MandM: 2007

Friday, 14 December 2007

The Body Snatchers and the Problem of Pluralism

As I was driving around Auckland this morning talkback was rife with people discussing the recent body snatchers case; an estranged father, against the wishes of both the deceased and her next of kin stole his daughters body and buried it in a family plot. Of course I remember the furor over the previous case, and my thoughts now are as they were then.

What people seem unaware of, or at least have not articulated clearly, is that the controversy over this case is symptomatic of a deep problem with the popular liberal response to pluralism. Let me elaborate.

The problem of Pluralism is this: we have in New Zealand people who hold to and live in accord with various differing “comprehensive views” as Rawls called them. A comprehensive doctrine can be theistic like Islam or Christianity or it can be secular like certain forms of Naturalism; Marxism, Liberal rationalism, humanism etc. However such views function as religions in that they answer fundamental questions such as who are we, what is the nature of good, what is real, etc. Now the problem such plurality creates is this: How does one maintain peace and order in a society characterized by radical disagreement over these fundamental questions? Each group believes (and cannot but believe) that their view is true and the others mistaken. Failure to find a solution to this problem can be deadly people can and have killed each other over these questions.

In New Zealand the answer popularly given is “tolerance”. One should allow each person to believe and act in accord with whatever view they think is correct and no one should be compelled to adopt some form of enforced orthodoxy. However there is one immediate problem with this response. Sometimes believers in different comprehensive doctrines will interact with one another. Hence, there needs to be rules or norms governing the relationships between believers of different “comprehensive doctrines” and the obvious difficulty is that these different groups frequently disagree over precisely what the correct norms or rules which constitute our duties are.

This is the case in the body snatchers incident. One group of people come from a community in which individual autonomy is an important value (this btw reflects certain religious and philosophical beliefs articulated in the late middle ages). Under this understanding of the world, when a person dies the individual who died can, prior to death decide ( within reason) how their body is to disposed of. Moreover certain relatives, become next of kin and aquire the responsibility to carry the deceased’s wishes out. The problem is that people from other cultures have quite different understandings of the world. I am not an expert on Maori culture and so will not try and elaborate. But the idea seems to be that individual autonomy is subordinated to the wider family and certain traditions which this family are required to uphold. Hence the wider community decides where one is buried in accord with their traditions regardless of the individual in questions wishes. Moreover there are different understandings of what constitutes membership in the relevant group. One group tends to think that if one is not brought up within a culture or does not conciously adopt it they are not part of a group that embodies this culture. Another however believes that mere biological lineage determines ones membership in the culture.

In this case a person dies. According to group A the deceased is not part of group B and the right thing do do is X. According to group B, she is a member of group B and the right thing to do is Y. Y however is incompatible with X only one of the two options is possible. I maintain that there is no *culturally or religiously neutral* way of adjudicaticating this dispute. At the end of the day we must decide which view of the world is correct and side with the solution they propose.

This case shows up the popular liberal response to the problem. The popular response is to suggest that the no group can impose the norms they believe in upon another group. Instead, norms governing relationships between practioners and believers of different comprehensive doctrines should be governed of norms that all reasonable people can accept regardless of their religious or quasi religious beliefs. This idea is often described as “public reason” the notion that there is a set of premises which are accepted implicitly by all reasonable people from which public policy regarding what rights everyone has can and coercive laws enacted can be decided.

The problem, which this case shows, is that public reason is something of a myth. If one defines a "reasonable person" broadly there is simply does not exist a set of principles which is both accepted by all reasonable people and also sufficiently “thick” and comprehensive to provide a basis for answers to public policy questions. On the other hand if one defines "a reasonable person" narrowly to exclude radical disagreement the very concept of a reasonable person will depend on the truth of a particular comprehensive perspective for its plausibility. The debate over Gods existence is a good example. Alvin Plantinga has argued, correctly I think, that if God exists and created men in his image and then revealed himself to them, much of what Christians believe is probably rational. If however God does not exist, its probably a delusion. However, its impossible to come to an answer on the rationality of theism without presupposing a stance on the ontological question of its truth. In fact it's difficult to see how one can come to an understanding of what constitutes a *reasonable person* if without appealing to premises specific to some comprehensive doctrine about what exists and what sort of beings people are.

That’s what’s seen in this case. We have two very different views of understanding the world. Each one if true entails that a certain course of action is mandated. If certain notions of individual autonomy then the body snatchers are wrong. If one does not they are not. The problem is according to a popular conception of liberal democracy the state has to be neutral with regard to differing faith or quasi faith positions. It should not privilege any group by writing its views into law and demanding that the others who don't accept the tradition live in accord with them. The state therefore can do nothing one way or the other. Interestingly that is precisely whats happend.

There is a solution to this. It’s an older view, and it’s far less palatable to many modern or post modern people, but it has the advantage of being correct. On this view the whole popular liberal idea of tolerance is a chimera. In his book Reason in the Balance Berkeley Law professor Philip Johnson argues that while liberal societies do not (and I would add should not) have established Churches they must always have a defacto “established religious philosophy.” By religious philosophy Johnson means “a way of about ultimate questions” and by saying its esthablished he means not that “dissenters are subject to legal punishment” but that “it provides the philosophical basis for law making and public education”. People who dissent will be tolerated within reasonable limits and what constitutes a "reasonable limit" will be determined by the esthablished religious philosophy.

In NZ the established religious philosophy ostensibly includes the proposition that killing non combatants in war is wrong hence Al Qaeda does not gain religious tolerance in NZ. In Saudi Arabia the established religious philosophy considers apostasy intolerable. In some "progressive" quarter’s today believing and teaching that homosexual conduct so violates the sensibilities of liberal orthodoxy that it cannot be tolerated. In each case we have a accepted orthodoxy and tolerance of dissenters limited by the values of the orthodoxy in question.

In his book Foreordained Failure, Steven Smith demonstrates that there is no such thing as a right to freedom of religion which is upheld by some traditions and opposed by others. Instead there is a spectrum of views about religious tolerance that comes in degrees; no state tolerates all religious sects and very few states tolerate none. He notes that Aquinas, Cromwell, Locke and Mill all advocated and defended forms of religious tolerance. However, each disagreed as to which religions such tolerance should apply to and the proper limits upon those they disagreed with. Smith argues further that these differing accounts of freedom of religion all depended upon comprehensive views to justify them and one cannot adjudicate between them without appeal to such views. Attempts to articulate a right to freedom of religion from a neutral or public stance are quite hopeless.

That’s what we have in this case. I think that those who stole the body should be prosecuted because I believe that the ideas about individual autonomy undergirding those who complain are correct and I think tolerance of diversity should not extend to allowing others to violate norms based on these ideas. Our political climate needs to stop hiding behind slogans of "tolerance" and "respect for diversity" and admit that it supports a particular religious orthodoxy and here are the limits on dissent. Then we can debate whether the orthodoxy is true. If we continue to hide behind the façade of “tolerance” and “respecting and celebrating all diverse view points” it will not be able to do anything in these situations.

Wednesday, 12 December 2007

Where the Islamists Have a Point

I am a fan of Bill Vallicella's blog. A few days ago I found a post of his which is worth reproducing.

Don't expect any more 'eye candy' on this site, but now that I have your attention I want to make a serious point.The well-endowed lass a picture of whom you see to the left has a name as beautiful as her body, Mayra Veronica. She was a guest on the O'Reilly Factor last night. She supports the troops in Iraq by going there and meeting with them, hugging and kissing them (that's what she said!), signing photographs and posters, and distributing calendars. The 'pin-up girl' is of course nothing new — our fathers and grandfathers gawked at Grable — but one has to ask how much we have to teach the Iraqis. Islamic culture is in many ways benighted and backward, but it is not clear that our trash culture is much of an improvement. If they think that our decadent culture is what democracy is all about, and something we are trying to impose on them, then we are in trouble.

Militant Islam's deadly hatred of us should not be discounted as the ravings of lunatics or psychologized away as a reflex of envy at our fabulous success. For there is a kernel of insight in it that we do well to heed. Sayyid Qutb (Milestones, 1965, emphasis added): "Humanity today is living in a large brothel! One has only to glance at its press, films, fashion shows, beauty contests, ballrooms, wine bars and broadcasting stations!Or observe its mad lust for naked flesh, provocative pictures, and sick, suggestive statements in literature, the arts, and mass media! And add to
all this the system of usury which fuels man's voracity for money and engenders vile methods for its accumulation and investment, in addition to fraud, trickery, and blackmail dressed up in the garb of law."

A wild exaggeration in 1965, the above statement is less of an exaggeration today. But setting aside the hyperbole, we are in several ways a sick and decadent society getting worse day by day. On this score, if on no other, we can learn something from our Islamist critics. The fact that a man wants to chop your head off does not mean
that he has nothing to teach you. The decadence of the West is a huge and many-sided topic. I'll mention just two trends. One is the degeneration of popular music, especially black music. There is a huge difference between Sam Cooke and the rap 'artists' popular today. Another is the drive to push all vestiges of religion out of public life. Since religion is the means whereby most people learn morality, the assault on religion is also an assault on morality.
Of course, when I say that there is something to be learned from our Islamist critics, that in no way implies that their actions can be justified. They are murderous terrorists who need to be hunted down and killed, and the governments that support them need to be toppled. What I am opposing is a certain thoughtless attitude that says, "They are demons, I don't want to understand them, and I shut my ears to everything they say."

Thursday, 29 November 2007

Greens, Tasers and Torture

Watching the news the other night, I heard how some UN body had declared that the use of tasers constituted torture. (At least that is how it was reported). Predictably the Green party cited this as I for rejecting the use of Tasers.

The implicit argument here seems to go something like this. [1] The use of Tasers constitutes torture [2] Torture is always unjust, therefore [3] the use of Tasers is unjust. Formally this argument is valid. If [1] and [2] are true [3] follows. Most people I suspect will take issue with [1] and I think there could well be problems with this claim. I think however a more interesting issue arises here. Is [2] actually true, is torture always unjust or are there circumstances in which it is justified and, assuming Tasers are torture devices, are they an instance of such a circumstance.

Is torture always unjust? A common argument for justifiable torture goes something like this: A terrorist cell has planted several bombs in malls around the countries; they will be detonated some time in the next 24 hours. One member of the cell who knows where these bombs are has been captured. Would it be acceptable to torture the terrorist to gain this information, or should one instead let thousands die? Cases like this are sometimes called “ticking time bomb” cases. Many people find, that their moral sense or intuitions lead to conclude that torture is justified in ticking time bomb cases. The popularity of shows like 24 attest to this.

Act Utilitarianism provides a prima facie rationale for this judgment. According to Act Utilitarianism, an action is right if and only if the consequences of performing it result in more net happiness than any alternative. In this instance, torturing the terrorist will make him suffer. However, failure to torture him will result in thousands of deaths and thus will lead to even greater suffering. Hence, the former action; that of torturing the terrorist is justified.

Until fairly recently I did not find this analysis convincing, while I see the force of the ticking time bomb case. The act utilitarian assessment seems to me to be wrong. This is because one can construct equally plausible cases where one should not engage in violence against another person, even if doing so results in an increase in net happiness. Consider the following two cases, taken from the literature. Judith Jarvis Thomson [i]. Thomson points out that if a doctor painlessly kills a group of healthy patients and harvests their organs, an even greater number of people can be saved via organ donation. It is in fact conceivable that forcing people to under go various medical procedures such as kidney and or bone marrow transplants would result in numerous people being saved from fatal illnesses. Despite these facts, however, neither killing people nor enforcing compulsory transplants are permissible practices. Although such procedures may promote the happiness of others and in some cases be life saving, they do so by unjust means, killing and assaulting innocent human beings.

Don Marquis suggests a second case. The infamous the Willowbrook experiments which involved experimenting upon mentally retarded children in order to ascertain information for fighting diseases such as Hepatitis or the Nazi experimenting upon concentration camp inmates to learn how to combat hypothermia. Regarding these experiments Don Marquis notes that

The Tuskegee, Willowbrook and Nazi studies were wrong, not because they were bad and useless science, but because the human subjects in them were treated inhumanely…There is now a consensus, both in society and in academic bioethics that this is wrong even when the research will clearly benefit the common good. In short conformity with a respect for human subjects principle is a necessary condition of morally permissible research whatever its benefits.[ii]

I contend that Marquis is correct in these sentiments. What made such experiments wrong was not that they failed to bring about the significant results they aimed at, but rather that the means they did so were unjust, and involved disrespecting and degrading human beings. Hence even if important advancements in fighting hypothermia or hepatitis have been achieved, the experiments should still be condemned.

A few years ago however, I came across a different analysis of the ticking time bomb case that makes sense of its initial plausibility without leading to the conclusion that violence is justified whenever more, or a large number, of people are made happy by its commission.

In his monograph The Theory of Morality Alan Donagan responds to ticking time bomb cases, by noting, correctly, that violence is not unjust if used against an unjust aggressor. Suppose a person is attacking an innocent third party and is threatening to kill them or do them irreparable injury, suppose further that the only way to stop him is by use of violence, either by physically hitting him and inflicting probable pain and injury upon him. In such a situation, both civil and divine law recognise that the use of violence is justified. It’s this moral insight that is behind the legal right to kill or use force in self defence.

Donagan goes on to note that the case I sketched above seems to fit this paradigm of justified use of violence. The terrorist, is complicit in the planting of bombs which are about to go off, hence he is in the process of committing a heinous act of violent aggression against hundreds of innocent people, hence if the only way to prevent this attack from killing these people is to use violence against him, it is justified. This however, seems to leave open a case for justified torture. If one has reasonable grounds for thinking that the terrorist is complicit in such an attack and if one knows that the only way to gain the information necessary to thwart this attack is to torture the terrorist, then one is justified in using violence proportionate to the gravity of the attack, against the terrorist, to extract this information.

Interestingly Donagan steps back from concluding that torture should be permitted in such cases. He notes, perhaps plausibly, that in real life situations its dubious one will really know that a given person is in fact a terrorist. Nor is it likely in most situations that one will know that torture is the only way to prevent an attack hence he concludes. A rule allowing torture in such cases would probably cause much mischief. He concludes “In the last century and a half, torture has come to be prohibited in all civilised countries: and rightly, because it has been found practically impossible , while allowing it at all, to confine it to those very few cases where it would be morally permissible”

This may be a compelling reason for banning torture as an interrogation technique. But it seems clear to me that the context in which the use of Tasers are being proposed is quite different. No one is suggesting Tasers be used as an interrogation device to extract information from suspects. Instead, Tasers are used by the proposed as a defensive weapon, to defend either the police man himself or a member of the public from imminent attack. And it seems false to suggest that the law cannot make distinctions between violence used in justifiable defence of the innocent and that which is not. For centuries both common law and statute law have been drawing just this distinction and applying it in the courts. Section 48 of the crimes act for example allows this defense to assault. “Every one is justified in using, in the defence of himself or another, such force as, in the circumstances as he believes them to be, it is reasonable to use." So it seems then that (i) one can justifiably inflict pain injury and even death on a person in defense of ones self or others and (ii) the law can make this distinction. Hence it’s hard to see why, torture, which is wrong presumably because it inflicts pain and injury on people, can always be unjustified in the context being proposed. Hence even if one grants that the Tasers are a form of torture it does not follow its always wrong to use them.

There is of course a way around this conclusion, an apologist for the greens could argue that (i) and (ii) are false and we should abolish section 48 of the crimes act. I think this is absurd, but stranger things have come from the Green party. Consider, Sue Bradfords tireless campaign to abolish section 59 of the crimes act which allowed parents to use “reasonable force” to correct bad behavior of children. I distinctly remember Sue arguing that this defense should be abolished because. (a) its unacceptable to draw distinctions between reasonable and unreasonable violence (b) all forms of violence are wrong. (c) All people have a right to be protected from violence and (d) what’s reasonable to one person is not reasonable to another (e) under section 59 some people who were guilty of assault were acquitted because they persuaded a jury that their force was reasonable. Now, as I pointed out Bradford herself, don’t each of these arguments apply with equal force to section 48 of the crimes act? In a sense then the Greens have already made the argument that people should not be allowed to defend themselves by implication which, perhaps, puts this whole Taser debate in an interesting context.

[i] Judith Jarvis Thomson “Killing Letting Die and the Trolley Problem” The Monist Vol. 59, p 205.
[ii] Don Marquis “Stem Cell Research: The Failure of the New Bioethics” Free Inquiry, Winter 2002 Vol. 23 # v1.

Friday, 23 November 2007

When Trust is Destroyed

In the last 24 hours I have been following the debate over the father convicted for assaulting his son. Predictably I have heard differing views from many people whose sense I respect. On the one hand I have heard that he was only prosecuted for delivering three smacks. On the other I have heard that there were other factors, the man lost his temper and left bruises.

Reflecting on this has led me to wonder if there is more to this than the surface debate. Is this debate simply a symptom of a corruption of confidence that has occurred in the last few years (or even few months).

Under the old law we knew that a person accused of child abuse could argue that their act was reasonable in the circumstances. We knew also that 12 people, randomly selected from the population, screened for bias had examined the facts and we knew there were strict rules of evidence applied. We also knew that the judiciary and police were independent of the government. And we knew that if an error was made we could appeal to higher independent tribunals if necessary. Hence if a person was prosecuted for “assaulting their child” we could have a degree of confidence they had done so unjustifiably. We also had some confidence that mistakes would be corrected. Of course the system was not perfect. It never is. But it was reliable.

Now we don’t. There is no distinction between reasonable and unreasonable force for correction in law. All force for correction no matter how trivial is unreasonable under the letter of the law. We know that this is absurd and against common sense. However we are told that we do not have to worry because police can exercise discretion and we can trust them.

The problem is, many of the same people have just told us that the police cannot be trusted. In the last month we have been told that are police are racist and will accuse of terrorism without evidence often from the same community that supported appealing S 59.The greens have warned us that, under terrorism legislation that state have wide discretion that they can use the police to silence dissent. Apparently those in power can’t be trusted to use commonsense in discretion. The Maori party has also told us that this police, whom can be trusted to exercise discretion, overreact to allegations of violence and will proceed terrorize families and children in their zeal. Both these groups exhorted us to trust police discretion in their voting on s59. We know that only in the last 24 hours a high profile police officer, who has been dodged by rape charges for several years, has resigned before he faced investigation on unspecified charges of misconduct. We also know several of his colleagues have been convicted of rape. We also know that at least three MP’s have committed assaults, the police know it, and they choose not to prosecute. We know that one of these MP’s assaulted children while a teacher and this was not considered serious. We also know that the police seem to almost never prosecute labour MP’s who commit crimes accept when those MP’s are ones known to be offside with the PM. We also know, however, that they did try to Prosecute National MP Nick Smith and that merely owing 35$ to an MP warrants a police car to be dispatched to the creditors house. We also know that recently evidence suppressed by the courts was leaked to the media, and confident claims by people on the far-left is that that the police, whom these people assure us we can trust to not use their power unjustly, leaked the documents to subvert a fair trial.

As to the courts we have heard in the last 24 hours, again from the Greens, that the court may have convicted and innocent man for murder. We know also that the Privy Council overturned another murder conviction, one that had been subjected to intense review from all NZ’s appeal courts, and described it as a miscarriage of justice. We also know that the privacy council has been scrapped, because the government considers it unnecessary, and that the ruling party now appoints the judges. We also are aware of evidence the court suppressed in the aforementioned police rape case may have lead to their conviction. We also suspect the courts have suppressed evidence which appears to provide a basis for thinking a group of people are terrorists.

We also have no idea what exactly our leaders consider reasonable or unreasonable force. We are told that violence is never OK. But that an MP who punches another will not face any serious ramification. We also know that a history of abusing children as a teacher does not disqualify you from being a government minister. While violence is never OK, we also are told that people who talk about killing pakeha, talk about engaging in armed insurgency, talk about assassinating people, also buy military weapons, dress as military soldiers and practice military style maneuvers are just mouthing of and it’s an overreaction to think otherwise. Apparently activists on the left mouth off like this all the time. On the other hand we have heard that health professionals should should ask questions of all women admitted to their care in order to screen for violence and abuse. And we know that these questions seem to work with a definition of abuse so broad that everyone is an abuser. Those on the left tell us that while it’s unwarranted to gain warrants for phone taps and surveillance under terror legislation for the above mentioned “mouthing off” families need professionals to regularly monitor them to prevent potential violence.

We also have no clue what the law actually says or how it will be applied. We have just been informed this father would have been prosecuted even if the old law was in place. But they also told us that legislative change was necessary because the old law allowed people to beat their children with planks of wood and could get away with almost anything. They also told us that this law does not mean smacking is illegal. In addition they told us that smacking was already illegal and always had been.

And it’s not just this law. We have been told that the terrorism suppression act was incoherent and impossible to apply. At the same time the MP’s were voting on a slightly amended version of the act and it passed with an overwhelming majority. We have heard that the Electoral Finance Bill law is confusing and difficult to interpret and could threaten our civil liberties. But that’s OK because, you can trust the police the courts and the government to rely on the law of commonsense. As you see from the examples above what our MP’s consider commonsense is difficult to discern.

In a fallen world violence is sometimes necessary. But it needs to be regulated. A civil society needs clear laws that the population can understand and which it’s reasonable to think most people can obey. Exceptions to these laws need to be understandable and not excessively complex to apply. These laws need to be applied impartially to all people regardless of their political allegiances and people who are governed by these laws need to be able to find out what they are. Most importantly we need to be able to trust those in authority to competently establish and maintain such a system

New Zealand is failing to do this. Our leaders in parliament are all over the place, and we have no idea whether those in charge can be trusted to do what they are supposed to do or even know what they are doing. For these reasons people justifiably do not trust the courts or the police to be sensible in prosecuting assaults nor do they trust legislators to pass adequate laws about assault and. And that is the real tragedy of this case.

Wednesday, 21 November 2007

New Publication

I just recieved word from the Editor of The Journal of Ethics and Medicine that my article "Boonin's Defense of the Sentience Criteria: A Critique" has been accepted for publication in a future issue (the exact issue is still being decided). There may be some minor ammendments made but at present the following is the accepted abstract for this article.

Defenders of the permissibility of feticide commonly argue that killing an organism is not homicide unless the organism’s brain has developed enough for it to acquire sentience: the capacity for consciousness and the ability to perceive pleasure and pain. In this paper I will critique one of the more sophisticated versions of this argument that proposed by David Boonin in A Defense of Abortion. In I I will sketch some prima facie problems faced by any appeal to sentience. In section II I will examine Boonin’s attempt to defend an appeal to sentience against these problems by contructing a modified future like ours (FLO) account of the wrongness of killing. I will argue that Boonin’s modified future like ours (FLO) defence of sentience fails. Both his argument for the modified FLO account and his application of this account to feticide rest on ad hoc arbitrary manoeuvres, manoeuvres which mean that the modified FLO account is a plausible criteria for the right to life only if one already grants that feticide is not homicide.

Damian Peterson on Sexual Morality

In a recent post I took a swipe at an argument often used to justify current sex education policies. In the comments section Damian Peterson advanced the debate further than this specific argument. I think he raises some issues worth clarifying so I will respond to them here. Damian’s comments in full are,

OK, I see. So you were referring to the politician who replied that he thought that it would be 'unrealistic' when asked about teaching abstinence in schools because a study showed that abstinence wasn't really being observed elsewhere?Did he say why it wasn't realistic? I would tend to agree that saying something isn't realistic because it's just too popular is a silly argument. And you'd be right to highlight it with the exaggeration of other, more emotive, examples.But if he was saying that it wasn't realistic because there is no rational reason to teach abstinence for other reasons (like studies of teen pregnancies where abstinence is taught or that there is no rational moral issue with consensual casual sex) then I'd have to side with the politician. But first I'd want to know his reason.I've read your second link and perused the first.
You seem to trying to find extremes to justify your stance on casual sex. I don't use the Bible as my reference point for my morals and I believe that most of life is filled with non-absolutes where we have to draw sometimes awkward lines that occasionally need adjusting. You didn't really address what would actually be wrong if (assuming I wasn't married) I went out on the town, hooked up with someone else who had the same expectations of a casual fling, and had consensual casual sex. What do you see is wrong with this? And why do you feel you have a right to try to stop it from happening?

1. Damien argues that abstinence education should not be taught in schools, because (a) there are studies which show it’s less effective at lowering teen pregnancies and (b) there is no rational moral basis for the normative principle prohibiting sex outside of a monogamous life long union.

Now I agree that abstinence education should not be taught in public schools that’s because I don’t think anything should be taught in public schools. I think public schools are problematic and unjust. Despite this I think, the reasons Damien’s suggests for opposing abstinence teaching are flawed.

Re b. Damien’s simply asserts that this principle has no rational basis. However asserting a religious teaching is irrational provides no one with any reason for thinking it is.

Re a. assuming the studies in correct are accurate, the conclusions each are beside the point. The issue is not what method achieves the desired results more efficiently, but whether it achieves these results by morally licit means. Sterilising teenagers as soon as they reach puberty would undoubtedly be extremely effective at reducing teenage pregnancy, yet that does not mean we should do this, because the results are brought about by unlawful means.

2. In several places I have critiqued the “liberal” position that an Damian responds to this critique by stating that “seem to trying to find extremes to justify your stance on casual sex. "
This, misunderstands my argument. I am not arguing that causal sex is wrong by appealing to extremes. Rather I am rebutting a common argument for numerous permissive policies (including causal sex) by pointing out that the core premise is false. It’s false because if it were true it would entail that actions which are self evidentially abhorrent are in fact merely permissive life style choices. The fact that these abhorrent practises can be classified as “extreme” is nether here nor there. The point is that they are entailed by the premise in question.

In fact by recognising them as extreme Damien reiterates my point, if what he professes were true they would not be extreme cases at all, merely the lifestyle preferences of one minority group.

3. Damian’s main line of argument however is to spell out his own position and then ask me to answer the question “why is causal sex wrong?”

I think my answer to this question is clear. I am a Voluntarist (or divine command theorist) hence I believe that what makes things right or wrong is their conformity with or divergence with the commands of God. Hence what makes causal sex wrong is ultimately the fact that it is contrary to Gods commands. Damian asserts he does not believe in the existence of a divine law but this has no bearing on whether the answer I have provided is correct. The fact that someone does not believe something is true does not mean it is not true.

To avoid caricatures however, let me articulate a little how I understand this. In a recent discussion of sexual morality Mark Murphy notes that appeals to divine law are “not a stop gap where a theory of normative ethics has failed” any more than “an appeal to the existence of a civil law prohibiting driving at over 65 miles per hour is a desperate turn to the civil law where normative ethical theories ‘fail’ to describe why people are bound to not drive more than 65 miles an hour” Murphy goes on to note that “ Just as human legislators can give reasons, rooted in the human good, for such a human law, even if the law does not dictate a particular speed limit” So “we as human beings can give some account, grounded in the good of rational creatures, as to why God would lay down this type of command”

I think Murphy’s understanding of the relation of divine law to human good in this context has some promise. We can see good reasons, such as the protection of life, property etc to have a speed limit. We can also recognise that because of the substantial benefits of travelling in cars some speed limits are unreasonable (i.e. one requiring people to only travel at 5 Klm). But none of these reasons dictates that the speed limit must be 100klm over say 95 klm or 110. This however does not lead us to question the law. Because there are good reasons for having one, and this rule is, in light of the dangers of driving not irrational, even if the dangers do not require a rational, virtuous person to endorse this particular speed limit as opposed to another. Because the state chooses this particular rule we are legally bound to follow it.

Similarly we can see good reasons, such the risk of STD’s, the economic and emotional burden of raising children, the danger of exploitation, emotional harm, the temptation to have an abortion etc, to have some rules regulating sexual conduct. We can also recognise that because of the substantial benefits of sex, (such as the creation of new life, pleasure, expression of intimacy and love) some rules (such as requiring celibacy of all people) would be unreasonable. None of these reasons dictates that the traditional rules be adopted over all possible alternatives. However this should not lead people to question the rule. Because there good reasons for having one , and the traditional rule is, in light of the dangers of involved in sex, not irrational, even if the dangers do not require a rational person to endorse this rule. Because God promulgated this particular rule we are morally bound to follow it.

I am also sceptical that anyone has ever come up with a reason why a rational person should reject this rule, or that “liberal alternatives” are any more defensible, plausible, or coherent or viable in light of the risks. At best the rule is unfashionable and (like the speed limit) widely flouted. For reasons I expounded in the aforementioned post, principles should not be based on fashion or popularity. We should not conduct ethical and theological discussions as glorified teenagers doing and believing X because all the other cool people do.

4. Finally Damian asks me “why do you feel you have a right to try to stop it [casual sex] from happening? Here I think Damian fails to note that being opposed to something happening is simply an implication of thinking it is wrong. To state an action is wrong is to express opposition to it to express a volition that it not be performed. Of course this does not mean one should use coercion or force to prevent the action occurring. Sometimes this is justified (like when a person shoots a rapist about to attack his daughter) but sometimes it is not. But the idea that one can simultaneously think an action is wrong and also not oppose the performance of the action is, I think, incoherent.

If Damian’s concern is that I am not incoherent then I make no apologies, the fact that some liberals think contradicting themselves is trendy or cool only underscores the foolishness of their position.

Monday, 12 November 2007

Congratulations

I want to take this opportunity to offer congratulation to my friend Glenn People’s over at Beretta on the successful examination of his PhD thesis entitled Religion in the Public Square. In this work Glenn criticizes contemporary liberal thinkers who maintain that religion should be excluded from public life in a liberal democracy. Glenn and I have been friends for years; he studied at Waikato Poly while I did my Masters in the Philosophy department, we both studies biblical studies at BCNZ together, and probably both drove our lecturers nuts, and Madeleine and I followed him down to Otago.

Glenn and I have also had similar trajectories. Glenn did his a undergrad and Masters in Theology and was doing a PhD in Philosophy. I did my undergrad in and masters in Philosophy and did my PhD in Theology. Ironically, Glenn received word that his thesis had passed examination on Friday November 9th 2007 I received word that mine had passed on Friday November 10 2006. We also have very similar interests, as the title of his thesis shows. Madeleine and I really miss the long debates and discussions we used to have at his house in Dunedin.

Congratulations Glenn, you Ruth and the kids have worked really hard on this. I am looking forward to reading your work when all the final amendments and hard binding etc are done. I wish you all success.

Wednesday, 7 November 2007

Imposing Your Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence

Recently an acquaintance forwarded me a some comments about this blog on a internet forum. The critic, who goes by the handle Kaiwai stated:

Matt Flanagan I find, yes, some of the things I agree with but there is generally speaking, a huge difference; I don't set out to impose my views by way of legislation - if I want to 'change the world', I'd sooner set an example by living the life I preach, then hope that it'll rub off on others

I want to focus on one criticism leveled at me in this comment. It’s the objection that that I support “imposing my views onto others”. This criticism of religious conservatives is not new, I have seen it numerous times in the media and even some academics use it. In her book The Abortion Myth, bio-ethicist Leslie Cannold writes.

The United States religious right, like most religious extremists, believe their political beliefs are actually God’s will. ... [Feminism is opposed] to one religious groups imposition of its rather narrow version of morality on a pluralistic society.

Cannold objects that any appeal to divine law as laid down in scripture constitutes an imposition of one’s view upon others and this is, she assumes objectionable. Feminists (such as her) she assures us oppose such things.

I always find this objection strange, because despite widespread impression to the contrary there is nothing objectionable about imposing one’s moral beliefs or values upon others. I know this comment will strike many as absurd, so I will offer two arguments for this claim. Firstly, the contention that it is wrong to require others to comply with one’s moral principles is subject to serious counter-examples. Secondly, it is self-referentially incoherent.

Turning to the first, consider an act like rape, assault or infanticide. I believe each of these practices is wrong. Further, I expect others to refrain from doing them. I even support their commission being considered a crime punishable by the state. However, if it were wrong to impose my moral beliefs upon others, my position on rape, assault or infanticide would be unacceptable. I would have to leave others free to choose whether they wished to rape or kill children and hold that my own qualms about these matters do not apply to others. This would be absurd.

Secondly, the contention that it is wrong to require others to comply with one’s moral principles is self-referentially incoherent. This is clear when one realises the contention itself is a moral principle. Those who defend it assert that it is wrong to impose one’s beliefs upon others, that one is required to refrain from such an imposition and any attempts to do so should be prevented. However, given that this contention expresses a moral principle then those who defend it have no right to expect that others will comply with it, nor can they force people to do so. If it is wrong to require others to comply with one’s own moral principles then those who reject this principle, such as I, are free from having to follow it since no one has the right to impose it upon me.

In fact, this contention that imposing your moral principles upon others is wrong has all sorts of curious consequences. Paul Hill believed that it was morally permissible to shoot abortionists. I think Paul Hill was wrong. However, if this contention is correct it is wrong for me to demand that Mr Hill comply with my beliefs as that would be forcing my beliefs on to him. Consequently, the laws that ban shooting abortionists are unjust as they impose someone else’s morality on to another. The same thing can be said about those who block abortion clinics and even those who blow them up. The alleged duty not to impose one’s beliefs onto others is a double-edged sword. Not only does it proscribe the criminalisation of abortion but it also proscribes making laws against preventing people from having abortions. It simultaneously entails both that people should be free to have abortions and free to force others not to have abortions. It is incoherent.

By itself, the observation that people are imposing their beliefs upon others is of little consequence. However, perhaps I am being unchartible Cannold does not object to such imposition in an unqualified manner. Her objection is that it is inappropriate to impose certain kinds of moral principles upon others . The types of principles Cannold wants to reject as a basis for public debate are those she labels “narrow”. What is meant by this spatial metaphor is unclear; however, I presume she means that this is a minority view, held by only a small segment of society.

Implicit in this argument is the claim that a necessary condition for any principle to be utilised in public debate is that the majority accepts it as true. However, this is subject to numerous counter-examples. Consider a culture where the majority believes that a husband has the right to beat his wife. Would an advocate of majoritarianism contend that in such a society criticism by a feminist minority of this practice and the advocacy of norms forbidding spousal abuse is an unacceptable imposition of a narrow, feminist perspective in a pluralistic society? Would it be true that in such a society public policy could not be based on the moral principle that it is wrong for a man to beat his wife?

Consider an Islamic society where the majority believe that conversion to a rival, monotheistic religion is immoral and should be a capital offence. Not to execute converts to Judaism or Christianity in such a society would, by this reasoning, be unjust. In societies where a racial majority thinks a racial minority is sub-human, it would be unjust to grant equal human rights.

I think then the objection to imposing ones “narrow” beliefs on to others is misguided. What is wrong is not the imposition of someones values, but the imposition of values that incorrect, irrational, oppressive or unjust. If the principles expounded in Christianity are correct and accurately reflect justice then there is nothing wrong with imposing them on others. To label an appeal to these values as unjust because it involves such an imposition is to argue backwards.

Thursday, 1 November 2007

Euthyphro Objection III:The Redundancy of God is Good

In my previous post I criticised Singer’s utilisation of the arbitrariness objection against voluntarism. Singer’s last objection comes as a rejoinder to the line of response sketched.

Some modern theists have attempted to extricate themselves from this type of
dilemma by maintaining that God is good and so could not possibly approve of
torture; but these theists are caught in a trap of their own making, for what
can they possibly mean by the assertion that God is good? That God is approved
by God?[i]

The problems with this response have already been demonstrated. Singer suggests that the modern theists who propose this response hold that ‘good’ means approved by God. However, this is not what they propose. Some, like Quinn and Weirenga, suggest that what makes actions right or wrong are the commands of God. Adams holds that wrongness is the property of being contrary to God’s commands. Neither of these views entails that ‘God is good’ means ‘God is approved’ by God.

In order for Singer’s objection to be something other than a straw man, it needs to be reformulated to deal with theories like the ones actually proposed by defenders of Voluntarism. One such formulation is suggested, though not endorsed, by Edward Weirenga.

[I]f to be morally good is to do no wrong, and if what is wrong is what is
forbidden by God, then to say that God is good is just to say that he never does
what he forbids himself to do. But there is no moral value in never doing what
one forbids oneself to do.[ii]

This objection is problematic. Firstly, the last premise affirms that there is no moral value in never doing what one forbids oneself to do; i.e. there is no moral value in living by the standards you set yourself, so to speak. This is false. There very clearly is moral value in avoiding hypocrisy and hypocrisy involves, in part, not following the standards one lays down for one’s own behaviour. Moreover, the very notion at the heart of much contemporary, ethical theory is that of autonomy. Autonomy refers to the act of regulating one’s own behaviour in light of the laws or principles of which one approves.

Finally, note that Weirenga’s objection begins with “if to be morally good is to do no wrong ... then”. [Emphasis added]. The argument assumes that goodness is defined purely in terms of doing one’s duty. This was not claimed in the theory proposed and this assumption is at best controversial. Many ethical theories define ‘right’ in terms of a relationship to what is good and others see rightness as involving side constraints upon the quest for good. At best, what is needed is an argument as to why a theist must accept such a definition and none has been offered.

Paul Faber notes that within Presbyterian tradition there are strong precedents for not characterising goodness this way. He notes how God’s goodness is characterised in the Westminster Confession.[iii]

[M]ost loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and
truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin; the rewarder of them that
diligently seek Him; and withal, most just, and terrible in His judgments,
hating all sin, and who will by no means clear the guilty.[iv]

Here God’s goodness is not defined so much in terms of conformity to duties but in terms of various character traits or excellence. Virtues such as being loving, truthful, forgiving, etc, hating actions that are wrong, praising and rewarding what is right. Nothing in Voluntarism entails that God cannot have such attributes. Voluntarism might have this implication if it also maintained that God has such traits because he is required to or if the virtues mentioned cannot be attributed to God without defining them in terms of various commands he has issued. However, none of this is necessary. God does not have to have a duty to have something in order to have it and such things as being loving, truthful, forgiving, etc. can all be understood without specifying any divine command.

[i] Singer, Practical Ethics, 3-4.
[ii] Weirenga, The Nature of God, 222.
[iii] Paul Faber, “The Euthyphro Objection to Divine Normative Theories: A Response” Religious Studies 21 (1985): 564-567.
[iv] Westminster Confession of Faith, Ch. 2, Article 1, 145.

Wednesday, 31 October 2007

The Euthyphro Objection II: Arbitrariness

In his work Practical Ethics Singer proposes a version of the Euthyphro dilemma to criticise Voluntarist (a Divine command theory) views of ethics

Some theists say that ethics cannot do without religion because the very meaning
of “good” is nothing other than “what God approves”. Plato refuted a similar
view more than two thousand years ago by arguing that if the gods approve of
some actions it must be because those actions are good, in which case it cannot
be the gods’ approval that makes them good. The alternative view makes God’s
approval entirely arbitrary: if the gods had happened to approve of torture and
disapprove of helping our neighbours, torture would be good and helping our
neighbours bad.[i]

In my previous post pointed out that his version of the Euthyphro argument relies upon a straw man. Voluntarism is not typically proposed as a theory about what is good but is usually restricted to deontic properties such as right and wrong. Its worth noting however that, this fact is not fatal to Singer’s position; it is possible to develop analogies to the Euthyphro that do not rely on this straw man. James Rachels is an example In The Elements of Moral Philosophy James Rachel’s suggests that an action is right either because God commands it or he commands it because it is right. He then offers the same arguments Singer does to suggest that only by embracing the second horn of the dilemma which amounts to giving up Voluntarism, can one escape absurdity.[ii]

The key argument Singer raises against Voluntarism is, “if the gods had happened to approve of torture and disapprove of helping our neighbours, torture would be good and helping our neighbours bad”.[iii] Singer couches this objection in terms of goodness and badness but the same objection can be raised with regards to claims that Gods commands constitutes what is right and wrong. Rachels for example states that Voluntrism “leads to trouble” because “it represents Gods commands as arbitrary. It means God could have given different commands just as easily. He could have commanded us to be liars, and then lying, not truthfulness would be right”[iv]

The objection is that Voluntarism entails a certain, counter-factual conditional; to use Singer’s example, if God commanded torture then torture would not be wrong. While Singer does not state that this conditional is false, he appears to take it for granted that it is. After all, if the conditional were true then the fact that Voluntarism entails it would not constitute an objection to Voluntarism. Unfortunately, Singer provides no reason for thinking this conditional is false. He appears to think that it is obvious.

Phillip Quinn has given reasons for questioning this assumption. Quinn notes that a counter-factual conditional such as ‘If God commands torture then torture is not wrong’ is false only if the antecedent is true and the consequent false.[v] In other words, the conditional is only false in a situation where God in fact does command torture and torture in that situation is wrong. In order for Singer’s objection to be sound there needs to be a logically-possible situation in which God does offer the command in question and the action he commands is wrong. Is such a scenario logically possible?

It is doubtful it is. God is perfectly and maximally good. Hence, the first premise is true only if a perfectly-good being would command an action such as the torture of children. This is unlikely. The claim that a perfectly-good being would command something morally abhorrent is on the face of it incoherent. Hence, it is unlikely that such a situation is possible.

A former teacher of mine, Mane Hajdin, suggested to me that this assertion is too hasty a few years ago he offered me the following criticism.

[I]t is assumed that being good involves being loving, forgiving, etc, in all
possible worlds. But why should we assume that? Why aren’t there worlds in which
being good involves being cruel, ruthless, etc? To simply assume that, in this
context, may leave the impression of begging the question

Roy Perett suggested to me that that there are possible states of affairs where the contingent and factual structure of the world would be so different that what we take as paradigms of virtue in fact are not. In such a world, torture may be conducive to human flourishing or be, in fact, a virtuous activity.There may be something to this response. The problem with this response is that it still fails to provide reasons for thinking that the above-mentioned conditional is false. In order for this conditional to be false it must be logically possible not just for God to command an action but for that action to be wrong in the given situation. Perett and Hajdin provide us reasons for thinking that it is possible for a perfectly-good being to command actions such as torture or creulty. However, the situations envisaged are ones in which torture is not, in fact, wrong. In the situation Perett envisages, torture is, in fact, virtuous and in Hajdin’s torture is good. In such examples it is the virtuous nature of torture that makes it plausible to assume that a perfectly-good being could command it.

It remains doubtful whether a logically-possible situation in which God commands an action and that action is wrong could exist. This is because a perfectly-good being would not command wrongdoing. To the extent that we think a perfectly-good being could command a particular action, we have reasons for thinking the action permissible. On the other hand, to the extent that we think it is impossible for the action to be wrong we find it impossible to envisage how a perfectly-good being could command it.

[i] Singer, Practical Ethics, 3.
[ii] James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) 42.
[iii] Singer, Practical Ethics, 3.
[iv] Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 42
[v] Phillip Quinn, “Divine Command Theory,” in Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. H Lafollette (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 70.

Sunday, 28 October 2007

The Euthyphro Dilemma Against Divine Commands I: Avoiding Strawmen

Perhaps the most common argument against an appeal to divine commands in ethical reasoning is the Euthyphro dilemma, first articulated by Plato and utilised by numerous critics of divine commands ever since. A representative example of this line of argument occurs in Peter Singer’s widely-acclaimed monograph Practical Ethics. In the first chapter of Practical Ethics Singer offers the following argument.

[E]thics is not something intelligible only in the context of religion. I shall treat ethics entirely independent of religion.

Some theists say that ethics cannot do without religion because the very meaning of “good” is nothing other than “what God approves”. Plato refuted a similar view more than two thousand years ago by arguing that if the gods approve of some actions it
must be because those actions are good, in which case it cannot be the gods’ approval that makes them good. The alternative view makes God’s approval entirely arbitrary: if the gods had happened to approve of torture and disapprove of helping our neighbours, torture would be good and helping our neighbours bad.[i]

Several features of this critique are noteworthy. Singer attacks a position known in the literature as Voluntarism (also called the divine command theory of ethics) that he construes as the view that “the very meaning of “good” is nothing other than “what God approves.” He bases this on the testimony of “some theists”. Singer’s argument here consists of three stages. He proposes the famous dilemma proposed by Socrates in Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro. He then claims that Voluntarism makes God’s commands arbitrary. He asserts that acceptance of Voluntarism entails that paradigmatically-evil actions such as torture could be good. He concludes that Voluntarism makes God’s goodness redundant,

Some modern theists have attempted to extricate themselves from this type of dilemma by maintaining that God is good and so could not possibly approve of torture; but these theists are caught in a trap of their own making, for what can they possibly mean by the assertion that God is good? That God is approved by God?[ii]

In the next few post I will respond to the Euthyphro dillemia, In this post I will comment upon Singer’s description of his opponents’ position and suggest it is a straw man. In the next few posts I will asses the arguments he proposes and argue they are unsuccessful. Contrary to what is commonly asserted in ethics textbooks and first year philosophy lectures, I do not think the Euthyphro dillemia is sound

As I stated above, Singer’s argument is an attack upon a position known in the literature as ‘Voluntarism’. Schneewind notes that in the late Middle Ages two schools emerged as to the relationship between God and the existence of an objective law. The first and older position is known as Intellectualism. In this view, God does not create morality; rather, God’s will is guided by his intellectual knowledge of eternal moral standards. The second position is Voluntarism. Voluntarism grounded the moral law not so much in God’s intellect but in his will. God himself creates the moral law.[iii]

It is worth noting at this juncture that Voluntarism is only one possible way of construing the nature of divine law and since Singer only offers an argument against this position, even if his argument is sound it fails to establish that the idea of divine law is problematic. Nevertheless, even as a critique of Voluntarism the argument appears to attack a straw man.

Singer construes Voluntarism as claiming “the very meaning of ‘good’ is nothing other than ‘what God approves.’” It appears then that Singer characterises Voluntarism as a theory about the meaning of the evaluative term “good”; however, this is a caricature of Voluntarism.

Few, if any, notable defenders of Voluntarism propose it as a theory about the meaning of the term ‘good’. This is demonstrated by examining the literature of those contemporary theists who do defend versions of Voluntarism. A notable, contemporary defender of Voluntarism is Robert Adams. In Divine Command Ethics Modified Again and later in his monograph Finite and Infinite Good, Adams puts forward the view that “ethical wrongness is (i.e., is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God”.[iv] [Emphasis original]

Note two things here; firstly, Adams does not offer a theory about ‘the good’ but explicitly limits his theory to deontological properties such as wrongness. Secondly, his theory is not about the meaning of terms; rather it is a metaphysical claim about identity.

This last distinction is important. Contemporary philosophy of language offers several examples of this distinction between two terms having the same meaning and two things being identical. One of the most famous is the relationship between water and H20. Water is H20. This is a claim of identity. The liquid on earth that we call water is hydrogen hydroxide. However, this is not a claim of meaning. The claim that water is H20 is not an analytic truth that is true in virtue of the meaning of the words, rather it is a claim discovered by empirical investigation. Moreover, a competent language user could refer to water and understand the meaning of this term without needing to know about the atomic structure H20. Similar examples are available with such claims as ‘the morning star is the evening star’ or ‘Superman is Clark Kent.’ In each case, we have a statement of identity that is distinct from the claim that two words have the same meaning. Adams then explicitly denies he is proposing the position Singer attributes to modern theists.

Similar things can be said about the other major defenders of Voluntarism. William Alston holds that divine commands are constitutive of deontological properties and notes Adam’s identity claim as a paradigm of the type of relationship he is defending.[v]

Philip Quinn defends a version of Voluntarism that is limited to the deontological status of actions.

In speaking of the deontological status of an action, I mean to refer to whether it has such properties as being morally permitted, being morally forbidden or prohibited, and being morally obligatory or required.[vi]

Quinn argues that God’s commands cause or bring about these properties. He specifically denies that he is offering a theory of ‘the good’ in general or that the relationship between God’s commands and moral properties is one of meaning. In fact, he argues against such a view.[vii]

Edward Weirenga defends a similar theory proposing that divine commands are those properties of actions that make them possess deontic properties such as right and wrong. He does not affirm that the word ‘good’ means commanded by God.[viii] Similarly, John Hare argues, “that what makes something obligatory for us is that God commands it”.[ix]

This is not just true of contemporary defenders of Voluntarism. In a survey of the historical literature, Janine Marie Idziak notes that, historically, Voluntarism was usually understood as a theory about what makes actions right and wrong and not a theory about the meaning of moral terms.[x] Moreover, historically, Voluntarists such as Locke[xi] and Puffendorf limited it to deontological properties and not to broader axiological properties such as goodness.

Robert Adams did defend a semantic theory in some of his earlier writings but, as noted, he later rejected his theory in favour of the one I sketched above. Moreover, the semantic theory Adams did initially defend bears little resemblance to the interpretation of Voluntarism made by Singer. Adams explicitly asserted that his theory was limited to analysing the meaning of the word wrong and not broader notions such as goodness. Moreover, it was limited to an analysis of what the word means in Judeo-Christian discourse not what the word meant in general.[xii]

It is difficult then to ascertain to whom exactly Singer is referring when he states “Some theists” hold this view and he fails to provide any citations as to whom he is referring. He appears to attack a straw man that has little resemblance to the theory as it has usually been articulated and defended in both historical and contemporary literature.

Not only does Singer attack a straw man but attention to the arguments he uses reveals that in the very next sentence he changes his interpretation from a theory of meaning to a dependence or causal theory. Immediately after stating, “the very meaning of “good” [is nothing other than] what God approves”, Singer follows Plato in suggesting that either something is good because God approves of it or God approves of it because it is good.[xiii] However, this presupposes that the relationship between divine approval and goodness is some kind of asymmetrical relationship where one entity in the relationship is temporally or ontologically prior to the other.

If, as Singer maintains, Voluntarism is the claim that “the very meaning of ‘good’ is nothing other than ‘what God approves’,” then the relationship between divine approval and goodness is not an asymmetrical relationship but rather a relationship of meaning so this dilemma simply does not apply.

Consider the following example. A person tells you that a bachelor is an unmarried man because the word bachelor means unmarried man. It would not make sense to respond to this claim ‘yes, but is he a bachelor because he is unmarried or is he unmarried because he is a bachelor?’ A person’s unmarried-ness is not prior to or the cause of his bachelorhood nor is his bachelorhood the cause of his being unmarried. His being unmarried is just a different way of referring to his bachelorhood. The relationship between a bachelor and an unmarried man is not causal; the relationship is one of meaning.

Immediately after stating that Voluntarism is a theory about the meaning of terms, Singer offers an objection that presupposes it is not a semantic theory but a causal one. However, only a few lines later he offers the following objection to Voluntarism “what can they [theists] possibly mean by the assertion that God is good? That God is approved by God?”[xiv] Here Singer’s objection relies on the claim that good means approved by God in order to generate the trap he refers to. Not only does Singer attack a straw man but also his target appears to change throughout the discussion. In fact, it appears to change in order to fit the objections raised.

[i] Singer,Practical Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3.
[ii] Ibid., 3-4.
[iii] Jerome Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8-9.
[iv] Robert Adams, “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979): 76.
[v] William Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 303-304.
[vi] Phillip Quinn, “An Argument for Divine Command Theory,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 291.
[vii] Ibid., 293.
[viii] Edward Weirenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 215-27. See also “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory,” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984): 311-318 and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory,” Nous 17 (1983): 387-408.
[ix] John Hare, God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands and Human Autonomy, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 49.
[x] Janine Maree Idziak, “In Search of Good Positive Reasons for an Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of Arguments,” Faith and Philosophy 6:1 (1989): 60.
[xi] For a defence of the claim that Locke was a voluntarist see Francis Oakley & Elliot W. Urdang, “Locke, Natural Law and God,” Natural Law Forum, 11 (1966): 92-109.
[xii] Robert Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness” In Divine Commands and Morality, ed. Paul Helm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 83-108.
[xiii] Singer, Practical Ethics, 4.
[xiv] Ibid., 3-4.
[xv] Ibid.
[xvi] Ibid., 40.

Thursday, 25 October 2007

Abortion and Capital Punishment and Craig Young

An acquaintance of mine sent me a copy of this article at Gaynz.com by Craig Young. Craig and I have a kind of knack at studying the very same topics at the same time. He wrote a PhD thesis criticising conservative Christian views on abortion around the same time I started writing my PhD thesis defending such views. With this article the timing is somewhat uncanny. One of the main burdens of Craig’s article is to argue for the conclusion that it is not inconsistent to both oppose capital punishment and support abortion "rights". Craig bases this conclusion on the contention that fetuses are not human because they lack sentience. Intriguingly I have just submitted an article for publication rebutting the claim that fetuses are not human until sentient and I have just had word that another article, where I discuss the relationship between feticide and capital punishment, has been accepted for publication. Since Craig has put his thoughts on these issues before the public, I will respond to them here.

Before getting to the nitty gritty is worth noting the deceptive slips in Craig’s post. Craig writes:

Amnesty International opposes torture, harassment organised homophobic violence and the death penalty when performed on the basis of homosexuality. Saudi Arabia demonstrates the complexity of the issue, with formal sharia law but co-existing cruising grounds and private indulgence of what is legally forbidden. However, Nigeria, Sudan, Iran, and Iraq's Mahdi Army all penalise male homosexuality, while Iran also mandates capital punishment for persistent lesbianism, Hezbollah and Hamas also believe that their version of fundamentalist Islamism, whether Shia or Sunni, has no place for homosexuality. They base this on their arguable interpretation of the Qu'ran and particular traditions of interpretation of attributed sayings of the Prophet Muhammed, although the Hanafi school of interpretation is more liberal than others….
Surely no-one could object to the above, especially given that the Christian Heritage Party, which alone supported reintroduction of the death penalty in New Zealand, died after Capillgate in 2005.

Now a couple of things to note here. Craig states that Amnesty opposes capital punishment when "performed on the basis of homosexuality." He then insinuates that only the Christian Heritage Party opposed Amnesty's stance because it supported the reintroduction of capital punishment.

This is deceptive. As Craig knows, Amnesty does not just oppose capital punishment for homosexuality, it opposes it for any crime including murder. It is this aspect of Amnesty that the Christian Heritage Party opposed. As Craig knows, the Christian Heritage Party did not support the death penalty for homosexuality, it supported it only for pre-meditated murder when there were multiple eyewitnesses. Craig is trying to conflate support for Capital Punishment per se with support for executing Gays.

Craig also seems to think that because some countries execute homosexuals it follows that people should support the abolition of the death penalty for any crime. This is a very weak argument. After all,many countries imprison homosexuals so an analogous line of argument would suggest that Craig should oppose imprisonment for any crime yet strangely he advocates imprisonment for murder later on in his article. This demonstrates Craig is quite capable of drawing distinctions between the morality of a practice and the morality of a specific application of the practice.

It is also a weak argument to suggest that because an organisation like Amnesty supports some worthy causes, such as opposition to torture, it follows it should not be subject to criticism for other causes it supports, such as abortion rights. If abortion is homicide then for every person saved by Amnesty thousands, if not millions, are killed with its tacit support.

However, what I really want to comment on is Craig’s argument for the consistency of a pro-abortion stance with an anti-death penalty stance. Craig writes:

However, the Christian Right has piped up with references to embryos and fetuses. There's a vast difference between pre-sentient potential humans and actual, flesh and blood biographical human subjects, not that that troubled Right to Life New Zealand throughout the nineties when it had Graham Capill as one of its patrons, or when Voice for Life Vice-Presidnet Annetta Moran stood on the same Christian Coalition party list as Capill in 1996. And as Amnesty International is a pluralist organisation, why should it support an essentially religious campaign against women's reproductive freedom, in any case?

Now several things are worth noting here; Craig’s key claim is that, unlike capital punishment, abortion does not kill an actual human being. This is because fetuses (up till around 28 weeks) are not sentient and hence not "biographical subjects." There is a serious problem with this argument. It presupposes that a being must be a "biographical subject" to be a human being.

Now while it is true that prior to sentience fetuses are not such subjects, neither are they such subjects for some time after sentience. In fact, for some time after birth infants are not "biographical subjects" either. This point was vigorously demonstrated by Michael Tooley in his monograph Abortion and Infanticide. Sentience is a necessary condition for being a "biographical subject" but it is not a sufficient condition.

To be a biographical subject one needs more than just sentience. One needs to have a concept of an enduring self and to have this, a certain level of cognitive development is necessary. As Tooley demonstrates, the requisite development does not take place until after birth. Hence, if Craig were consistent he would support not just abortion but also infanticide. Craig can maintain a consistent stance on the ethics of killing only if he maintains that serial killers have a right to life and newborn infants do not.

Craig’s appeal to sentience is similarly problematic. In A Defense of Abortion, David Boonin notes that those who attempt to ground humanity in the psychological development of an organism face a dilemma, "Any appeal to what a brain can do at various stages of development would seem to have to appeal to what the brain can already do. Or to what the brain has the potential to do in the future."

Either option leads to problems for a defender of the permissibility of feticide who does not also want to endorse infanticide. This is because "by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows and pigs, chickens and ducks or more intellectually developed than a new born infant." Suppose, then, one takes the first horn of the dilemma and appeals to what the brain can already do. However, unless one wishes to affirm that cats, dogs and chickens are human beings, "appeals to what the brain can already do" will "be unable to account for the presumed wrongness of killing toddlers or infants."

Suppose then, one takes up the second horn of the dilemma and appeals to "what the brain has the potential to do in the future". This will entail that feticide is homicide. "If [such an account] allows appeals to what the brain has the potential to do in the future, then it will have to include fetuses as soon as their brains begin to emerge, during the first few weeks of gestation." Again, Craig is forced to either grant the humanity of a fetus or deny the humanity of an infant.

Finally it is worth noting how Craig attempts to pass of his contradictory stance with some really silly inferences. He dismisses support for Capital Punishment on the grounds that the Christian Heritage Party "died after Capillgate." Similarly, in the citation above he notes that some anti-abortion groups were either associated with Capill or had people associated with Capill in them.

One wonders what this has to do with anything?

Both groups had the associations in question before it was known Capill was a criminal. There is no evidence they supported his actions or that they were complicit in his crimes. Given these facts, how is Capill remotely relevant? The only purpose reference to him serves is to encourage people to jump to unwarranted conclusions that certain people support abusing children when they do not.

However, let us suppose, contrary to fact, that these people had been complicit in Capill’s crimes. This would still tell us nothing about the permissibility of capital punishment or abortion. It would merely tell us that some people who oppose abortion are criminals. In the absence of a compelling reason for thinking that no just policy is ever supported by criminals and remember Criminals tend to vote left of centre, the correct response to Craig’s assertion is to ask "and?"

Let me illustrate the problems with Craig’s inferences by turning the tables here. Craig writes for Gaynz.com, a few years ago it was discovered that one of Gaynz’s regular writers, Jim Peron, had been an apologist for the views of NAMBLA. Jim Peron had published paedophile erotica written by convicted child molesters, written articles agressively labelling critics of "man boy love" as "hysterics" for viewing paedophilia as abuse, sold NAMBLA material and had NAMBLA meetings in his store. His visa to NZ was denied on the basis of these facts about his character.

Now, would it be fair of me to insinuate from this association that Craig is a NAMBLA supporter or that everyone who agrees with him on abortion and capital punishment is morally suspect because Craig is associated with a group that was once associated with this man Jim Peron? Could I logically dismiss Craig’s position on abortion and capital punishment merely by pointing this fact out? Of course not!

What I need to do and have done above, is provide an argument against these positions. Similarly, if Craig is to provide a rebuttal of the stances I and others have taken on capital punishment and abortion he needs to provide arguments against those stances but as usual, Craig and the team at Gaynz have none.

Spot the Difference

A few weeks ago wide publicity was given to a study that concluded that NZ women are the most promiscuous in the world. (The fact that, this study had some serious scientific shortcomings having neither a control group nor a random sample group was not so widely publicised.)

What was interesting was the reaction by some that this study as somehow validated permissive sexual mores. To cite one typical example, at the recent family first forum a question was asked from the floor about what would be taught in sex education courses at public schools. The response, from at least one politician, was that this study showed that encouraging people outside of a monogamous sexual relationship to practise abstinence was unrealistic.

Now this morning we see another study has come out this study suggests that sexual molestation of children is prevalent in NZ it suggests that one in four women have been sexually molested. I note the almost universal response from our politicians and media and quite rightly so, is to condemn these practises and exhort NZers to change any actions and attitudes that lead to such behaviour.

I am confused: I thought that when a significant number of people engaged in a sexual practise, then it was unrealistic to condemn it? I thought the state was supposed to simply accept contemporary practise and alter their values to fit it. Can the politicians who make the aforementioned argument about sex ed answer me this: When are you going to advocate that the state to teach safe child molestation techniques in public schools?

The reality is that we do not look to contemporary practise to determine what’s right and wrong. Rather we use principles of right and wrong to critique contemporary practise. Despite their trendy sloganising, our politicians know this, or at least they do when it suits them, but conveniently forget when it doesn’t. If contemporary liberals want to justify their values to others, they need to provide arguments for them. Not assurances that these practises are fashionable or trendy or that “all the cool people are doing it” or that “Kinsey showed 10% of people do this” etc. Unlike some people in parliament and the media many of us grew out of our teens sometime ago.

Friday, 19 October 2007

What we can learn from the police raids

The recent raids on various anarchist, environmentalist and Maori sovereignty activists of this week have thrown up some issues which its worth reflecting on.

The police allege that several activists up and down the country were involved in some kind of armed insurgency against the government. (Given the far left ideology these people hold this actually is not as surprising or far fetched as it seems. Marx taught that social change can only be brought about through armed revolution and advocated such revolution. Worldwide millions of people have died as a result of this belief. In fact the idea that force or violence against innocent people is justified to achieve social reform is at the heart of even moderate left wing thinking see here). These allegations by the police will be tested in a court of law at this early stage however the evidence for these allegations has not yet been provided. That’s because the trial is yet to happen. Hence it would be unwise and unjust to make a prouncement either way. Unlike what occurs in socialist regimes in NZ whether a person is guilty or innocent is determined by an impartial trial, according to evidence. We don’t use state owned media or the discretion of leftist news editors to determine these things. Nor do we use denouncement by a mob of people to determine these things.

Note however the reaction of many activists on the political left. They appear to not like this fact about our current society. Instead are condemning the police for racism, they are claiming that the state has unjustly persecuted groups working for social change. They claim arrests on flimsy evidence have been made to ensure the passing of anti-terror legislation. They are organising protests up and down the country to condemn the arrests. The problem is that no one has yet seen the evidence for the allegations. This should send a message to all loud and clear, these activists will condemn people are organisations for racism, without and before examining the evidence . They will support a group without examining the evidence about what that groups actions actually were. They will allege government conspiracies to suspend people’s civil liberties, without examining the evidence or before the evidence for this claim is clear.

Of course it’s possible that they are correct in these allegations and its also possible that they are not. If it turns out they are correct then this will mean NZ has to face some very unpleasant truths about our current government. It will be apparent that under our current left wing regime, we have a police force that will accuse people of terrorism, send armed police into their homes, search their property and arrest them with out any evidence whatsoever to assist the state in passing certain legislation. That will be very concerning. On the other hand if these activists are wrong, then it will reveal to us some unpleasant truths about far left activism in this country. That groups, many of which have preached armed revolution for years, actually mean what they say and intended to kill harm and maim New Zealanders.

The point is however at this stage we have insufficient evidence to know which of these scenarios are true. If these activists turn out to be correct, its not because they actually had evidence for these claims, it will be simply a fluke, a piece of luck. Although they will take credit for bringing this to NZ’s attention they will not deserve such credit All they brought forward was unwarranted speculation which just happened to turn out to be correct.

This brings us to what I think is worth noting here. Many activists on the far left in our country have demonstrated to all that evidence means nothing to them. They have made up their minds about what’s true and false regardless of what the evidence is, they will jump on band wagons make serious allegations accuse others of conspiracy racism, and protest when they have no evidential basis for what they say. There is a word for this, its called prejudice: judging a person or group as evil prior to any consideration of the evidence for and against them. There is also a word for people who express intolerance for others, and do so obstinately regardless of the evidence for or against. My dictionary states the correct English word for people who do this is “bigot”. There is also a word used for denigrating another’s character ( i.e. accusing him of racism, conspiracy, persecution of others etc) without evidence “slander”

I also want my readers to reflect on a couple of questions: What does the fact that a group of people will make accusations this serious about others before the evidence is in say about their integrity, their concern for other people, their commitment to truth and fairness? And what does the fact that a group will make public condemnations, protests and prouncements without any evidence say about their credibility?

I want you then to take a further action, remember these questions and the obvious answers to them next time you see the same people march down the street alleging a conspiracy of governments and big business to destroy the freedoms of the workers, Maoris and Gays. Or claiming that this event was really a conspiracy to get Oil. Remember it next time they make some allegation about another person being a racist or homophobe and remember it next time they make some condemnation prouncement or public condemnation. People who are not interested in the facts deserve to have no credibility.

I discovered at Uni that many segments of the far left in this country are a nasty group of malicious people who will lie, slander, and defame others, without any evidence at all to achieve their political goals. I also discovered that they frequently lies distort the truth, suppress or refuse to consider any evidence against their views they then whip up irrational mobs to repeat their slogans. In fact they tend to get very nasty and aggressive if counter evidence is provided. For example if say a PhD student ethics writes into a magazine and refutes their argument, they often respond with nasty puerile slander and abuse, but are unable to actually deal with the evidence provided.

This lesser known face of left wing activism is now there in public for all to see. Take a good look.

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