley demonstrates, the requisite development does not take place until after birth. Hence, if Craig were consistent he would support not just abortion but also infanticide. Craig can maintain a consistent stance on the ethics of killing only if he maintains that serial killers have a right to life and newborn infants do not.

Craig’s appeal to sentience is similarly problematic. In A Defense of Abortion, David Boonin notes that those who attempt to ground humanity in the psychological development of an organism face a dilemma, "Any appeal to what a brain can do at various stages of development would seem to have to appeal to what the brain can already do. Or to what the brain has the potential to do in the future."

Either option leads to problems for a defender of the permissibility of feticide who does not also want to endorse infanticide. This is because "by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows and pigs, chickens and ducks or more intellectually developed than a new born infant." Suppose, then, one takes the first horn of the dilemma and appeals to what the brain can already do. However, unless one wishes to affirm that cats, dogs and chickens are human beings, "appeals to what the brain can already do" will "be unable to account for the presumed wrongness of killing toddlers or infants."

Suppose then, one takes up the second horn of the dilemma and appeals to "what the brain has the potential to do in the future". This will entail that feticide is homicide. "If [such an account] allows appeals to what the brain has the potential to do in the future, then it will have to include fetuses as soon as their brains begin to emerge, during the first few weeks of gestation." Again, Craig is forced to either grant the humanity of a fetus or deny the humanity of an infant.

Finally it is worth noting how Craig attempts to pass of his contradictory stance with some really silly inferences. He dismisses support for Capital Punishment on the grounds that the Christian Heritage Party "died after Capillgate." Similarly, in the citation above he notes that some anti-abortion groups were either associated with Capill or had people associated with Capill in them.

One wonders what this has to do with anything?

Both groups had the associations in question before it was known Capill was a criminal. There is no evidence they supported his actions or that they were complicit in his crimes. Given these facts, how is Capill remotely relevant? The only purpose reference to him serves is to encourage people to jump to unwarranted conclusions that certain people support abusing children when they do not.

However, let us suppose, contrary to fact, that these people had been complicit in Capill’s crimes. This would still tell us nothing about the permissibility of capital punishment or abortion. It would merely tell us that some people who oppose abortion are criminals. In the absence of a compelling reason for thinking that no just policy is ever supported by criminals and remember Criminals tend to vote left of centre, the correct response to Craig’s assertion is to ask "and?"

Let me illustrate the problems with Craig’s inferences by turning the tables here. Craig writes for Gaynz.com, a few years ago it was discovered that one of Gaynz’s regular writers, Jim Peron, had been an apologist for the views of NAMBLA. Jim Peron had published paedophile erotica written by convicted child molesters, written articles agressively labelling critics of "man boy love" as "hysterics" for viewing paedophilia as abuse, sold NAMBLA material and had NAMBLA meetings in his store. His visa to NZ was denied on the basis of these facts about his character.

Now, would it be fair of me to insinuate from this association that Craig is a NAMBLA supporter or that everyone who agrees with him on abortion and capital punishment is morally suspect because Craig is associated with a group that was once associated with this man Jim Peron? Could I logically dismiss Craig’s position on abortion and capital punishment merely by pointing this fact out? Of course not!

What I need to do and have done above, is provide an argument against these positions. Similarly, if Craig is to provide a rebuttal of the stances I and others have taken on capital punishment and abortion he needs to provide arguments against those stances but as usual, Craig and the team at Gaynz have none.

Spot the Difference

A few weeks ago wide publicity was given to a study that concluded that NZ women are the most promiscuous in the world. (The fact that, this study had some serious scientific shortcomings having neither a control group nor a random sample group was not so widely publicised.)

What was interesting was the reaction by some that this study as somehow validated permissive sexual mores. To cite one typical example, at the recent family first forum a question was asked from the floor about what would be taught in sex education courses at public schools. The response, from at least one politician, was that this study showed that encouraging people outside of a monogamous sexual relationship to practise abstinence was unrealistic.

Now this morning we see another study has come out this study suggests that sexual molestation of children is prevalent in NZ it suggests that one in four women have been sexually molested. I note the almost universal response from our politicians and media and quite rightly so, is to condemn these practises and exhort NZers to change any actions and attitudes that lead to such behaviour.

I am confused: I thought that when a significant number of people engaged in a sexual practise, then it was unrealistic to condemn it? I thought the state was supposed to simply accept contemporary practise and alter their values to fit it. Can the politicians who make the aforementioned argument about sex ed answer me this: When are you going to advocate that the state to teach safe child molestation techniques in public schools?

The reality is that we do not look to contemporary practise to determine what’s right and wrong. Rather we use principles of right and wrong to critique contemporary practise. Despite their trendy sloganising, our politicians know this, or at least they do when it suits them, but conveniently forget when it doesn’t. If contemporary liberals want to justify their values to others, they need to provide arguments for them. Not assurances that these practises are fashionable or trendy or that “all the cool people are doing it” or that “Kinsey showed 10% of people do this” etc. Unlike some people in parliament and the media many of us grew out of our teens sometime ago.

Friday, 19 October 2007

What we can learn from the police raids

The recent raids on various anarchist, environmentalist and Maori sovereignty activists of this week have thrown up some issues which its worth reflecting on.

The police allege that several activists up and down the country were involved in some kind of armed insurgency against the government. (Given the far left ideology these people hold this actually is not as surprising or far fetched as it seems. Marx taught that social change can only be brought about through armed revolution and advocated such revolution. Worldwide millions of people have died as a result of this belief. In fact the idea that force or violence against innocent people is justified to achieve social reform is at the heart of even moderate left wing thinking see here). These allegations by the police will be tested in a court of law at this early stage however the evidence for these allegations has not yet been provided. That’s because the trial is yet to happen. Hence it would be unwise and unjust to make a prouncement either way. Unlike what occurs in socialist regimes in NZ whether a person is guilty or innocent is determined by an impartial trial, according to evidence. We don’t use state owned media or the discretion of leftist news editors to determine these things. Nor do we use denouncement by a mob of people to determine these things.

Note however the reaction of many activists on the political left. They appear to not like this fact about our current society. Instead are condemning the police for racism, they are claiming that the state has unjustly persecuted groups working for social change. They claim arrests on flimsy evidence have been made to ensure the passing of anti-terror legislation. They are organising protests up and down the country to condemn the arrests. The problem is that no one has yet seen the evidence for the allegations. This should send a message to all loud and clear, these activists will condemn people are organisations for racism, without and before examining the evidence . They will support a group without examining the evidence about what that groups actions actually were. They will allege government conspiracies to suspend people’s civil liberties, without examining the evidence or before the evidence for this claim is clear.

Of course it’s possible that they are correct in these allegations and its also possible that they are not. If it turns out they are correct then this will mean NZ has to face some very unpleasant truths about our current government. It will be apparent that under our current left wing regime, we have a police force that will accuse people of terrorism, send armed police into their homes, search their property and arrest them with out any evidence whatsoever to assist the state in passing certain legislation. That will be very concerning. On the other hand if these activists are wrong, then it will reveal to us some unpleasant truths about far left activism in this country. That groups, many of which have preached armed revolution for years, actually mean what they say and intended to kill harm and maim New Zealanders.

The point is however at this stage we have insufficient evidence to know which of these scenarios are true. If these activists turn out to be correct, its not because they actually had evidence for these claims, it will be simply a fluke, a piece of luck. Although they will take credit for bringing this to NZ’s attention they will not deserve such credit All they brought forward was unwarranted speculation which just happened to turn out to be correct.

This brings us to what I think is worth noting here. Many activists on the far left in our country have demonstrated to all that evidence means nothing to them. They have made up their minds about what’s true and false regardless of what the evidence is, they will jump on band wagons make serious allegations accuse others of conspiracy racism, and protest when they have no evidential basis for what they say. There is a word for this, its called prejudice: judging a person or group as evil prior to any consideration of the evidence for and against them. There is also a word for people who express intolerance for others, and do so obstinately regardless of the evidence for or against. My dictionary states the correct English word for people who do this is “bigot”. There is also a word used for denigrating another’s character ( i.e. accusing him of racism, conspiracy, persecution of others etc) without evidence “slander”

I also want my readers to reflect on a couple of questions: What does the fact that a group of people will make accusations this serious about others before the evidence is in say about their integrity, their concern for other people, their commitment to truth and fairness? And what does the fact that a group will make public condemnations, protests and prouncements without any evidence say about their credibility?

I want you then to take a further action, remember these questions and the obvious answers to them next time you see the same people march down the street alleging a conspiracy of governments and big business to destroy the freedoms of the workers, Maoris and Gays. Or claiming that this event was really a conspiracy to get Oil. Remember it next time they make some allegation about another person being a racist or homophobe and remember it next time they make some condemnation prouncement or public condemnation. People who are not interested in the facts deserve to have no credibility.

I discovered at Uni that many segments of the far left in this country are a nasty group of malicious people who will lie, slander, and defame others, without any evidence at all to achieve their political goals. I also discovered that they frequently lies distort the truth, suppress or refuse to consider any evidence against their views they then whip up irrational mobs to repeat their slogans. In fact they tend to get very nasty and aggressive if counter evidence is provided. For example if say a PhD student ethics writes into a magazine and refutes their argument, they often respond with nasty puerile slander and abuse, but are unable to actually deal with the evidence provided.

This lesser known face of left wing activism is now there in public for all to see. Take a good look.

Wednesday, 17 October 2007

Were the Urban Legends True?

It was 1989, despite the howling winds, sleet and freeze all around us I felt secure and warm in the sleeping bag my parents had bought me. Our tent was pitched on the slopes of Mt Rupaehu white out conditions had ensued and a blustering wind raged outside. I was one of several teenage boys holed up in the tent as part of a weekend exercise for the boarding school I was attending.

It was the first mountain craft weekend at Tihoi. Tihoi was a six month "venture school" modelled on outward bound to which St Paul's sent all it's fourth formers. I found the students at this school weird. I was an urban middle class boy, (though my grandparents were working class). I had attended state schools my whole life and since intermediate it was common to have several Maori and pacific Islanders in my class. I had even been friends with some. The kids at Tihoi were different. Most of them came from rural farming backgrounds; they had been in elite boarding schools since age seven. There was only one Maori at our school, though we only spoke a couple of times, I admired him immensely; he was one of the most motivated people I had ever met. Inga’s father was a minister and clearly was committed to his son’s development. Inga voluntarily did twice as many cross country runs a week as was required and did it in hiking boots to ensure he was being physically challenged. This while others slacked of and tried to get away with not doing any and the rest of us did the bare minimum to avoid getting in trouble. Inga topped the school in academic achievement as well he came first in science ( at St Pauls we ranked each other and the rankings were known to all). He was different to the Maori had experienced in previous schools, who were almost always low achievers academically, often obese, and frequently flirting with criminal activity. Prior to that point, I had developed some unfair sterotypes of Moari people. Inga for ever shattered these. I felt the need to repent before God for holding these views.

But something else happened at Tihoi, and I remember vividly the conversation on that mountain. As we lay awake at night talking one of the students informed me passionately how his father was part of an anti Maori group, how NZ would be served better if all the “niggers” as he called them, were made to live in the south Island and Pakehas lived in the north Island. He was adamant that this is what Maori deserved and they had asked for it. I was somewhat appalled by this, yet few of the other boys in the tent seemed fussed at all. Another student expressed disdain that Inga “that nigger” was even at the school. When Inga was not in ear shot they referred to him as “coon” I was horrified, this was New Zealand after all, not South Africa.

Inga never returned to St Paul’s after Tihoi. He received a package in the mail full of letters telling him he was an unwanted nigger and expressing general racist vitriol he was so upset by this that he walked out of the school and disappeared for a day or two to get over it. I felt absolutely sickened. I remember seeing him win the school tug of war competition when his father passionately cheered him on, I also remember one of the other kids remarking that their parents wished that “coon” would shut up and only politeness prevented them saying this out loud. After Tihoi was over Inga never returned. I did not blame him at all. Who would want to return? But I felt St Pauls was the worse for this, they had lost one of their best students and best athletes who had more drive and commitment than any other student I encountered in my time at high school. I never knew what happened to Inga. But I was saddened by the fact that he had felt he had to do leave. I was also disgusted by the glee others showed when he did.

But one thing I also remember from that time was the rumour that I was to hear over and over again in my time at high school even after I left St Paul’s six months latter. (I left because I did not wish to associate with the kids who attended this school any more) This was that Maori groups were secretly training with weapons, waiting for an opportunity to strike. This was often said in muted tones, as though lots of people knew about it and yet no one dared do anything about it. This urban legend came up over and over in the debates I had with other students over race relations. While I tried to get them to understand that previous governments had stolen Maori land, had violated a treaty they had signed with Maori and that hence there were some legitimate grievances. This was always brushed aside; they were out to get us. They were being trained in military tactics getting ready to strike. It was hard to convince people who held fears like this. I remember a work colleague once telling me that she knew people in the military, that the army was dominated by Maori and it was only a matter of time before they began assisting the activists. I always took these urban legends with a grain of salt. The sources were hardly reliable people and it was always hear say and to be honest I had little respect for these peoples opinions anyway.

In light of recent events it’s saddening to see that these rumours may now be substantiated in the eyes of many New Zealanders. The revelations that the police have raided several places up and down the country, that they allege that various far left activists were compiling weapons and training and planning potential strikes against the “colonial oppressor” is not what New Zealand needs. Of course the evidence is not all in and caution is needed until all is revealed. But I find myself in a state of disbelief. That at least on one issue, my interlocutors were, inadvertently onto something. I would hate to see the kind of people that drove Inga from our school reinforced in their prejudice and I would hate to see other Inga’s; other promising Maori students denied opportunities and subjected to appalling harassment and abuse because some people believe their ignorant rantings have been confirmed.

Matt

Monday, 15 October 2007

Dissecting the Family First Forum

Today I took the day off work and Matt and I headed to the Family First Forum. It was a worthwhile day out, all the speakers were great. What was especially impressive was the diversity of the speakers and the range of worldviews and political persuasions - this was an impression I formed even before we got to the panel of MP's from every party. Also well done was Bob McCoskrie's MC-ing, the organisation from the behind the scenes people - especially the food, the entertainment ranging from the local school doing a national anthem cum haka to Ben Lummis' live performance.

Of the speakers, Christine Rankin was especially memorable for me. Maybe it was because she spoke a little about her background and motivations and life turning points and I could really relate to where she was coming from or maybe it was the outspoken, confident, right-wing, woman thing - cause I so get that.

John Tamihere was impressive too. I found myself agreeing with a lot of what he said and wondering how he could ever have been in the Labour Party.




The political panel was really good too. Judith Collins was outstanding. Absolutely outstanding (it warranted repeating - you had to be there). Nick Kearney (who stood in for Heather Roy) was a close second and did a very good job. The two Future MP's Judy and Gordon basically had the same policy so it was kind of funny thinking of them as being from two different parties - Gordon is an impressive individual and I really do hope he has success with Future NZ but I just cannot... I am just not a centrist. He was really good on some issues but goverment sponsored marriage courses just make me want to run and scream - Judith and Nick were great on that when they pointed out that those initiatives, whilst excellent and important for the good of society, were not and should not be in the domain of the government. Russell Fairbrother and Sue Bradford did a good job of playing the villians - given the audience they were almost always going to bomb with their answers though they did both manage the odd answer that got agreement.



I somehow ended up baiting Russell Fairbrother - Bob says he will hereinafter refer to me as the giggle girl for it - a few questions on conscience issues had come up, the panel had all stipulated that this or that issue was a conscience issue for their party and then gone on to expound their personal view. Each time Russell had his turn at this it grated me more and more - I mean Labour allows conscience votes?!? puh-lease! I sat quietly (well fairly quietly) through Russell's "smacking was always illegal" then 20 minutes later "this bill did not make smacking illegal" contradiction but the repeated references to Labour allowing conscience votes was too much - I laughed out loud, my giggle audibly echoed just as Russell paused after alluding to yet another of the instances Labour allowed their MP's to vote on a conscience issue, other giggles erupted but mine was lingered in such a way that any cynic present might have suggested was a little too perfectly timed and executed (never!). It seemed to hit a nerve, Russell began aggressively claiming that Labour respects conscience voting which simply elicited more howls of laughter from the audience and the panel of MP's.

Another pearler was Sue Bradford's suggestion that the claim that a light smack was essentially the same thing as beating a child with a horse whip, block of wood or a piece of hosepipe - this elcited howls of outrage. At another point she said she could not see any value in locking up violent, recidivist offenders for long sentences and did not understand why anyone might think doing so was a good idea.

I sat next to some very impressive teenagers - homeschooled (what a surprise) - very sharp. Their reasoning skills and ability to see how things followed was evident by their comments to each other both as they critiqued and evaluated the answers the MP's gave to the questions and as they commented on Matt's commentary to me (he cannot watch panel discussions without commentating - even talks to the television during political debates).

All in all a very worthwhile and enjoyable day.

Madeleine


[Photos swiped from http://section59.blogspot.com]

Thursday, 11 October 2007

More on Iraq and the Just War Theory

A little while ago I posted up some thoughts I had about the war in Iraq. These thoughts did not come in a vacuum. At the time of the invasion I read several books on the morality of war. At the time of compiling this article had just read James Turner Johnson's works on the issue and was reading the medieval ethicist Vitoria’s De Indus . This morning I discovered a discussion about my article at the Manawatu Christian Apologetics Society website . One correspondent Murray asks several questions about my post. These are good questions so I will clarify here.


Just War Theory is all very well, and sounds good. However, I would ask the following in respect to the 6 requirements needed to call a war “Just” by this theory:
1. Who decides what a “just cause” is? When religion is involved [especially] the word “just” is completely dependant upon your world view.
The question of what constitutes a just cause, is simply an extension of the more general question when is a person justified in using violence .In the Christian tradition, two answers are forthcoming, to defend innocent people from attack and to punish those guilty of crimes. Hence, in the writings of Theologians the two cases have generally been either to defend people from an attack upon their rights or to punish a person for an offence committed. My understanding is that Jewish and Islamic traditions do not differ greatly on these conclusions, and international law about war in fact is largely based on just war theorizing.

Murray seems to espouse a kind of relativism, whereby what’s right and wrong depends on what a person thinks. The problem is he does not seem to apply this consistently because he condemns the US invasion for violating principles he and the peace movement think is correct. If no one has a right to decide these questions then the peace movement doesn’t either.


2. When does any nation have a lawful authority to wage war, and whose law do we judge this right by?
OK here the answer is relatively straightforward. The right of a government to go to war is simply an extension of governments police powers. If a criminal attempts to rape or kill people within the geographical realm over which a government has authority then the government can use force to prevent this and also can use force to try and punish anyone who does hence the existence of a police force, courts and prisons. Just war theorists simply note that there seems no reason why this authority ceases to exist when the person committing the offence is a soldier from another country as opposed to a domestic criminal.

I have never heard anyone give an answer as to why this should make a difference. If the NZ government cannot use force against foreign soldiers who invade us why are they required to protect Greenpeace demonstrators on a peaceful march from violence? Or why are they allowed to protect children from violent parents and yet not allowed to protect those same children from bullets from a foreign army?


3. There is usually no such thing as a “last resort”, simply preferred resorts. If invading Iraq was a last resort what is a nuclear bomb? The resort after the last resort?
It’s hard to get exactly what Murray’s point is here. First, use of Nuclear weapons are almost always ruled out by a just war theory on the basis of principles of discrimination (only combatants can be targeted) and proportionality ( the force used must be the proportionate to the threat being repelled).

As to Murray’s other point, again the idea of a last resort is simply an extension of principles governing a resort to violence in other contexts. The basic idea is that if a conflict can be reasonably and realistically resolved without violence, then to use it is unnecessary and hence unjust.

In the case I wrote about. The the US wanted regime change. They wanted the Baathists out of power. Given the horrendous record of this government in violating the rights of its citizens and other citizens that was a perfectly reasonable request. One that Saddam could have granted, and was morally obligated to grant. (Did Saddam have a right to torture kill and massacre people?) He did not grant this request. Hence Iraq did not fight as a last resort.

On the other hand if Saddam had made reasonable concessions, if he had agreed to write a new constitution granting basic rights to Iraqi citizens, had set a date for free and open elections with international observers etc and organized a transition. Then the US should not have invaded or at least delayed the invasion until the sincerity of these concessions was apparent.


.4. Who is the judge of the “possibility of waging war with a reasonable chance of success”? What is success and who determines it, by what guidelines is success measured? Success is dependant upon the original aim. (in Iraq this was removal of WMD, then when that was found lacking it was changed to “regime change to bring democracy”. No,luck there, sow whats next, control of oil flow? well, I guess that has been almost achieved…). If we don’t know the aim of waging a war (i.e. we were told it was WMD in Iraq, but obviously was not as they are still there and no WMD found) then how can we possibly judge the likeliness of a successful war?
With any moral question the person who needs to answer the question is the person engaging in the action The role of being a moral agent is to ask oneself is what I am about to do the right thing? So in this case the government has the duty to ask, before it goes to war whether it’s likely the end for which they are fighting is one they are likely to achieve. This is determined by examining the factual information and making the best assessment one can *at the time of the decision*. (not on the basis of what was known after the event) Like all factual decisions it’s fallible. If this counts against making it then one should not make any factual decisions which involve life and death.

Murray’s response to some extent proves the point of my original post, because after dismissing the idea of doing so he inconsistently criticizes the US for not making this assessment adequately. However, as I noted its not just the US who have a duty to act justly so does Iraq, and it seems blatantly obvious that Saddam had good reasons for thinking that he could not successfully fight of a US invasion, hindsight confirms this to a far greater extent than it does with regards to the US belief that they could defeat Saddam. Yet Murray ignores this and applies the standard only to the US despite suggesting that the standard is meaningless.

It is precisely this kind of garbage that lead me to not support the peace movement.


5. To prevent evil we must agree on what evil is. One mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter.
Well this slogan is simply false. A terrorist is a person who targets non combatants for the purpose of striking terror into the population so as to achieve political ends. A freedom fighter is a person who engages in war for the purpose of liberating a people from oppression. It’s simply false to conflate these categories. A person can use terrorism to enslave people and a person can fight for freedom without using terrorism.

However again, Murray is also very inconsistent here, if what constitutes an unjust attack on another’s rights is simply relative. If what counts as an unjust act of war (terrorism) and what is justified (freedom fighting) is simply arbitrary and relative. Then on what basis does he condemn the US invasion. Its funny how, when dictators act unjustly we can’t condemn it because morality is relative, when the US uses force suddenly the standards the peace movement believe are correct apply to the US government even when it disagrees with them.

If one cannot make judgements that certain actions are evil, then one cannot judge George Bush's actions as evil.


6. How is it possible to wage a war in a civilian area (e.g. a city) and at the same time use only “proportionate and discriminate” force? Any attempt at this would result in a quagmire within hours, which any invading army knows full well. Which is why Baghdad was bombed from the air. In that particular case “Just War” is surely an oxymoron.
I find this response surprising because just war theorists have frequently and repeatedly discussed this very issue.

The problem Murray points to is this. According to traditional just war theory a state can (in certain circumstances) use proportionate violence against enemy combatants but not against non-combatants. However, this requires the ability to distinguish between the two and to be able to attack one without attacking not the other. For this reason in addition to refraining from targeting combatants, there is also a duty to not use combatants as human shields (hence the traditional European method of meeting at a battlefield in Uniform).However, if enemy combatants dress like civilians, look like civilians, hide amongst civilians and attack from within civilians centres it becomes extremely difficult to repel them without hitting civilians in the cross fire.

There are really only two responses to this problem: The more sensible response is the one suggested by several just war theorists such as Donagan, Walzer Ramsey etc that in such cases, soldiers should take reasonable care to avoid hitting civilians, but if they cannot defend themselves from attack without killing some civilians then the responsibility for the deaths is not theirs, its rather the fault of the enemy who choose to attack from amongst them. This suggests that the duty to not kill non-combatants does not apply to human shields if there is no reasonable way of hitting the assailant without hitting them.

(This I think is a general point about self defence a F 16 would have been justified in shooting down one of the United Airliners heading for the world trade centre for the same reason and similarly a policeman could shoot a suicide bomber threatening to blow up a mall who was also carrying a baby )

Murray however takes a different option which I consider mistaken. He suggests that when the enemy fights from within a civilian area it is wrong to defend oneself against their attacks. This seems to lead to a conclusion that as long as I hide behind civilians and use them as human shields I gain protection from the morality, however if I don’t do this and refuse to use human shields I do not. This seems problematic if not outright perverse.

In a sense however Murray answers his own question he notes attacking a city would result in mass civilian causalities, he therefore notes that because of this an alternative method was used precisely to minimise these causalities. Exactly, that’s what a just belligerent tries to do in such cases, minimise civilian causalities. Would Saddam have made an effort to do this, I doubt it.

RELATED POSTS:
Iraq and the Just War Theory: Why I Choose not to Support the Anti-War Movement

Wednesday, 10 October 2007

Published

This morning I recieved word that my article Abortion and Capital Punishment : No Contradiction, will be published in one of the next 3-4 issues of Think.

The article was originally part of my PhD thesis.

I would like to thank Perfect Man whose comments motivated me to submit this section of my thesis for publication.

Tuesday, 9 October 2007

Why Blaming the Ref is Not Welfarism

I am not a sports commentator, and would not consider myself any expert on the question. Like many New Zealanders I love rugby, I played it as a child and at high school. Recently I played a game at the College I teach at and remember the thrill of breaking three tackles and later scoring a try in the annual married versus singles match.

My father played for Waikato and played in an upset match took the Ranfurly Shield off Auckland. My grandfather was Chairman of the Waikato Rugby Union. He was a wise and insightful person and I remember the shock I experienced, as a young Waikato undergrad, when he informed me that he despised Waikato University. He remembered the activists tearing down rugby park fence, initiating violence and threats to his friends and colleagues when Hamilton hosted that infamous game with South Africa. My Grandfather was shocked that academics, people who ostensibly were committed to reason and persuasion would attempt to use force, threats to prevent him and others from watching a game. He was not a racist or a supporter of apartheid and watching a game between Waikato and South Africa no more made him one than watching a game with China makes one a communist or watching a game with Fiji makes one a supporter of military coups. He simply wanted to watch a game and was subjected to threats, force and abuse for doing so and he never forgave Waikato University for this.

In hindsight I should have heeded my grandfather’s warnings. I learnt the hard way that my grandfather’s assessment of Waikato University student activism was correct. Having been subjected to threats of violence, minor assaults, vicious personal abuse and repeated slanderous character assassination for arguing vigorously for more conservative viewpoints I now sympathise with my grandfather considerably.

So rugby is to some extent in my blood, and with this pedigree what I say may make me sound like just another ignorant red neck. But I think the referee is responsible for the All Blacks defeat by France on Sunday. I don’t condone the anger and nastiness that has been thrown at the ref by some. But I also dislike the facile analysis dominating talk back radio today. I hear that we lost have a “blame the authority” mentality fostered by welfare. Its all socialisms fault and blaming the ref is symptomatic of this. Apparently, we need to be less socialistic in our thinking, like the French apparently are.

The issue for me is this: the score was 20- 18. At least two French tries came about as a result of bad refereeing decisions. The first was the sin binning of Luke McAlister the second an obvious forward pass which should have been picked up and wasn’t. The Dominion post this morning notes a third, when the All Blacks had possession towards the end and were attempting a counter strike, the referee signaled advantage and then when the AB’s acted on this signal he disallowed advantage giving the French possession at a crucial time.

I am also sick of hearing people minimise these facts. We have been told that bad ref calls happen and the all blacks should have been able to win despite this. I disagree, its perfectly reasonable in international rugby for the players to expect competent refereeing. And while the odd bad call is to be expected, the consistent bizarre incompetence displayed on Sunday is not acceptable in an international match. People should not have to win despite incompetent referees. Those refs should not be there. It’s not the players job to make up for referee incompetence, the organizers have a duty to ensure competent officials are in charge of matches.
This is not welfarism: True one problem with some welfare policy is that people make the government (and hence the taxpayer) responsible for problems which they are not responsible. To take an example, the DPB makes the government responsible for meeting the costs of rearing children, when the person responsible for this the defaulting parent is not made responsible. If you doubt this try the following experiment (a) Tell the IRD that you will not pay taxes and see what happens. Then (b) get an non custodial parent to tell IRD they will no longer pay the child support payments which the IRD are required to collect and hand over to the custodial parent. Use the same excuse in both situations (such as I can’t afford it, I am a student etc) see what happens. Compare the results of (a) and (b).

I know first hand of a man who owes the IRD several thousand dollars as a result of a student loan. His wife is also owed several thousand dollars in child support payments and has been owed this for years. They have not seen this money, and for sometime the IRD informed them that they could not collect the money because at the time much of this debt was built up the person who owed it was a student.

But while this is one feature of welfarism it is not corrected by “an official is always right, we are always to blame” attitude. In fact one feature of welfarism is a misguided trust in authorities and officials. A belief that somehow that private individuals or corporations cannot be relied on to do certain things while governments can. According to this mind set the profit motive corrupts but power does not.

Sure the AB’s made some mistakes, and they could have played better, that’s all true. But the point is they shouldn’t have needed to, to beat the French they simply needed one thing a competent referee. And it is reasonable to expect them to have been given one. If you can reasonably demand something, aren’t given it, and as a result fail when you would not have, then you can be justifiably upset.

The fact that its predictable that officials will act incompetently and arbitrarily does not mean we should condone them does so. Nor does it mean we should require people to flourishing in spite of it and then blame them when they do not. It means we should try and reform authorities to minimize this, so that people do not need to bend over backwards to flourish. Even on a bad day the AB’s still should have won, because they had the talent to do so, arbitrary incompetence by officials prevented this. This is wrong and should not have happened. Of course it needs to be put in perspective, far worse injustices occurred in the last few days. But it was still wrong and telling people that thinking this is welfarism is absurd.

Tuesday, 2 October 2007

Viability

A common argument claims that a fetus is not a human being until it is capable of surviving independently of another individual. Prior to this period, it does not have an independent existence from its mother; hence killing it is not homicide. This position is common in many legal and ethical arguments about the morality of abortion. Susan Sherwin, for example, notes that a fetus “is wholly dependent on her [the mother’s] unique contribution to its maintenance, while a newborn is physically separate, though still in need of a lot of care” [1].

Two things can be said about this claim. Firstly, the ability to exist independently of another is not an essential property of human beings. Secondly, the inability to exist independently of another is in fact present in both fetuses and infants and so does not provide a reason for distinguishing between feticide and infanticide.

1. Viability is not an essential property of human beings. Fetal viability is contingent upon the medical technology of a given culture. A fetus that is not viable in Chad is viable in Los Angeles. If viability is necessary for something to be a human then a woman pregnant with a viable fetus in Los Angeles who flies from Los Angeles to Chad carries a human being when she leaves but this human being ceases to exist when she arrives in India and yet becomes human again when she returns.

A similarly-strange implication of the viability criterion is that it implies that Siamese twins are not humans either. Consider Siamese twins Bob and Scott. If Bob is a human being, then since Scott cannot live independently of Bob, Scott must not be a human person. However, it is difficult to see what property Bob has that Scott lacks which would justify considering one a human and the other not. It appears then that one would be forced to conclude that they both are, and are not, human. However, both Bob and Scott are human and killing one or both of them would be homicide despite this entailing that they are both human beings even though one cannot live independently of the other.

2. Not only does making viability the demarcer of humanity entail numerous absurdities but the property Sherwin points to to justify its doing so , dependence, is not something that ends at birth. Oderberg puts the point well.

A born baby is also totally dependent on its mother, only instead of being fed and sheltered by the mother’s automatic internal processes, it is fed and sheltered by the mother’s consciously controlled external, behaviour. How can that make a difference to whether or not a foetus is a human being? [2]

A new-born is totally dependent on its mother if it happens to be born in an isolated area where there are no other lactating women or the means of bottle-feeding. An elderly woman may be totally dependant on her children looking after her. A hiker who breaks her leg a week’s walk from a road will die if her companions do not bring help. Yet in these situations, it remains that it would be homicide for the mother to kill her baby, the children to kill their mother or the hikers their companion. Further, one could not plausibly say that the hiker, the elderly women or the baby are not human beings. Consequently, it is not plausible to suggest that the dependence of the non-viable fetus upon its mother makes it non-human.

These examples preclude an objection often raised against this type of criticism. Some critics have tried to argue that the position of a new-born infant in terms of dependence is different to non-viable fetuses in that after birth or viability other options are available. The dependence for survival can be handed on to someone else. However, before viability this is not the case. Hence, while infanticide is wrong, abortion prior to viability is not. This feature is absent in the cases of the hiker, the elderly mother and the infant.

In fact, Sherwin notes;

It is doubtful, however, that adoptions are possible for every child whose mother cannot care for it. The world abounds with homeless orphans; even in the industrialised West, where there is a waiting list for adoption of healthy (white) babies, suitable homes cannot always be found for troubled adolescents; inner city, AIDS babies, or many of the multiply handicapped children whose parents have tried to care for them but whose marriages broke under the strain.[3]

Sherwin's observation entails that some infants (and even older disabled children) are entirely dependent upon their parents and no one else is available to look after them. However, this confession is fatal to her position. Suppose society, as Sherwin argues, is racist and refuses to adopt dark skinned children. Does it follow that killing white children is homicide, whereas killing dark-skinned children is not? Suppose society is sexist or only wishes to adopt babies with blond hair and blue eyes or those that are able-bodied. Would non-Aryan babies, baby girls and those disabled cease to be human? If one’s humanity depends on societal conventions, the position is problematic.

[1]Susan Sherwin, “Abortion a Feminist Perspective,” in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 5th ed., ed. Bonnie Steinbock & John D. Arras (Mountain View CA: Mayfield Publishing Co, 1999), 364.
[2] David Oderberg, Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Co, 2000), 5.
[3]Sherwin, “Abortion a Feminist Perspective,” 366


RELATED POSTS:
Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
Sentience Part 1
Sentience Part 2
Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
Abortion and Child Abuse: Another Response to Farrar
Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
Imposing You Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence
Published: Boonin's Defense of the Sentience Criteria - A Critique
Published: Abortion and Capital Punishment - No Contradiction

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