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Thursday, 29 November 2007

Greens, Tasers and Torture

Watching the news the other night, I heard how some UN body had declared that the use of tasers constituted torture. (At least that is how it was reported). Predictably the Green party cited this as I for rejecting the use of Tasers.

The implicit argument here seems to go something like this. [1] The use of Tasers constitutes torture [2] Torture is always unjust, therefore [3] the use of Tasers is unjust. Formally this argument is valid. If [1] and [2] are true [3] follows. Most people I suspect will take issue with [1] and I think there could well be problems with this claim. I think however a more interesting issue arises here. Is [2] actually true, is torture always unjust or are there circumstances in which it is justified and, assuming Tasers are torture devices, are they an instance of such a circumstance.

Is torture always unjust? A common argument for justifiable torture goes something like this: A terrorist cell has planted several bombs in malls around the countries; they will be detonated some time in the next 24 hours. One member of the cell who knows where these bombs are has been captured. Would it be acceptable to torture the terrorist to gain this information, or should one instead let thousands die? Cases like this are sometimes called “ticking time bomb” cases. Many people find, that their moral sense or intuitions lead to conclude that torture is justified in ticking time bomb cases. The popularity of shows like 24 attest to this.

Act Utilitarianism provides a prima facie rationale for this judgment. According to Act Utilitarianism, an action is right if and only if the consequences of performing it result in more net happiness than any alternative. In this instance, torturing the terrorist will make him suffer. However, failure to torture him will result in thousands of deaths and thus will lead to even greater suffering. Hence, the former action; that of torturing the terrorist is justified.

Until fairly recently I did not find this analysis convincing, while I see the force of the ticking time bomb case. The act utilitarian assessment seems to me to be wrong. This is because one can construct equally plausible cases where one should not engage in violence against another person, even if doing so results in an increase in net happiness. Consider the following two cases, taken from the literature. Judith Jarvis Thomson [i]. Thomson points out that if a doctor painlessly kills a group of healthy patients and harvests their organs, an even greater number of people can be saved via organ donation. It is in fact conceivable that forcing people to under go various medical procedures such as kidney and or bone marrow transplants would result in numerous people being saved from fatal illnesses. Despite these facts, however, neither killing people nor enforcing compulsory transplants are permissible practices. Although such procedures may promote the happiness of others and in some cases be life saving, they do so by unjust means, killing and assaulting innocent human beings.

Don Marquis suggests a second case. The infamous the Willowbrook experiments which involved experimenting upon mentally retarded children in order to ascertain information for fighting diseases such as Hepatitis or the Nazi experimenting upon concentration camp inmates to learn how to combat hypothermia. Regarding these experiments Don Marquis notes that

The Tuskegee, Willowbrook and Nazi studies were wrong, not because they were bad and useless science, but because the human subjects in them were treated inhumanely…There is now a consensus, both in society and in academic bioethics that this is wrong even when the research will clearly benefit the common good. In short conformity with a respect for human subjects principle is a necessary condition of morally permissible research whatever its benefits.[ii]

I contend that Marquis is correct in these sentiments. What made such experiments wrong was not that they failed to bring about the significant results they aimed at, but rather that the means they did so were unjust, and involved disrespecting and degrading human beings. Hence even if important advancements in fighting hypothermia or hepatitis have been achieved, the experiments should still be condemned.

A few years ago however, I came across a different analysis of the ticking time bomb case that makes sense of its initial plausibility without leading to the conclusion that violence is justified whenever more, or a large number, of people are made happy by its commission.

In his monograph The Theory of Morality Alan Donagan responds to ticking time bomb cases, by noting, correctly, that violence is not unjust if used against an unjust aggressor. Suppose a person is attacking an innocent third party and is threatening to kill them or do them irreparable injury, suppose further that the only way to stop him is by use of violence, either by physically hitting him and inflicting probable pain and injury upon him. In such a situation, both civil and divine law recognise that the use of violence is justified. It’s this moral insight that is behind the legal right to kill or use force in self defence.

Donagan goes on to note that the case I sketched above seems to fit this paradigm of justified use of violence. The terrorist, is complicit in the planting of bombs which are about to go off, hence he is in the process of committing a heinous act of violent aggression against hundreds of innocent people, hence if the only way to prevent this attack from killing these people is to use violence against him, it is justified. This however, seems to leave open a case for justified torture. If one has reasonable grounds for thinking that the terrorist is complicit in such an attack and if one knows that the only way to gain the information necessary to thwart this attack is to torture the terrorist, then one is justified in using violence proportionate to the gravity of the attack, against the terrorist, to extract this information.

Interestingly Donagan steps back from concluding that torture should be permitted in such cases. He notes, perhaps plausibly, that in real life situations its dubious one will really know that a given person is in fact a terrorist. Nor is it likely in most situations that one will know that torture is the only way to prevent an attack hence he concludes. A rule allowing torture in such cases would probably cause much mischief. He concludes “In the last century and a half, torture has come to be prohibited in all civilised countries: and rightly, because it has been found practically impossible , while allowing it at all, to confine it to those very few cases where it would be morally permissible”

This may be a compelling reason for banning torture as an interrogation technique. But it seems clear to me that the context in which the use of Tasers are being proposed is quite different. No one is suggesting Tasers be used as an interrogation device to extract information from suspects. Instead, Tasers are used by the proposed as a defensive weapon, to defend either the police man himself or a member of the public from imminent attack. And it seems false to suggest that the law cannot make distinctions between violence used in justifiable defence of the innocent and that which is not. For centuries both common law and statute law have been drawing just this distinction and applying it in the courts. Section 48 of the crimes act for example allows this defense to assault. “Every one is justified in using, in the defence of himself or another, such force as, in the circumstances as he believes them to be, it is reasonable to use." So it seems then that (i) one can justifiably inflict pain injury and even death on a person in defense of ones self or others and (ii) the law can make this distinction. Hence it’s hard to see why, torture, which is wrong presumably because it inflicts pain and injury on people, can always be unjustified in the context being proposed. Hence even if one grants that the Tasers are a form of torture it does not follow its always wrong to use them.

There is of course a way around this conclusion, an apologist for the greens could argue that (i) and (ii) are false and we should abolish section 48 of the crimes act. I think this is absurd, but stranger things have come from the Green party. Consider, Sue Bradfords tireless campaign to abolish section 59 of the crimes act which allowed parents to use “reasonable force” to correct bad behavior of children. I distinctly remember Sue arguing that this defense should be abolished because. (a) its unacceptable to draw distinctions between reasonable and unreasonable violence (b) all forms of violence are wrong. (c) All people have a right to be protected from violence and (d) what’s reasonable to one person is not reasonable to another (e) under section 59 some people who were guilty of assault were acquitted because they persuaded a jury that their force was reasonable. Now, as I pointed out Bradford herself, don’t each of these arguments apply with equal force to section 48 of the crimes act? In a sense then the Greens have already made the argument that people should not be allowed to defend themselves by implication which, perhaps, puts this whole Taser debate in an interesting context.

[i] Judith Jarvis Thomson “Killing Letting Die and the Trolley Problem” The Monist Vol. 59, p 205.
[ii] Don Marquis “Stem Cell Research: The Failure of the New Bioethics” Free Inquiry, Winter 2002 Vol. 23 # v1.

Friday, 23 November 2007

When Trust is Destroyed

In the last 24 hours I have been following the debate over the father convicted for assaulting his son. Predictably I have heard differing views from many people whose sense I respect. On the one hand I have heard that he was only prosecuted for delivering three smacks. On the other I have heard that there were other factors, the man lost his temper and left bruises.

Reflecting on this has led me to wonder if there is more to this than the surface debate. Is this debate simply a symptom of a corruption of confidence that has occurred in the last few years (or even few months).

Under the old law we knew that a person accused of child abuse could argue that their act was reasonable in the circumstances. We knew also that 12 people, randomly selected from the population, screened for bias had examined the facts and we knew there were strict rules of evidence applied. We also knew that the judiciary and police were independent of the government. And we knew that if an error was made we could appeal to higher independent tribunals if necessary. Hence if a person was prosecuted for “assaulting their child” we could have a degree of confidence they had done so unjustifiably. We also had some confidence that mistakes would be corrected. Of course the system was not perfect. It never is. But it was reliable.

Now we don’t. There is no distinction between reasonable and unreasonable force for correction in law. All force for correction no matter how trivial is unreasonable under the letter of the law. We know that this is absurd and against common sense. However we are told that we do not have to worry because police can exercise discretion and we can trust them.

The problem is, many of the same people have just told us that the police cannot be trusted. In the last month we have been told that are police are racist and will accuse of terrorism without evidence often from the same community that supported appealing S 59.The greens have warned us that, under terrorism legislation that state have wide discretion that they can use the police to silence dissent. Apparently those in power can’t be trusted to use commonsense in discretion. The Maori party has also told us that this police, whom can be trusted to exercise discretion, overreact to allegations of violence and will proceed terrorize families and children in their zeal. Both these groups exhorted us to trust police discretion in their voting on s59. We know that only in the last 24 hours a high profile police officer, who has been dodged by rape charges for several years, has resigned before he faced investigation on unspecified charges of misconduct. We also know several of his colleagues have been convicted of rape. We also know that at least three MP’s have committed assaults, the police know it, and they choose not to prosecute. We know that one of these MP’s assaulted children while a teacher and this was not considered serious. We also know that the police seem to almost never prosecute labour MP’s who commit crimes accept when those MP’s are ones known to be offside with the PM. We also know, however, that they did try to Prosecute National MP Nick Smith and that merely owing 35$ to an MP warrants a police car to be dispatched to the creditors house. We also know that recently evidence suppressed by the courts was leaked to the media, and confident claims by people on the far-left is that that the police, whom these people assure us we can trust to not use their power unjustly, leaked the documents to subvert a fair trial.

As to the courts we have heard in the last 24 hours, again from the Greens, that the court may have convicted and innocent man for murder. We know also that the Privy Council overturned another murder conviction, one that had been subjected to intense review from all NZ’s appeal courts, and described it as a miscarriage of justice. We also know that the privacy council has been scrapped, because the government considers it unnecessary, and that the ruling party now appoints the judges. We also are aware of evidence the court suppressed in the aforementioned police rape case may have lead to their conviction. We also suspect the courts have suppressed evidence which appears to provide a basis for thinking a group of people are terrorists.

We also have no idea what exactly our leaders consider reasonable or unreasonable force. We are told that violence is never OK. But that an MP who punches another will not face any serious ramification. We also know that a history of abusing children as a teacher does not disqualify you from being a government minister. While violence is never OK, we also are told that people who talk about killing pakeha, talk about engaging in armed insurgency, talk about assassinating people, also buy military weapons, dress as military soldiers and practice military style maneuvers are just mouthing of and it’s an overreaction to think otherwise. Apparently activists on the left mouth off like this all the time. On the other hand we have heard that health professionals should should ask questions of all women admitted to their care in order to screen for violence and abuse. And we know that these questions seem to work with a definition of abuse so broad that everyone is an abuser. Those on the left tell us that while it’s unwarranted to gain warrants for phone taps and surveillance under terror legislation for the above mentioned “mouthing off” families need professionals to regularly monitor them to prevent potential violence.

We also have no clue what the law actually says or how it will be applied. We have just been informed this father would have been prosecuted even if the old law was in place. But they also told us that legislative change was necessary because the old law allowed people to beat their children with planks of wood and could get away with almost anything. They also told us that this law does not mean smacking is illegal. In addition they told us that smacking was already illegal and always had been.

And it’s not just this law. We have been told that the terrorism suppression act was incoherent and impossible to apply. At the same time the MP’s were voting on a slightly amended version of the act and it passed with an overwhelming majority. We have heard that the Electoral Finance Bill law is confusing and difficult to interpret and could threaten our civil liberties. But that’s OK because, you can trust the police the courts and the government to rely on the law of commonsense. As you see from the examples above what our MP’s consider commonsense is difficult to discern.

In a fallen world violence is sometimes necessary. But it needs to be regulated. A civil society needs clear laws that the population can understand and which it’s reasonable to think most people can obey. Exceptions to these laws need to be understandable and not excessively complex to apply. These laws need to be applied impartially to all people regardless of their political allegiances and people who are governed by these laws need to be able to find out what they are. Most importantly we need to be able to trust those in authority to competently establish and maintain such a system

New Zealand is failing to do this. Our leaders in parliament are all over the place, and we have no idea whether those in charge can be trusted to do what they are supposed to do or even know what they are doing. For these reasons people justifiably do not trust the courts or the police to be sensible in prosecuting assaults nor do they trust legislators to pass adequate laws about assault and. And that is the real tragedy of this case.

Wednesday, 21 November 2007

New Publication

I just recieved word from the Editor of The Journal of Ethics and Medicine that my article "Boonin's Defense of the Sentience Criteria: A Critique" has been accepted for publication in a future issue (the exact issue is still being decided). There may be some minor ammendments made but at present the following is the accepted abstract for this article.

Defenders of the permissibility of feticide commonly argue that killing an organism is not homicide unless the organism’s brain has developed enough for it to acquire sentience: the capacity for consciousness and the ability to perceive pleasure and pain. In this paper I will critique one of the more sophisticated versions of this argument that proposed by David Boonin in A Defense of Abortion. In I I will sketch some prima facie problems faced by any appeal to sentience. In section II I will examine Boonin’s attempt to defend an appeal to sentience against these problems by contructing a modified future like ours (FLO) account of the wrongness of killing. I will argue that Boonin’s modified future like ours (FLO) defence of sentience fails. Both his argument for the modified FLO account and his application of this account to feticide rest on ad hoc arbitrary manoeuvres, manoeuvres which mean that the modified FLO account is a plausible criteria for the right to life only if one already grants that feticide is not homicide.

Damian Peterson on Sexual Morality

In a recent post I took a swipe at an argument often used to justify current sex education policies. In the comments section Damian Peterson advanced the debate further than this specific argument. I think he raises some issues worth clarifying so I will respond to them here. Damian’s comments in full are,

OK, I see. So you were referring to the politician who replied that he thought that it would be 'unrealistic' when asked about teaching abstinence in schools because a study showed that abstinence wasn't really being observed elsewhere?Did he say why it wasn't realistic? I would tend to agree that saying something isn't realistic because it's just too popular is a silly argument. And you'd be right to highlight it with the exaggeration of other, more emotive, examples.But if he was saying that it wasn't realistic because there is no rational reason to teach abstinence for other reasons (like studies of teen pregnancies where abstinence is taught or that there is no rational moral issue with consensual casual sex) then I'd have to side with the politician. But first I'd want to know his reason.I've read your second link and perused the first.

You seem to trying to find extremes to justify your stance on casual sex. I don't use the Bible as my reference point for my morals and I believe that most of life is filled with non-absolutes where we have to draw sometimes awkward lines that occasionally need adjusting. You didn't really address what would actually be wrong if (assuming I wasn't married) I went out on the town, hooked up with someone else who had the same expectations of a casual fling, and had consensual casual sex. What do you see is wrong with this? And why do you feel you have a right to try to stop it from happening?

1. Damien argues that abstinence education should not be taught in schools, because (a) there are studies which show it’s less effective at lowering teen pregnancies and (b) there is no rational moral basis for the normative principle prohibiting sex outside of a monogamous life long union.

Now I agree that abstinence education should not be taught in public schools that’s because I don’t think anything should be taught in public schools. I think public schools are problematic and unjust. Despite this I think, the reasons Damien’s suggests for opposing abstinence teaching are flawed.

Re b. Damien’s simply asserts that this principle has no rational basis. However asserting a religious teaching is irrational provides no one with any reason for thinking it is.

Re a. assuming the studies in correct are accurate, the conclusions each are beside the point. The issue is not what method achieves the desired results more efficiently, but whether it achieves these results by morally licit means. Sterilising teenagers as soon as they reach puberty would undoubtedly be extremely effective at reducing teenage pregnancy, yet that does not mean we should do this, because the results are brought about by unlawful means.

2. In several places I have critiqued the “liberal” position that an Damian responds to this critique by stating that “seem to trying to find extremes to justify your stance on casual sex. "
This, misunderstands my argument. I am not arguing that causal sex is wrong by appealing to extremes. Rather I am rebutting a common argument for numerous permissive policies (including causal sex) by pointing out that the core premise is false. It’s false because if it were true it would entail that actions which are self evidentially abhorrent are in fact merely permissive life style choices. The fact that these abhorrent practises can be classified as “extreme” is nether here nor there. The point is that they are entailed by the premise in question.

In fact by recognising them as extreme Damien reiterates my point, if what he professes were true they would not be extreme cases at all, merely the lifestyle preferences of one minority group.

3. Damian’s main line of argument however is to spell out his own position and then ask me to answer the question “why is causal sex wrong?”

I think my answer to this question is clear. I am a Voluntarist (or divine command theorist) hence I believe that what makes things right or wrong is their conformity with or divergence with the commands of God. Hence what makes causal sex wrong is ultimately the fact that it is contrary to Gods commands. Damian asserts he does not believe in the existence of a divine law but this has no bearing on whether the answer I have provided is correct. The fact that someone does not believe something is true does not mean it is not true.

To avoid caricatures however, let me articulate a little how I understand this. In a recent discussion of sexual morality Mark Murphy notes that appeals to divine law are “not a stop gap where a theory of normative ethics has failed” any more than “an appeal to the existence of a civil law prohibiting driving at over 65 miles per hour is a desperate turn to the civil law where normative ethical theories ‘fail’ to describe why people are bound to not drive more than 65 miles an hour” Murphy goes on to note that “ Just as human legislators can give reasons, rooted in the human good, for such a human law, even if the law does not dictate a particular speed limit” So “we as human beings can give some account, grounded in the good of rational creatures, as to why God would lay down this type of command”

I think Murphy’s understanding of the relation of divine law to human good in this context has some promise. We can see good reasons, such as the protection of life, property etc to have a speed limit. We can also recognise that because of the substantial benefits of travelling in cars some speed limits are unreasonable (i.e. one requiring people to only travel at 5 Klm). But none of these reasons dictates that the speed limit must be 100klm over say 95 klm or 110. This however does not lead us to question the law. Because there are good reasons for having one, and this rule is, in light of the dangers of driving not irrational, even if the dangers do not require a rational, virtuous person to endorse this particular speed limit as opposed to another. Because the state chooses this particular rule we are legally bound to follow it.

Similarly we can see good reasons, such the risk of STD’s, the economic and emotional burden of raising children, the danger of exploitation, emotional harm, the temptation to have an abortion etc, to have some rules regulating sexual conduct. We can also recognise that because of the substantial benefits of sex, (such as the creation of new life, pleasure, expression of intimacy and love) some rules (such as requiring celibacy of all people) would be unreasonable. None of these reasons dictates that the traditional rules be adopted over all possible alternatives. However this should not lead people to question the rule. Because there good reasons for having one , and the traditional rule is, in light of the dangers of involved in sex, not irrational, even if the dangers do not require a rational person to endorse this rule. Because God promulgated this particular rule we are morally bound to follow it.

I am also sceptical that anyone has ever come up with a reason why a rational person should reject this rule, or that “liberal alternatives” are any more defensible, plausible, or coherent or viable in light of the risks. At best the rule is unfashionable and (like the speed limit) widely flouted. For reasons I expounded in the aforementioned post, principles should not be based on fashion or popularity. We should not conduct ethical and theological discussions as glorified teenagers doing and believing X because all the other cool people do.

4. Finally Damian asks me “why do you feel you have a right to try to stop it [casual sex] from happening? Here I think Damian fails to note that being opposed to something happening is simply an implication of thinking it is wrong. To state an action is wrong is to express opposition to it to express a volition that it not be performed. Of course this does not mean one should use coercion or force to prevent the action occurring. Sometimes this is justified (like when a person shoots a rapist about to attack his daughter) but sometimes it is not. But the idea that one can simultaneously think an action is wrong and also not oppose the performance of the action is, I think, incoherent.

If Damian’s concern is that I am not incoherent then I make no apologies, the fact that some liberals think contradicting themselves is trendy or cool only underscores the foolishness of their position.

Monday, 12 November 2007

Congratulations

I want to take this opportunity to offer congratulation to my friend Glenn People’s over at Beretta on the successful examination of his PhD thesis entitled Religion in the Public Square. In this work Glenn criticizes contemporary liberal thinkers who maintain that religion should be excluded from public life in a liberal democracy. Glenn and I have been friends for years; he studied at Waikato Poly while I did my Masters in the Philosophy department, we both studies biblical studies at BCNZ together, and probably both drove our lecturers nuts, and Madeleine and I followed him down to Otago.

Glenn and I have also had similar trajectories. Glenn did his a undergrad and Masters in Theology and was doing a PhD in Philosophy. I did my undergrad in and masters in Philosophy and did my PhD in Theology. Ironically, Glenn received word that his thesis had passed examination on Friday November 9th 2007 I received word that mine had passed on Friday November 10 2006. We also have very similar interests, as the title of his thesis shows. Madeleine and I really miss the long debates and discussions we used to have at his house in Dunedin.

Congratulations Glenn, you Ruth and the kids have worked really hard on this. I am looking forward to reading your work when all the final amendments and hard binding etc are done. I wish you all success.

Wednesday, 7 November 2007

Imposing Your Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence

Recently an acquaintance forwarded me a some comments about this blog on a internet forum. The critic, who goes by the handle Kaiwai stated:

Matt Flanagan I find, yes, some of the things I agree with but there is generally speaking, a huge difference; I don't set out to impose my views by way of legislation - if I want to 'change the world', I'd sooner set an example by living the life I preach, then hope that it'll rub off on others

I want to focus on one criticism leveled at me in this comment. It’s the objection that that I support “imposing my views onto others”. This criticism of religious conservatives is not new, I have seen it numerous times in the media and even some academics use it. In her book The Abortion Myth, bio-ethicist Leslie Cannold writes.

The United States religious right, like most religious extremists, believe their political beliefs are actually God’s will. ... [Feminism is opposed] to one religious groups imposition of its rather narrow version of morality on a pluralistic society.

Cannold objects that any appeal to divine law as laid down in scripture constitutes an imposition of one’s view upon others and this is, she assumes objectionable. Feminists (such as her) she assures us oppose such things.

I always find this objection strange, because despite widespread impression to the contrary there is nothing objectionable about imposing one’s moral beliefs or values upon others. I know this comment will strike many as absurd, so I will offer two arguments for this claim. Firstly, the contention that it is wrong to require others to comply with one’s moral principles is subject to serious counter-examples. Secondly, it is self-referentially incoherent.

Turning to the first, consider an act like rape, assault or infanticide. I believe each of these practices is wrong. Further, I expect others to refrain from doing them. I even support their commission being considered a crime punishable by the state. However, if it were wrong to impose my moral beliefs upon others, my position on rape, assault or infanticide would be unacceptable. I would have to leave others free to choose whether they wished to rape or kill children and hold that my own qualms about these matters do not apply to others. This would be absurd.

Secondly, the contention that it is wrong to require others to comply with one’s moral principles is self-referentially incoherent. This is clear when one realises the contention itself is a moral principle. Those who defend it assert that it is wrong to impose one’s beliefs upon others, that one is required to refrain from such an imposition and any attempts to do so should be prevented. However, given that this contention expresses a moral principle then those who defend it have no right to expect that others will comply with it, nor can they force people to do so. If it is wrong to require others to comply with one’s own moral principles then those who reject this principle, such as I, are free from having to follow it since no one has the right to impose it upon me.

In fact, this contention that imposing your moral principles upon others is wrong has all sorts of curious consequences. Paul Hill believed that it was morally permissible to shoot abortionists. I think Paul Hill was wrong. However, if this contention is correct it is wrong for me to demand that Mr Hill comply with my beliefs as that would be forcing my beliefs on to him. Consequently, the laws that ban shooting abortionists are unjust as they impose someone else’s morality on to another. The same thing can be said about those who block abortion clinics and even those who blow them up. The alleged duty not to impose one’s beliefs onto others is a double-edged sword. Not only does it proscribe the criminalisation of abortion but it also proscribes making laws against preventing people from having abortions. It simultaneously entails both that people should be free to have abortions and free to force others not to have abortions. It is incoherent.

By itself, the observation that people are imposing their beliefs upon others is of little consequence. However, perhaps I am being unchartible Cannold does not object to such imposition in an unqualified manner. Her objection is that it is inappropriate to impose certain kinds of moral principles upon others . The types of principles Cannold wants to reject as a basis for public debate are those she labels “narrow”. What is meant by this spatial metaphor is unclear; however, I presume she means that this is a minority view, held by only a small segment of society.

Implicit in this argument is the claim that a necessary condition for any principle to be utilised in public debate is that the majority accepts it as true. However, this is subject to numerous counter-examples. Consider a culture where the majority believes that a husband has the right to beat his wife. Would an advocate of majoritarianism contend that in such a society criticism by a feminist minority of this practice and the advocacy of norms forbidding spousal abuse is an unacceptable imposition of a narrow, feminist perspective in a pluralistic society? Would it be true that in such a society public policy could not be based on the moral principle that it is wrong for a man to beat his wife?

Consider an Islamic society where the majority believe that conversion to a rival, monotheistic religion is immoral and should be a capital offence. Not to execute converts to Judaism or Christianity in such a society would, by this reasoning, be unjust. In societies where a racial majority thinks a racial minority is sub-human, it would be unjust to grant equal human rights.

I think then the objection to imposing ones “narrow” beliefs on to others is misguided. What is wrong is not the imposition of someones values, but the imposition of values that incorrect, irrational, oppressive or unjust. If the principles expounded in Christianity are correct and accurately reflect justice then there is nothing wrong with imposing them on others. To label an appeal to these values as unjust because it involves such an imposition is to argue backwards.

RELATED POSTS:
Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
Sentience Part 1
Sentience Part 2
Viability
Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
Abortion and Child Abuse: Another Response to Farrar
Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
Published: Boonin's Defense of the Sentience Criteria - A Critique
Published: Abortion and Capital Punishment - No Contradiction

Thursday, 1 November 2007

Euthyphro Objection III:The Redundancy of God is Good


In my previous post I criticised Singer’s utilisation of the arbitrariness objection against voluntarism. Singer’s last objection comes as a rejoinder to the line of response sketched.

Some modern theists have attempted to extricate themselves from this type of
dilemma by maintaining that God is good and so could not possibly approve of
torture; but these theists are caught in a trap of their own making, for what
can they possibly mean by the assertion that God is good? That God is approved
by God?[i]


The problems with this response have already been demonstrated. Singer suggests that the modern theists who propose this response hold that ‘good’ means approved by God. However, this is not what they propose. Some, like Quinn and Weirenga, suggest that what makes actions right or wrong are the commands of God. Adams holds that wrongness is the property of being contrary to God’s commands. Neither of these views entails that ‘God is good’ means ‘God is approved’ by God.

In order for Singer’s objection to be something other than a straw man, it needs to be reformulated to deal with theories like the ones actually proposed by defenders of Voluntarism. One such formulation is suggested, though not endorsed, by Edward Weirenga.

[I]f to be morally good is to do no wrong, and if what is wrong is what is
forbidden by God, then to say that God is good is just to say that he never does
what he forbids himself to do. But there is no moral value in never doing what
one forbids oneself to do.[ii]

This objection is problematic. Firstly, the last premise affirms that there is no moral value in never doing what one forbids oneself to do; i.e. there is no moral value in living by the standards you set yourself, so to speak. This is false. There very clearly is moral value in avoiding hypocrisy and hypocrisy involves, in part, not following the standards one lays down for one’s own behaviour. Moreover, the very notion at the heart of much contemporary, ethical theory is that of autonomy. Autonomy refers to the act of regulating one’s own behaviour in light of the laws or principles of which one approves.

Finally, note that Weirenga’s objection begins with “if to be morally good is to do no wrong ... then”. [Emphasis added]. The argument assumes that goodness is defined purely in terms of doing one’s duty. This was not claimed in the theory proposed and this assumption is at best controversial. Many ethical theories define ‘right’ in terms of a relationship to what is good and others see rightness as involving side constraints upon the quest for good. At best, what is needed is an argument as to why a theist must accept such a definition and none has been offered.

Paul Faber notes that within Presbyterian tradition there are strong precedents for not characterising goodness this way. He notes how God’s goodness is characterised in the Westminster Confession.[iii]

[M]ost loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and
truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin; the rewarder of them that
diligently seek Him; and withal, most just, and terrible in His judgments,
hating all sin, and who will by no means clear the guilty.[iv]


Here God’s goodness is not defined so much in terms of conformity to duties but in terms of various character traits or excellence. Virtues such as being loving, truthful, forgiving, etc, hating actions that are wrong, praising and rewarding what is right. Nothing in Voluntarism entails that God cannot have such attributes. Voluntarism might have this implication if it also maintained that God has such traits because he is required to or if the virtues mentioned cannot be attributed to God without defining them in terms of various commands he has issued. However, none of this is necessary. God does not have to have a duty to have something in order to have it and such things as being loving, truthful, forgiving, etc. can all be understood without specifying any divine command.

[i] Singer, Practical Ethics, 3-4.
[ii] Weirenga, The Nature of God, 222.
[iii] Paul Faber, “The Euthyphro Objection to Divine Normative Theories: A Response” Religious Studies 21 (1985): 564-567.
[iv] Westminster Confession of Faith, Ch. 2, Article 1, 145.

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