This morning I recieved word that my article Abortion and Capital Punishment : No Contradiction, will be published in one of the next 3-4 issues of Think.

The article was originally part of my PhD thesis.

I would like to thank Perfect Man whose comments motivated me to submit this section of my thesis for publication.

I am not a sports commentator, and would not consider myself any expert on the question. Like many New Zealanders I love rugby, I played it as a child and at high school. Recently I played a game at the College I teach at and remember the thrill of breaking three tackles and later scoring a try in the annual married versus singles match.

My father played for Waikato and played in an upset match took the Ranfurly Shield off Auckland. My grandfather was Chairman of the Waikato Rugby Union. He was a wise and insightful person and I remember the shock I experienced, as a young Waikato undergrad, when he informed me that he despised Waikato University. He remembered the activists tearing down rugby park fence, initiating violence and threats to his friends and colleagues when Hamilton hosted that infamous game with South Africa. My Grandfather was shocked that academics, people who ostensibly were committed to reason and persuasion would attempt to use force, threats to prevent him and others from watching a game. He was not a racist or a supporter of apartheid and watching a game between Waikato and South Africa no more made him one than watching a game with China makes one a communist or watching a game with Fiji makes one a supporter of military coups. He simply wanted to watch a game and was subjected to threats, force and abuse for doing so and he never forgave Waikato University for this.

In hindsight I should have heeded my grandfather’s warnings. I learnt the hard way that my grandfather’s assessment of Waikato University student activism was correct. Having been subjected to threats of violence, minor assaults, vicious personal abuse and repeated slanderous character assassination for arguing vigorously for more conservative viewpoints I now sympathise with my grandfather considerably.

So rugby is to some extent in my blood, and with this pedigree what I say may make me sound like just another ignorant red neck. But I think the referee is responsible for the All Blacks defeat by France on Sunday. I don’t condone the anger and nastiness that has been thrown at the ref by some. But I also dislike the facile analysis dominating talk back radio today. I hear that we lost have a “blame the authority” mentality fostered by welfare. Its all socialisms fault and blaming the ref is symptomatic of this. Apparently, we need to be less socialistic in our thinking, like the French apparently are.

The issue for me is this: the score was 20- 18. At least two French tries came about as a result of bad refereeing decisions. The first was the sin binning of Luke McAlister the second an obvious forward pass which should have been picked up and wasn’t. The Dominion post this morning notes a third, when the All Blacks had possession towards the end and were attempting a counter strike, the referee signaled advantage and then when the AB’s acted on this signal he disallowed advantage giving the French possession at a crucial time.

I am also sick of hearing people minimise these facts. We have been told that bad ref calls happen and the all blacks should have been able to win despite this. I disagree, its perfectly reasonable in international rugby for the players to expect competent refereeing. And while the odd bad call is to be expected, the consistent bizarre incompetence displayed on Sunday is not acceptable in an international match. People should not have to win despite incompetent referees. Those refs should not be there. It’s not the players job to make up for referee incompetence, the organizers have a duty to ensure competent officials are in charge of matches.
This is not welfarism: True one problem with some welfare policy is that people make the government (and hence the taxpayer) responsible for problems which they are not responsible. To take an example, the DPB makes the government responsible for meeting the costs of rearing children, when the person responsible for this the defaulting parent is not made responsible. If you doubt this try the following experiment (a) Tell the IRD that you will not pay taxes and see what happens. Then (b) get an non custodial parent to tell IRD they will no longer pay the child support payments which the IRD are required to collect and hand over to the custodial parent. Use the same excuse in both situations (such as I can’t afford it, I am a student etc) see what happens. Compare the results of (a) and (b).

I know first hand of a man who owes the IRD several thousand dollars as a result of a student loan. His wife is also owed several thousand dollars in child support payments and has been owed this for years. They have not seen this money, and for sometime the IRD informed them that they could not collect the money because at the time much of this debt was built up the person who owed it was a student.

But while this is one feature of welfarism it is not corrected by “an official is always right, we are always to blame” attitude. In fact one feature of welfarism is a misguided trust in authorities and officials. A belief that somehow that private individuals or corporations cannot be relied on to do certain things while governments can. According to this mind set the profit motive corrupts but power does not.

Sure the AB’s made some mistakes, and they could have played better, that’s all true. But the point is they shouldn’t have needed to, to beat the French they simply needed one thing a competent referee. And it is reasonable to expect them to have been given one. If you can reasonably demand something, aren’t given it, and as a result fail when you would not have, then you can be justifiably upset.

The fact that its predictable that officials will act incompetently and arbitrarily does not mean we should condone them does so. Nor does it mean we should require people to flourishing in spite of it and then blame them when they do not. It means we should try and reform authorities to minimize this, so that people do not need to bend over backwards to flourish. Even on a bad day the AB’s still should have won, because they had the talent to do so, arbitrary incompetence by officials prevented this. This is wrong and should not have happened. Of course it needs to be put in perspective, far worse injustices occurred in the last few days. But it was still wrong and telling people that thinking this is welfarism is absurd.

A born baby is also totally dependent on its mother, only instead of being fed and sheltered by the mother’s automatic internal processes, it is fed and sheltered by the mother’s consciously controlled external, behaviour. How can that make a difference to whether or not a foetus is a human being? [2]

It is doubtful, however, that adoptions are possible for every child whose mother cannot care for it. The world abounds with homeless orphans; even in the industrialised West, where there is a waiting list for adoption of healthy (white) babies, suitable homes cannot always be found for troubled adolescents; inner city, AIDS babies, or many of the multiply handicapped children whose parents have tried to care for them but whose marriages broke under the strain.[3]

Not PC has taken exception to my recent criticism of his blog. He also takes issue with my comments on faith and reason. His responses I think are illustrative of the popular secular mindset so it’s worth responding here.

PC expounds a great deal of rhetorical energy describing my work in pejorative terms. I committed to arguing that “black is white” if the hierarchal Church says so. My reasoning consists merely of “word games” my standards of debate are “low” and my writing is a “tangled thicket” of “misdirections”. Unfortunately simply using pejorative names to describe a position does not provide any reason for rejecting it. A rational person, and PC claims to be a follower of reason, provides arguments. It is to these that I will turn.

1.) PC objects to my comments in a previous blog where I criticised the statement that it is irrational to believe something without proof. (a proposition which was labelled [2] in the original post) PC writes:

Now he may or may not have been referring to exchanges here at Not PC, but if he is then proposition 2 is misstated. What I've said here is that a proposition without proof is flatly arbitrary, and the arbitrary is out. Arbitrary statements don't even get to be called irrational; they don't even get to the table. Matt then goes on to base a whole post on this misstatement.

Now the key word here is *if*.In fact I was not referring to exchanges in not PC. However it’s worth noting that even if I was, PC’s rejoinder could be easily responded to. One could simply change the word “irrational” with the word “arbitrary” in my argument and everything else would still follow. My conclusion would be that it’s not always “arbitrary” to believe things without proof and each of my arguments would be reasons for this altered conclusion.

Not PC clearly takes issue with this conclusion. Latter in his post he states:

Matt himself provides us with an tip that is like a signpost for those of us curious about christian epistemological standards. Says Matt: "you can rationally believe certain things, in certain situations, without evidence."

Oddly PC thinks that simply noting the existence of my thesis refuts it. However, in reality, PC merely demonstrates his lack of understanding of the issues. I am not in this comment defending “Christian” epistemological standards. The thesis that one can rationally (or non arbitrarily) believe some things without proof is largely uncontroversial amongst secular epistemologists. In fact Aristotle, whom not PC attempts to follow, accepted this claim for some of the very reasons I provided in my blog. Roy Clouser summarizes the problems:

If everything needs to be proven then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and a proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand a that everything be proven because an infinte regress of proofs is impossible( Knowing With the Heart p 69)

As the above citation shows, there are arguments for the position I advanced. There are serious philosophical problems with claiming that all beliefs need to be proved. Strangely PC does not even attempt to address these arguments. Instead he merely asserts my position, calls it “Christian epistemological standards” and thinks that’s enough to rebut it. Unfortunately it is not.

2.)PC goes on to state

as all assiduous listeners of Monty Python are aware, "an argument is a connected series of propositions intended to establish a conclusion." What I posted above was not an argument. It was one post with four quotes, one point and an invitation to think about it; some thoughts for a Sunday on how faith undercuts reason. It was not an argument,

I had assumed that when PC was contending that faith destroys knowledge he was actually attempting to provide reasons for his conclusion instead of several assertions. That I though was a more charitable interpretation of PC’s work Apparently, I was mistaken, my contention that he provides a weak argument for his conclusion is mistaken, I should have said he provided none at all. Does this make his position more defensible, No

3.) PC also contents I misinterpreted his position on Tertullian, he states “. I do not "cite" Tertullian as "a Fideist." I simply quoted what he said.” Well what according to PC did Tertullian say? PC contends that Tertullian is one of several thinkers who “held the view that faith is antagonistic to knowledge and reason, a divorce which [Tertullian] approved.” However, as I pointed out in my blog, fideism is the name given to the view that faith is antagostic to reason. Hence PC, by his own admission did contend that Tertullian is a fideist. He simply was unaware the position he attributed to Tertullian has a name and that name is fideism.

4.) PC continues that

He[Me] carries on in this manner, acribing to me all sorts of things I haven't said and positions I haven't taken, eg,"First, [PC] provides some counter examples to anti-evidentialism..." and "Second, he offers some criticisms of the Kalam Cosmological Argument...". In other words, he faults me for insufficiently countering in the comments section two very specific theological sallies, when my response was simply to two fairly general and poorly argued points.

PC states that he was not attacking the kalam cosmological argument and anti-evidentialism. He was rather attacking some general and poorly argued points. Well what were those points? One was the claim that God provides the best explanation of the origin of the Universe. In Philosophy of Religion this argument is known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument. The second, was PC’s contention that its *arbitrary* to believe without evidence. In the literature this is known as evidentialism which is of course the anti-thesis of anti-evidentialism.

Hence, contrary to what PC affirms, he in fact did comment on these issues. It’s just that PC is so unfamiliar with the literature as to know that the positions he criticized had these names. Moreover the arguments he raised were in fact general arguments against these positions not criticisms of specific popularized versions. Hence everything I said stands. PC offered dubious arguments against both positions.

Finally, PC continues to make some questionable claims. He states that I am a doctoral student training to be a theologian. In fact I am a professional theologian with a doctorate. He asserts, that the Gospels were probably written in the second century and third centuries despite the fact the few NT scholars accept such a late date, and again without any evidence. He ignores the numerous scholarly debate about what Kant’s views on religion actually were. He seems unaware for example of Kant’s rationalistic methods in Religion within the bounds of reason or Kant’s attempt to argue for God’s existence in the Critique of Practical Reason. He seems unaware of the debate over whether Kant was a deist, a closet atheist or a Lutheran and he, oddly, seems to think that Kant’s position in the First Critique is clear and obvious (has he read it?) He refers to Mr Alvin Plantinga as a Theologian when it’s Dr Alvin Plantinga and he is a Philosopher.

Not PC has a blog on "How Faith destroys Knowledge". The basic line of argument appears to be as follows: three famous thinkers appear to hold that faith and reason are at odds and that faith is the preferable stance. I am tempted to say so what? Does the fact that three people appear to believe this mean it's true? The only reason PC provides for thinking it is, is that Christopher Hitchens and Ayn Rand say so.

PC also makes some fairly dubious clams. He cites Tertullian as a Fidest and states that the Gospels were written around in the third century AD. Both claims are highly questionable.

What intrigues me most however is his discussion of in the comments section.

But there is no evidence for fairies at the bottom of my garden, spiders on the far side of Mars, or an unlimited bar tab at my local with my name on it.

Until or unless evidence exists for any of these (or for gods, dragons, unicorns or centaurs), then as far as reason and good sense are concerned, they're part of the realm of myth, legend and wishful thinking respectively.

"What caused the start of the universe?"

This is a question that is doubly meaningless. Existence exists. There is no start to existence, though there may be changes to the form in which existence is constituted (through hypotheses such as the big bang for example). But here you're proposing god simply to plug gaps in your knowledge, sort of like a dog-ate-my-homework line.

And even if you reject that obvious point -- that existence has always existed -- and you insist on hypothesising that a god kicked existence into existence, then your hypothesis poses a further who question: who kicked your god into existence, and who kicked her god into existence, etc., etc., etc.

"God done it" is not an explanation, but an admission one doesn't yet have one.

PC here addresses to two issues. First, he provides some counter examples to anti-evidentialism ; the position that belief in God is rational in the absence of evidence for its truth. Second, he offers some criticisms of the Kalam Cosmological Argument: the argument for God's existence based on the fact it has a finite past. I think on both issues he is mistaken, and demonstrates unwittingly some popular confusions on these issues.

Turning first to Anti-Evidentialism. Anti-Evidentialists have argued that you can rationally believe certain things, in certain situations, without evidence. It does not follow from this that one can believe any old thing without evidence. Nor does it follow that the mars and spider examples meet these conditions. These latter claims would require argument. Unfortunately PC gives none.

Similar misunderstandings occur with PC’s critique of the Cosmological argument similar misunderstandings emerge he states

This is a question that is doubly meaningless. Existence exists. There is no start to existence, though there may be changes to the form in which existence is constituted (through hypotheses such as the big bang for example).*

The problem here is that those who propose this version of the cosmological argument do not claim that *existence* started to exist, nor do they argue that something outside of existence ( ie. Something non existent) created existence, that would be absurd. What they claim is that the spatio temporal universe began to exist and that whatever begins to exist has a cause. Not PC’s interpretation of the argument follows only if one assumes that the spatio temporal universe is the totality of existence which of course begs the question.

Not PC then cites the famous “who made God objection”

then your hypothesis poses a further who question: who kicked your god into existence, and who kicked her god into existence,

I have never understood the force of this argument. Those who defend the cosmological argument state that the universe has certain features ( for example a contingent modal status or finite past) which mean its existence requires some form of explanation and they conclude that from these premises that there must be a being that *does not* have these as an explanation. Consequently, it’s false that the question arises at second remove. Of course simply actually reading a defender of the argument would have cleared this up.

I suspect however that PC has not read Christian thinkers he has read Ayn Rand and various libertarian caricatures of Christian thinkers. On the basis of these caricatures he denigrates Christians as irrational and politically dangerous. That is unfortunate.

Recently in correspondence with non believer I have repeatedly meet with the following argument. This is usually touted as a kind of self evident mantra.

[1] There is no proof that God exists [2] Its irrational to believe something unless you have proof . Therefore: [3] belief in the existence of God is irrational.

Now we need to elaborate what is meant by proof here; in Philosophical Theology the word is historically used for the various philosophical arguments that purport to show God exists. Such, things as the Cosmological, ontological, teleological, and moral arguments for Gods existence as well as the 2 dozen or so other arguments that have been proposed. I take it then that claim then that there is no proof means that these arguments all fail.

I think this argument is a bad one. I’ll elaborate why below.

First note there is an interesting relationship between [1] and [2] , in that if [2] is true then a person should not believe in [1] unless they have some arguments for the truth of [1] merely asserting [1] is not enough. If I believe [1] in the absence of a reason for doing so I am, according to [2] irrational, and hence in the very same epistemic situation the proponent of this argument claims a theist is in. Consequently, the first thing, that needs to be asked is: what’s the basis for asserting [1]?. In order to rationally accept this premise, the objector would need take me through the most sophisticated versions of the cosmological, teleological, moral and ontological arguments being proposed in the literature today and demonstrate that they all fail. Now few atheists I know can do this, most in fact have never even read these arguments and have next to zilch familiarity with the literature on these arguments. It seems to me then that these people hold to an incoherent irrational position. They maintain [1] without any proof or reason at all and then assert in [2] that one should not maintain things without proof or reason.

However, to be fair, some atheists have studied this literature and believe they have rebuttals of the arguments in question. So to advance the argument let us assume they are correct, this takes us to [2], but here I think several problems arise.

First, [2] leads to a regress problem, suppose I believe P, to be rational I need proof, therefore I need an argument and I need to be able to rationally believe the premises of this argument. But then by [2] I need proof for these premises. But then I have to believe further premises and I will need proof for this and so on. Unless we stop at some point and believe something without proof, we will be irrational in believing everything.

Second, [2] leads to scepticism, since at least the time of Hume it has been fairly clear that some of the most important beliefs we hold cannot be proved. Consider the belief in a physical world that exists independently of our senses. It has proven difficult if not impossible to find any argument for the existence of this world which does not assume the external world’s existence as an implicit premise. Familiar Sci Fi scenarios where a person is plugged into a virtual reality machine show its logically possible for the world to not exist and us think it does and have all the current experiences we do and hence deductive arguments from the way things appear are unsound. Inductive arguments appear also to fail. For an inductive argument to work one need’s to assume that the future will resemble the past, that there is uniformity in the world. But the existence of the world is what one is trying to prove. William Alston has argued, cogently I believe that the existence of the external world cannot be proven, neither can for that matter the existence of other peoples thoughts and feelings, the existence of moral rightness, the existence of a past and numerous other things. So if [2] is true we are in serious epistemological trouble.

Third [2] is incoherent, suppose [2] is true, then it follows I should not believe anything without proof. But then I should not believe [2] without proof. Until I become aware of some compelling argument for [2] its irrational to accept it and if the skeptic has no argument to offer me, he is irrational accepting it as well. I think the points above show that such an argument is impossible. Any such argument will employ premises which will need to be justified by other premises, which will need other premises and so on and seeing even things such as the existence of the physical world cannot be proven its doubtful such an argument can get off the ground.

The claim that one is never rational in believing in something without proof “on examination consists of a mass of incoherence. The objector contends that the theist is irrational why? Well because according to a claim for which he has no proof, one should not accept things without proof, oh and according to another claim he has not proved, theism has not been proved. Hardly compelling stuff if the premises are true we should reject them, and if they are not true then the argument is unsound.

When I began studying Theology and Philosophy I discovered that some important Christian traditions claim that not all beliefs require proof to be rational in order to know anything at all, some things need to be taken for granted unproven. On this they are clearly correct. Second, and interesting they maintained that certain theological beliefs about God should be accepted this way.

Now this does not mean that there is no place for rational argument in assessing theological claims, or in thinking about this issues. If one starts assuming belief in God is true, one still need to reason *from* this and see if it can provide coherent answers to various, metaphysical, moral and existential questions. One still needs to ask whether various arguments against belief in God is sound. One still needs to show the implications of what one believes are not contrary to obvious facts. And one needs to be able to examine whether theism is able to cohere with and be consistent with other things we know. One requires arguments to do all these things and if a one cannot do these things reason may provide us grounds for rejecting theism.

But the claim that one cannot prove theism from the outset does not. The traditions I mention deny one needs to be able to do this, one does not rebut them by simply asserting their claims are false one needs to provide them with an argument, and the incoherent nonsense which is often provided is not a very good argument.

In a recent issue of Salient Lindsay Perigo laments the “power wishful thinking”. Predictably he cites Christianity as a paradigm of such thinking. However, like many in the media who take swipes at orthodox or conservative expressions Christianity his analysis is superficial. Perigo writes.

Two thousand years of Christianity have been based on a lie, in which countless millions have blithely and willingly believed, notwithstanding its absurdity—in fact, because of its absurdity, as Tertullian proclaimed:
“The Son of God was born: there is no shame, because it is shameful. And the Son of God died: it is wholly credible, because it is inappropriate. And, buried, He rose again: it is certain, because impossible.”
He might have added: “and because something perverse in us makes us want to believe nonsense.”

Perigo here asserts that Christianity is absurd. Of course merely asserting some thing is absurd hardly constitutes a compelling objection to it. Perigo however suggests that, not only is Christianity absurd, but its practioners actually recognise it’s absurdity and believe because of it. The idea is that they deliberately go against what reason tells them and choose a path recognised as irrational He cites the famous “Credo quia absurdum” popularly attributed to Tertullian to substantiate this claim.

There are a couple of problems here: First, even if it’s true that one Theologian (Tertullian) has suggested that Christianity is absurd and commended belief in it for this reason it does not follow that all Christians or even many follow suit. To establish this Perigo would need to show that Tertullian’s position was the dominant mainstream one for most of Christian history. He does not even attempt to do so. Moreover, the suggestion Tertullains views, as Perigo interprets them was the mainstream views is very dubious .

Second, Perigo’s picture of Tertullian is inaccurate. Its was once common for people to Tertullian as a proponent of extreme fideism a position defined by Alvin Plantinga as “the exclusive or basic reliance upon faith alone, accompanied by a consequent disparagement of reason” and the “Credo quia absurdum” passage is the usual reason for this attribution of fideism to Tertullian.

The problems with the extreme fideist interpretation of Tertullian are nicely set out in an article by Robert Sider published in Classical World 73 (April-May 1980), pp.417-9. Sider notes two problems; first, the comment Credo quia absurdum is in fact a misquote and second, he notes that when understood in its context Tertullian was actually commending the Christian faith as rational and philosophically defensible. What Tertullian does in the passage Perigo cites is utilize a line of argument from Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Aristotle (who is something of a hero to Perigo) argues that if something is contrary to current expectations and highly improbable its unlikely that a rational intelligent person will believe it unless they actually witnessed it. Tertullian then is not saying we should believe what reason shows to be absurd because it is absurd. He is utilizing the best epistemological theories of his day to argue that belief in the Gospel is not absurd. Perigo relies on a popular but erroneous stereotype of Tertullian to make his point. A little reading on the issue would cleared have this up. In fact a Google search would have revealed it straight away.

After caricaturing Tertullian as an extreme fidest Perigo goes on to offer another caricature. He states

Taborites of Bohemia predicted that Christ would return to earth in February 1420. Believers in the prophecy braced themselves. ..As the date drew near, mass hysteria took hold, much as it is doing now over global warming. Expecting a huge flood, many people built boats or moved to higher ground. The flood never came. But all over the world, folk carried on believing whatever they wanted to believe.
The Puritans were especially enthused about an imminent apocalypse, notwithstanding Jesus’ singular failure to keep any of his previous appointments, and exported their enthusiasm to America, where it’s had a ready audience ever since.

Perigo cites the example of the Taborites a millennial sect who falsely predicted the imminent return of Christ. Perigo then suggest that Puritans held the same view and imported it to America and hence to contemporary American evangelicals. This is dubious In a study of Puritan Eschatology entitled The Puritan Hope Iain Murray notes that mainstream Puritan Eschatology was not millennial. Looking, at primary sources he argued that the Puritans developed the position that Christ’s return was not imminent the world had to be converted and the institutions of the world Christianised before Christ would return. Nor is it true that the Puritans view has had “wide audience ever since” in fact most American evangelicals today do not except Puritan eschatology ( some would say to their detriment).

Apart from caricature Perigo does provide the occasional argument for his claim that Christianity is absurd. He notes that “in her newly-released letters that Mother Teresa felt she was praying to no one all those years might give [Christians] some cause for pause” but why should it? Does the fact that a prominent apologist of Atheist Anthony Flew relatively recently decided that his advocacy of atheism for numerous years was mistaken and that a God exist give Perigo pause.

Perigo then notes that Kerry Packer after being dead for 15 minutes testified that “there’s nothing there” but again one wonders why this should bother Christians. Christianity teaches a resurrection of the dead at the parousia not popular the stories associated with “near death experiences” the movie ghost or the TV series Medium.

Perigo often says some thoughtful and interesting things. On theology and religion however he does not. Like most in the media he simply spouts stereotypes provides facile arguments and backs this up with ad hominem abuse.

Kiwiblog has some discussion on the recent mix up between Gordon Copeland and Destiny Church. Predictably respondents in the comments section denounce Destiny as hate filled homophobic bigots. This of course nothing new this charge is frequently bandied about in the media whenever a theological based objection to homosexual conduct is raised.

Now don’t get me wrong. I am no fan of Destiny. Destiny is a Neo-Pentecostal denomination of Christianity, founded by controversial Tele-evangelist Brian Tamaki. Studying Theology over the last decade has lead me to be fairly critical of the Neo-Pentecostal movement. Its anti intellectualism, it’s over emphasis on subjective experience, its a-contextual citing of scripture and excessive emotionalism are all problematic. Moreover, the theology of such Churches is often deeply flawed, as are the dispensational eschatology and corresponding anti-nomist ethics they often expound. Much can and should be said in criticism of this movement and its effect upon evangelicalism

However those who denounce Destiny’s alleged homophobia are not concerned about such theological questions. What they object to is a specific ethical teaching of Destiny Church: that sex between members of the same sex (homosexual conduct) is wrong.

However, this teaching on homosexual conduct is not unique to Destiny Church, it is believed and proclaimed by numerous other religious organisations. My own Presbyterian Church also teaches that homosexual conduct is wrong. As do Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, evangelical Protestants, Muslims, Orthodox Jews, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witness’s etc. Hence the objections raised against Destiny apply with equal force to these organisations as well. An attack on Destiny for holding this belief is an attack on all those groups who agree with Destiny on this point.

Now this objection: that teaching homosexual conduct is wrong is homophobic, has always puzzled me. It puzzles me that educated intelligent people give it so much credence. Because it seems to me an obviously ridiculous argument in fact it is downright Orwellian.

To see this we need to consider what the objector here is saying: he argues that because Tamaki teaches and takes seriously the teaching that sex between people of the same sex is wrong, Brian Tamaki is homophobic. That is he has an irrational fear, hatred and loathing towards homosexual people. Two things are worth noting about this.

First, this argument is clearly fallacious. Tamaki has proposed a moral claim: that sex between members of the same sex is wrong. The objector responds, not with an argument that this claim is false. Rather, he argues that there is something wrong with Tamaki’s character; he has irrational hatred towards others. But this is a paradigmatic case of fallacious reasoning its clearly an example of the ad hominem fallacy.

Second, this attack on Tamaki’s character is based on a clear, non-sequitur. Formally it assumes that if a person teaches that an action A, is wrong, then they are have an irrational hatred and fear of people who engage in A. Such an assumption is false. Destiny also teach that lying and theft are wrong, it does not follow from this that they are inciting hatred and violence against thieves and liars.

If this assumption were correct, the only way one could avoid hatred and violence would be to have no moral teachings at all – which would not be love, but nihilism.

This argument is also incoherent, those making this claim are making moral judgements of their own, they are proclaiming that condemning homosexual conduct is wrong. Parity of reasoning entails then that they are expressing irrational hatred and fear against Destiny Church. By their own argument they are guilty of the very hatred and violence they protest against.

So what do we have here? We have an obviously fallacious objection, which constitutes an attack on another’s character on very flimsy evidence, evidence which is at best worst incoherent and at best nowhere near sufficient to establish the allegation made.

Now I contend that it’s irrational to base ones position on an obviously fallacious argument and it’s irrational to believe something on the basis of an incoherent non sequitur. Moreover, I also contend that it’s wrong to denigrate another’s character on the basis of little or no evidence, this is called slander. To slander someone is to show them contempt; it’s to disrespect them. In this instance one refuses to treat ones interlocutor as a rational agent to be reasoned with instead one ignores what he says and smears him with a unwarranted allegation hoping that other people will also jump to this unwarranted conclusion and despise the speaker.

So; here is the irony, To argue that one should reject a prohibition on homosexual conduct on the grounds that those who say this are homophobic is to express irrational contempt for another person. The charge of homophobia then is in fact an expression of irrational hatred of others.

Welcome to 1984 where irrational bigotry is called tolerance.

Frequently when my six year old son tries to take something from his siblings, something that belongs to them and he has not asked for, he attempts to justify his actions with the phrase “but I want it” said in an annoying whiny, loud, self-pitying tone.

An important part of moral education is to teach people they can’t just take whatever they want. One's conduct needs to be guided by principles that often restrict one from doing certain actions one might want to do. The phenomena of temptation involves cases where what one wants and what is right are at variance. In such cases a person of integrity should resist doing what she wants rather she should do what is right.

These points are obvious or at least one would have thought they were.

Today while driving I heard people ringing talk back radio complaining about the fact that New Zealand does not have as much sport on free to air TV as Australia does. One caller in particular stated emphatically that there was something unfair about this; without free to air TV those who enjoyed rugby would have to pay money to watch it and not everyone can afford this.

I find this reaction, well, odd.

I have had a similar reaction to arguments that were proposed by fellow students when I was studying at Uni. The argument was made that student loans or course fees were unfair. Why? Well, because it meant those who want an education have to pay for it. The price means those who cannot afford this can’t get it or at least have to borrow money to do so and if they borrow money they have to pay this back. Notice the premise in both arguments; if I am unable to afford something that I want to have then that is unfair.

Surely a moments reflection shows this premise to be false? Surely this is obviously so? I for example want to visit Greece, Italy, Isreal and Eygpt as having spent a good part of my life studying the history of these places I want to go there. I really would love to visit friends of mine in Colorado. I would love to live in a bigger house. Does it follow that it is unfair that this is not given to me 'free'? Is the fact that if I gained these things I would have to pay for them unjust? Is the fact that I cannot currently afford everything I want really an issue of justice? Surely not!

Some would say that I am belabouring a straw man here, particularly with the tertiary education issue. The issue is not that it is unfair merely because I want to study at Uni as going to Uni is not a luxury item like a trip to Rome. It is unfair because I have a right to a university education. (So the argument goes.)

Now I think this is one of those areas where appeals to “rights” is misleading. Rights and duties are correlated. If I have a right to Q from P, then P has a duty to provide me with Q. Moreover, in a political context, these duties are enforceable. Not only does P have a duty to provide me with Q but the state should punish P if P fails to discharge this duty.

Once this point is realised, appeals to rights can be seen for what they are. They are attempts to impose by force a duty upon other people. Liberal lefties love to talk about defending human rights and opposing evil religious conservatives who “impose their values on others” but their language hides the real moral situation. What in fact they want is to reject the imposition of some duties on others while supporting the imposition of others. This is one of the reasons why I incline to the view that rights talk is redundant and should be dropped and replaced with the older moral discourse which merely emphasised duties. It enables situations to be viewed with a clarity that is otherwise hidden.

The phrase I have “a right to Q” is ambigious and couching the issue in terms of duties clarifies the issues. When someone claims they have "a right" they could mean a negative right or a positive right, a negative right to rugby watching or tertiary education means that the person whom the right is against has a duty to not prevent you (via coercion or intimidation) from accessing those things. A positive right means that the person has a duty not to prevent you from accessing those things but to actually give them to you. In addition, saying I have a right to X does not tell us who this right is held against couching the issue in terms of duties does.

Returning to our example, what these people appear to be saying is that the government has a duty to provide people with free rugby games and a tertiary education if they want these things. Everyone else in society has a duty to contribute their money towards their TV watching or their tertiary education and breaching this duty is so serious that justice requires that those who do not do this be arrested and incarcerated. Is this a plausible claim?

I think it is not. I agree that parents have a duty to provide their children with a basic education and I agree that parents who do not do this are guilty of neglect and should be prosecuted for doing so. But the suggestion that the state has a duty to educate adults up to masters and PhD level and that a citizens failure to provide other adults with the funds to do this is a serious breach of their duties warranting prosecution seems far fetched. It is not as though failure to watch the All Blacks thrash Italy or to gain a PhD in physics means one is condemned to a dehumanising degrading existence.

It is hard to resist the conclusion that people who make these claims are presenting sophisticated versions of my six year old son "I want that so I am going to take it. You give it to me or else." They are essentially calling on a powerful strong person (the state) to intimidate other people to give them what they want. Maybe I am missing something, but I do not understand how intelligent adults can believe that this constitutes serious moral or ethical discourse in our society. Or how words like “rights” can cause people to systematically deceive themselves as to the nature of what they are doing.

This view of “rights” and public discourse essentially turns democracy into an egocentric mob where one segment plunders another for their own personal gain and political parties compete for votes by promising their faction the better spoil. To pass it of as progressive caring policy is nonsense.