Suppose a person upon reading scripture and hearing the scriptures expounded through preaching from the pulpit believes that God has prohibited a certain class of actions. Suppose further that the believer is aware of no conclusive argument either for God’s existence or for the affirmation of the command in question. Nor is he or she aware of any cogent arguments for the reliability of scripture. The believer on discerning that God affirms this in scripture simply takes it at its word and finds himself or herself deeply convinced or persuaded that the action is wrong. Does this person believe in an intellectual acceptable manner?

Many people think the obvious answer is no, here I want to reflect on one particular argument for this negative assesment.

In an lecture expounding Calvin’s view of faith, Greg Dawes has argued that a person who believes in this fashion does act irrationally. A claim he repeats in his text book Philosophy of Religion which was , at least couple of years ago, the proscribed text for Philosophy of Religion at Otago University. ( I should add that Dawes was one of my thesis examiners) Dawes states

One can concede that it would be perfectly reasonable to believe something on
the authority of God, even if one had no other evidence for its truth (what
could be more reasonable than to believe something told me by an omniscient and
morally perfect being). But on the face of it one would still need evidence in
support of one’s belief that (a) that these propositions are revealed by God;
and, (b) that God is a reliable source of knowledge. We’ll see in a moment how
believers have responded to this demand.[1]

Here Dawes claims that although it is true that one is warranted in accepting things on a reliable authority such as God, before one does so one needs evidence that the authority in question is, in fact, reliable, that the testimony is from God and that that God is a reliable testifier.

Dawes goes on however to argue that in the case of faith in scriptural testimony, no non-circular evidence is forthcoming. In questioning what makes believers think God speaks authoritatively through Scripture he states,

The more common response ... is to ‘bootstrap’ the believer’s sense of
certainty: to base the certainty of his belief on the very revelation in which
he believes. ... Religious faith believes certain propositions on the authority
of God on the authority of God. (This is not a typographical error.) The
authority of God is simultaneously that which (id quod) and that by virtue of
which (id quo) one believes.

The circularity in this position might seem to be the Achilles’ heel, not just of the Protestant system, as David Friedrich Strauss suggested, but of this traditional, ‘bootstrapping’ view of faith in whatever form it is expressed.[2]

Dawes’s argument rests on two assumptions. Firstly, that the believer has no non-circular reasons for thinking that the scripture is a medium of divine discourse. Secondly, that the believer must have such reasons if he or she is to be warranted in accepting anything on these grounds. I think both assumptions are false.

1. Does the Believer Need Reasons for Thinking his Source Reliable?
I suspect Dawes conflates two separate questions in the second of his assumptions; whether a given ground is, in fact, reliable and whether one has grounds or reasons for thinking it is reliable. These are not the same question. It is possible for a ground to be reliable without knowing or having any reason for thinking it is. Likewise, the fact that a person has no reason for thinking something is reliable does not entail that it is not reliable.

In defending Calvin’s view of faith Alvin Plantinga and those who follow a similar tack such as William Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff utilise a highly-influential theory of knowledge known as Reliabilism. Reliabilism holds that a belief is warranted if, and only if, the source, grounds or mechanism that produces the belief, or that it is based on, is reliable, i.e. likely to produce true beliefs on the topic in question. Robert Nozick, Alvin Goldman, John Armstrong, Alvin Plantinga and William Alston have advanced versions of this theory.

The exact version of Reliabilism does not matter too much but for clarity I will use Alston’s version. Alston suggests that a belief is warranted if it is based on a reliable ground or grounds.[3] A person’s belief is warranted if the grounds on which the belief is held are reliable grounds for holding a belief of that sort. He also adds that the person who holds the belief must not have a reason for thinking that the belief is false nor a reason for thinking that the belief is not reliable.

On a reliabilist account, it is the former and not the latter condition that must be met for a belief to be warranted. Alston’s Reliabilism entails that a belief is warranted if it is based on a reliable ground; it does not hold that it must be based on what one has reason for thinking is a reliable ground. The same can be said for most Externalism and Reliabilism theories in general. Noting that a person has no reason for thinking that something is reliable does not show that this condition is not met and hence, does not show that the belief in question lacks warrant.

An obvious response to this line of argument would be to claim that there is some kind of epistemological principle or requirement to avoid believing something based on a given ground or source until one has reasons for thinking that such sources are reliable and that the believer violates this requirement. However, this position has at least two problems.

Firstly, it leads to absurd conclusions. If I cannot believe any thing on a given ground until I have good reasons for thinking the ground reliable, then I cannot believe anything because I remember it happening. To do so I would need good reasons for thinking my memory is reliable. Clearly, such reasons are not forthcoming as any argument I use to try to demonstrate my memory would be circular. I could attempt to show that most of the times I used my memory in the past it was correct but then I would need to remember how I had used my memory in the past and remember whether or not it was accurate. However, I am not permitted to utilise memory in this way until I have reason for trusting it and hence, any such argument could not get off the ground. Similarly, I would be unable to rationally rely on the deliverance of reason. After all, how can I show that a reason is reliable? This can only be done by offering reasons.

The problems do not stop here because memory is essential to any given line of reasoning one engages in. Reasoning is a temporal process; one begins with the first premise and follows an inference through to a conclusion. One does not hold every step of an argument in one’s mind at the same time. Rather one relies on one’s memory to remember the first steps while the second is assessed and then remembers this step while the third is examined and so on. Hence, without memory one cannot reason at all. This creates an unsolvable sceptical situation. One cannot trust memory if one does not have a reason for thinking it is reliable but one cannot get any such reason unless one trusts one’s own memory. Moreover, one cannot engage in reasoning at all if one does not trust it. This position leads to the destruction of all reason.

The second problem created by this kind of stance is that it leads to an infinite regression. To show that the source were reliable, I would have to appeal to certain premises that are based on some other source but then I would have to show that this source was reliable and so on. The claim that one needs reasons for thinking a ground is reliable before one can be warranted in believing anything on the basis of that ground appears problematic.

A further rejoinder suggests that it is in general true that I do not need to have reasons for thinking a ground reliable before I am warranted in accepting a given proposition on this ground. However, I do need such reasons if the ground of my belief is testimony, that is, the say-so of some other person. Dawes suggests something like this in his paper.[4] He distinguishes beliefs based on testimony from basic beliefs. He states that basic beliefs are such that one is warranted in believing them independently of any argument for them, whereas beliefs based on authority are warranted by “indirect evidence”. By indirect evidence, he means evidence that the testimony in question is reliable. A person who believes something based on testimony will, if they are rational, have “reasons to believe the trustworthiness of the source” from which he or she “gained the information”.[5]

However, this view of testimony is mistaken. Coady summarises the problem. If one is going to have grounds for the reliability of a given authority or testimony then these grounds will be either some other testimony or authority, in which case there is a problem of circularity, or it will be based upon sources apart from testimony. [6] The problem with this second horn of the dilemma is that if we exclude what we know by way of testimony we will have so little to go on that such grounds will be almost impossible to come by.

To demonstrate this, consider an example Dawes himself provides, the belief that E=MC2. Dawes writes,

Very many of our beliefs are held on the basis of testimony. (In this context I shall sometimes refer to these as beliefs held on the basis of authority.) Does e=mc2 represent the rate at which matter can be transformed into energy? I believe so, although I would not have the faintest idea how to demonstrate its truth I have it on good authority that it is true...Of course, there is a sense in which I do believe this on the basis of evidence. I have reasons to believe in the trustworthiness of the sources from which I gained the information.[7]

Dawes suggests that a non-physicist can rationally believe e=mc2 because he or she has reasons to believe that his or her sources are trustworthy. I believe this last comment is incorrect. Consider, for example, what reasons he could offer for believing that the source of his information was reliable. Presumably, it would be because the author of the book in which he read it or the person who told him it was a physicist. Nevertheless, how does he know this? He could have read the person’s qualifications off a faculty list, off the dust-jacket of the book or been told them by the person himself but in each case he is relying on testimony and so, in the absence of further reasons he cannot believe these sources. Suppose, however, Dawes was to investigate thoroughly and locate the address of the university where the degree in physics was awarded in order to check its original records. Yet again, he will be relying on testimony in the form of an address list and records. He would also have to have trusted the testimony of maps and road signs in getting to the university in question.

Consider then what Dawes would have left to go on if he did not use testimony. He could not rely on any information which he himself did not observe first-hand. This would exclude any information about events prior to his own lifetime, any events in his own lifetime that he did not remember witnessing first hand and any event that happened in a place other than where he was at the time. Nothing read in journals, books, heard in lectures, taught to him by his parents or teachers could be used. Nothing heard on the news, read on the computer, told over the phone or reported on would be included. Almost everything he had learnt through his entire education would be excluded because nearly all of it is based on testimony. It seems, then, that if Dawes were really to comply with the epistemic standards he laid down, he could not rationally believe in e=mc2. It appears he is mistaken in thinking that one needs to have reasons for thinking a given authority is reliable to be warranted in believing in testimony.

I think this example shows that this is not isolated. What we know by way of being told by others accounts for a huge and pervasive amount of what we believe. Everything I know about other places, other times, everything learnt at school, university, from parents, friends, books, newspapers, television, etc. is based on testimony. If I were to try to verify any of these beliefs without first relying on some other piece of testimony, I would be unable to.

2. Does the Believer have Non-Circular Reasons for Believing in Scripture
These observations also give us grounds for calling into question the first contention Dawes makes in his criticism of believing in scriptural testimony. Dawes assumes that the believer has no non-circular grounds for thinking that scripture is a medium of divine discourse.[8]

Here his argument appears to be as follows. Dawes grants that if scripture is a medium of divine discourse then one is warranted in accepting theological beliefs on scriptural testimony. He then notes that the only way one could get to the conclusion that such beliefs are warranted is by affirming the antecedent of this conditional and affirming that scripture is in fact a medium of divine discourse.

However, he goes on to argue that this latter belief is typically believed based on scriptural testimony and hence the argument is circular.

What is mistaken here is Dawes’s assumption that this practice involves some form of argument in which the proposition that scripture is a medium of divine discourse serves as a premise. On the above model a person believes propositions affirmed in scripture not by inferring them via argument but by simply taking scripture’s word for it. Consequently, these propositions are not based on any argument at all and cannot be based upon a circular argument as Dawes suggests.


Here his argument appears to be as follows. First he conceeds that if scripture is a medium of divine discourse then one is warranted in accepting theological beliefs on the basis that scripture affirms them. He then suggests that this entails that one can believe on the basis of scripture only if one has good reasons for thinking scripture is the word of God. However, he goes on to argue that this latter belief is typically believed based on scriptural testimony and hence the argument is circular.

What is mistaken here is Dawes’s assumption that this practice involves some form of argument in which the proposition that scripture is a medium of divine discourse serves as a premise. On the above model a person believes propositions affirmed in scripture not by inferring them via argument but by simply taking scripture’s word for it and hence believes such propositions as basic. Consequently, these propositions are not based on any argument at all and cannot be based upon a circular argument as Dawes suggests.

Perhaps what Dawes is driving at is not that this claim that scripture mediates divine discourse is based on a circular argument but rather, it is circular in some other fashion. The distinction between logical and epistemic circularity is helpful here. Logical circularity occurs when a person affirms in the premise of the argument what he or she is attempting to establish in the conclusion. Such circularity can then only apply to arguments and not to basic beliefs. However, William Alston has pointed out that there is also such a thing as epistemic circularity. This occurs when one in practice relies upon a particular source or type of ground in order to establish the reliability of the type of ground in question. A person who relied on perceptual judgements to argue for the reliability of sense perception would be an example. This approach is not logically circular; the person need not argue from premises affirming the reliability of perception. However, it is circular nevertheless.[9]

It is clear, I think, that the model is epistemically circular. The real question is whether there is anything wrong with such circularity. This is borne out by another point Alston stresses, that every, major, doxastic practice, even ones that are paradigmatically rational, are epistemically circular. [10] I noted this with memory above; one can only establish that memory is reliable by relying on the deliverance of memory as premises in a deductive argument. Similarly, with beliefs based upon a sound, deductive argument. Such arguments can be shown to be reliable only with other arguments and so on. Even an omniscient being could not demonstrate that his cognitive faculties are reliable without appealing to those faculties. Hence, if the practice of believing in divine commands because they are affirmed in scripture is problematic because one cannot believe the reliability of scripture without engaging in epistemic circularity, then various paradigms of rational belief are also problematic. In fact, rationality is impossible. This is, of course, absurd.


[1] Greg Dawes, “Faith and Reason”, a paper presented to the University of Otago Theology and Religious Studies Faculty. This is contained in Dawes, Philosophy of Religion, (so far unpublished) 46.
[2] Ibid.
[3] William Alston, “The Concept of Epistemic Justification,” in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. William Alston (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 77.
[4] Ibid., 38.
[5] Ibid.
[6] C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
[7] Dawes, “Faith and Reason,” 34.
[8] Ibid., 9.
[9] William Alston, “Epistemic Circularity,” in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. William Alston (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 319-349.
[10] By doxastic practice, I refer to the practice of forming beliefs in response to certain grounds, whether the ground is argument, some form of experience or the assertion of some authority.

I find it really frustrating when I encounter someone who throws the “you think you’re right” accusation at me and assumes that this obviously makes me arrogant and that I should therefore back down and run away ashamed.

I am sick of it and I want to scream in a Destiny/Jim Peron-esque manner, "enough is enough!" I will not be made to feel guilty for thinking my opinion is right, or worse, for what that entails, that I think opinions in conflict with my own are wrong.

Further, I will not engage in the ridiculous practice of beginning every sentence with “it’s just my opinion, but…” (as if that somehow makes what follows the “but” any less of an assertion that I think my position is correct).

The expectation that I should not believe that I am right and everyone else is wrong, that I should not express and argue that my belief is the correct one in the context of a discussion is a ridiculous standard that even those who trot it out do not hold themselves to. You see, everyone thinks that they are right and that all other conflicting beliefs are wrong. E v e r y o n e.

The statement, “you think you are right” is always asserted by someone who themselves thinks they are right in asserting that I think I am right. If their objection is cogent, then I should reject their objection, but, if it is not cogent then I should reject it anyway.

The person who objects that I think I am right is suggesting that I adopt an irrational stance, that I should believe something that I think is incorrect; but if I think it is incorrect then I am not going to believe it.

(If I lost you just then, perhaps you had to reread the preceding once or twice, then perhaps that should tell you something about the logic behind the assertion you should not think you are right)

People like to pretend they don’t think they are right and dress up their “arrogance” by starting sentences with “in my humble opinion,” but like the emperor's new clothes it’s a crock; it's all smoke and mirrors, because no sane person holds to a belief they think is wrong or inferior to other viewpoints. I mean why would you? You would hardly rank the differing views and then decide to hold the second or third most plausible view? You’d hold the view you thought most plausible and by doing that you tacitly reject the other views.

So why not just admit this? Why do we play these games? Why do we buy into the theory that there is something wrong with thinking we are right? Admitting we think we are right does not mean that we have to paint ourselves into a corner, refuse to be open to other’s counter arguments or to refuse to consider new facts. It’s simply an admission that we hold a position. Is there really something wrong with not sitting on the fence? (Which in and of itself is to take a position to not hold a position but lets not go there.)

In my last post I took a swipe at certain popular dismissals of theism on the grounds that “God’s existence can’t be proved.” Mark V offered a measured and thoughtful response in the comments section. We enjoy feedback from our readers and I have always enjoyed his, particularly those on the Euthyphro dilemma and I think Mark raises some interesting points in his latest response. So, in order to advance these issues a bit further I will use this post to respond to Mark V. I do so, in part, because I think the issues he raises reflect broader views of God and religion in our culture.

Mark writes:

My position is not that I deny God exists, but that I am not convinced by the arguments that he does exist.

Simply someone claims that God exists; I look about me and cannot see this God so I ask the person to prove this God exists. My response would be the same if the person claimed to believe in ghosts or telepathy.

I will take Mark’s position here as agnosticism, the position that neither affirms nor denies the existence of God. Strictly speaking Mark does not say this, he claims merely that he, “is not convinced by the arguments that God does exist,” however, I assume he means to affirm more than this. After all, there are many theists who find the arguments for God’s existence unconvincing. Some theist’s influenced by Pascal or William James, for example, believe that there are no arguments either for or against theism but nevertheless hold that practical considerations mean one should accept God’s existence. Some, such as Plantinga in God and Other Minds, hold that while the arguments for and against God’s existence both fail, belief in God is justifiably believed in the absence of evidence as a properly basic belief. In contrast to these positions I think Mark V is intending to adopt a position incompatible with theism.

Assuming this, if I read Mark correctly, his comments in this citation presuppose a certain method which goes something like this:

[1] If something cannot be detected by the five senses then it needs to be proven to be true.
[2] If something cannot be proven to be true then we should not deny its existence but we should not believe it exists either i.e. adopt some form of agnosticism towards the object.

He applies this method to God and concluding that God’s existence can’t be proved, embraces agnosticism.

I think this objection to theism is problematic; [1] and [2] appear to me to have at least two problems (a) they entail skepticism about rational beliefs; and, (b) [1] is self-contradictory.

Turning to the first of these points, (a), consider the belief that the universe has existed for more than six seconds or the belief that minds other than mine exist. One cannot “see” with the five senses that these claims are true. What we can see is limited to the present and while we can see physical beings engaging in certain behavior, we cannot feel or detect their thoughts or feelings. Hence by [1] the existence of these objects would need to be proven. However, I think it’s pretty evident from the history of philosophical discussion on these matters that one cannot prove these things to be true.

Everything we see is in fact logically compatible with the claim that the entire universe (including all traces of age) popped into existence six seconds ago or that other people merely behave in certain ways and have no thoughts or feelings at all. Similar things can be said about the existence of physical objects. We assume that certain objects such as trees, logs, rocks, etc exist independently of whether we are looking at them or not. We cannot test that they are there when we go inside or turn our backs as by hypothesis we can only see them when we are looking at them. Their existence would need to be proven and proven from premises that do not assume that there exists anything independent of our senses from the outset. However, given that these things can’t be proven in this manner acceptance of [2] means we should be agnostic about the existence of trees, logs, rocks and any physical object, other people, the existence of a world that is more than six seconds old, etc.

Turning now to (b), that [1] is self refuting, take the claim explicitly articulated in [1] that if something cannot be detected by the five senses then it needs to be proven to be true. Now the truth of this claim itself cannot be detected by sight, hearing, touch, etc. So, if [1] is true, Mark needs to prove that [1] is true using the method he proscribed. He has not done so. Moreover if [2] is true, the failure of Mark to provide such a proof would mean that neither he nor I nor you should believe [1], but rather be agnostic towards it.

Note also that any proof Mark attempts to offer can only appeal to premises which can be ascertained by the five senses. If they do not, we will be required to disbelieve the premises and hence the proof.

This, then, is what I think is the problem with this kind of critical rejection of theism. The skeptic rejects God’s existence out of allegiance to certain assumptions about what constitutes a rational belief. The problem is that these assumptions are in the same boat as theism is alleged to be; a person who rejects theism because he believes these assumptions is acting inconsistently. Moreover, if these assumptions were consistently applied, almost all knowledge would be destroyed.

Similar things can be said about Mark’s other argument, which I take to be an expression of a very similar line of thought.

People belive in the existence of many things e.g. ghosts UFOs telepathy. To prove these phenomena exist various experiments are conducted using a range of instruments. If these experiments do not detect the phenomena the conclusion is that the phenomena do not exist.

The exception is God. God cannot be detected by our senses or by any instrument. God's existence can only be established by the use of logical arguments. But then almost anything can be proven or disproven by carefully wording a logical argument.

No one outside the individual believeing in God can conduct a test to confirm that the God the individual believes exists in fact does exist. The existence of God is personal to each individual believing in God.

Here I think Mark’s reasoning is similar to what I criticised above. If I understand him correctly he reasons something like as follows,

[1] Existence claims can only be known by experiments “conducted using a range of instruments” or by logical arguments.
[2] God cannot be detected by experiments conducted using a range of instruments” as “No one outside the individual believing in God can conduct a test to confirm that the God the individual believes exists in fact does exist.”

[1] and [2] entail:

[3] God can only be determined by logical arguments.

However, Mark also contends:

[4] “[A]lmost anything can be proven or disproven by carefully wording a logical argument.”

These premises jointly entail that God’s existence cannot be known. If one accepts [1] and [2], it follows that, “God's existence can only be established by the use of logical arguments,” but then [4], prima facie rules out the idea that anything can be known by logical argument.

I find the argument fascinating because it is a good expression both of contemporary exaltation of science as sole paradigm of knowledge, seen in Mark’s claims about experiments “conducted using a range of instruments” and his concerns that God cannot be subjected to scientific testing, alongside a kind of relativistic dismissal of all non-scientific sources of knowledge, seen in Mark’s claim that “almost anything can be proven or disproven by carefully wording a logical argument.” I also, predictably, think this mindset is mistaken.

Turning first to [1], I think Mark’s first premises again leads to skepticism on a wide scale. Take my previous examples of belief in other people or the existence of physical objects that continue to exist when people do not perceive them or the belief in the past. None of these things can be determined by the type of empirical testing Mark refers to, they can only be determined by logical arguments. However, given [4], no such arguments are ever conclusive as almost anything can be proved or disproved by them. So presumably we should not believe in other people, the past or enduring physical objects.

In addition, in this context one could reflect on what these assumptions do to moral knowledge. Take the claim ‘rape is wrong.’ This suggests that there exists some kind of binding prescription ‘do not rape’ that we are required to follow, presumably one that holds even if I or my society or my peers think rape is a good idea. However, such a prescription cannot be detected by experiments “conducted using a range of instruments,” hence, we need logical arguments.

I happen to think, however, that the claim ‘rape is wrong’ is not self-evident and something that cannot be proved by argument and does not need to be. However, if it can be proved by argument then Mark’s advancement of [4] suggests that it probably can be disproven by argument and hence we have no real rational grounds for believing that rape is wrong. Surely this is absurd. We do know rape is wrong independent of scientific experiments and independently of logical arguments.

I think Mark’s premise [4] is self refuting. Mark is offering an argument for his position. But if [4] is true and almost anything can be proved or disproved by logical argument, it would seem everyone, including Mark, has good reasons for not trusting conclusions based on argument, therefore we should reject his argument.

As a final comment I would like to broaden my comments a bit. I noted above that Mark’s comments appear to reflect an epistemological paradigm which exalts science as the sole method of knowledge and dismisses what science cannot accommodate as a kind of private personal preference. Many Christian thinkers have responded to this charge by trying to show this paradigm can accommodate God. They offer scientific type arguments for God’s existence by appealing to things like the big bang, the fine-tuning of the universe, laws of nature, etc as evidence for God’s existence. While I have some sympathy for this response I am inclined to think that in one sense these arguments are irrelevant as the more important point is to note the paradigm itself is mistaken. In Mark’s case applying the paradigm consistently would rule out not just God but all kinds of knowledge which even an ardent atheist would hold as rationally held. Moreover, the paradigm appears to invalidate itself. Hence, even if it is the case that such methods cannot establish the existence of God the problem lies with the methods and not with theism.

Matt

On Tuesday despite being able to connect, we discovered we could not download or send email and we could not access the web at all. After doing battle with the automated ISP Help Desk computer that claims to understand english and in fact frequently does not, we heard a recorded message that they were experiencing a high volume of calls and the expected wait time was 60 minutes - argh!

I attempted to get to the bottom of the problem myself wondering if one of the more technologically challenged members of the household had messed with the settings but got nowhere so I braved out the 60 minute wait to the helpdesk.

I barely managed to get out "since Tuesday night I can connect but I can't..." and the technician impatiently cut me off with "do you use ZoneAlarm?"

The technician explained that on Tuesday an auto update was issued that meant ZoneAlarm's firewall was so extremely effective one was not able to send or receive email or access the net at all. The solution was to simply disable ZoneAlarm and keep an eye on their website for a patch or a remedy. He concluded by telling me that their helpdesk had gone nuts as heaps of people use ZoneAlarm and were all hit by the same problem (one wondered why, given the pervasiveness of the problem and the simplicity of the solution, I and everyone else affected, had had to endure the 60+ minute wait of hold music and looped recorded messages about the wait time, surely a "try disabling ZoneAlarm" or similar, put alongside the wait time message would have eased their stress and mine - but what would I know, I am not a technichian).

Anyway, problem solved. We have been happily emailing and surfing again but I write this post because of the email I just received a few minutes ago from ZoneAlarm:

ALERT: IMPORTANT NOTICE TO ZONEALARM CUSTOMERS

Dear Customer,

Installation of Microsoft Update KB951748 may result in loss of Internet connectivity. Click here for more information on how to resolve this issue. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

Thank you,

ZoneAlarm

Hang on a minute, anyone in need of information on how to resolve this issue would need to:

1. Be able to receive the email containing the above message; and,
2. Be able to actually access the web in order for the "click here" instruction to be of any use (the page will not display error message is hardly helpful).

Those of us with the fortitude to withstand 60+ minutes of hold music and recorded messages and who subsequently managed to actually receive the above email discover that when you click on the link provided in the email you get a page with the following information, note the bolded bits, (my emphasis):

Severity: High

Workaround to Sudden Loss of Internet Access Problem

Date Published : 8 July 2008

Date Last Revised : 9 July 2008

Overview : Microsoft Update KB951748 is known to cause loss of internet access for ZoneAlarm users on Windows XP/2000. Windows Vista users are not affected.

Impact : Sudden loss of internet access

Platforms Affected : ZoneAlarm Free, ZoneAlarm Pro, ZoneAlarm AntiVirus, ZoneAlarm Anti-Spyware, and ZoneAlarm Security Suite

Recommended Actions

- Download and install the latest versions which solve the loss of internet access problem here (English only): [Series of download URLs]

- or follow the directions below.
Option 1: [Series of directions to alter internet settings]
Option 2: [Series of directions to uninstall the update]

So, the email and webpage were aimed at customers who faced the problem that they could not receive email and could not access the internet. They were to receive an email, navigate to a webpage and then either download and install something or follow or a set of instructions...

In other words, if you receive the email and can access the help page there is a good chance you don't need either.

Note to ZoneAlarm: read Immanual Kant or Richard Hare.

Prescriptive language such as instructions, commands, imperitives, etc. to be rationally followed need to be able to be willed universally i.e. a person must be able to will the thing without contradicting themselves. Sending somebody an instruction to fix the problem of not being able to have access to instructions to fix the problem is not rational, is arguably self-referentially incoherent and worse of all, is just not very helpful.

Madeleine

One common reason I hear for atheism is the claim that there is no proof that God exists. Several questions can be asked about this objection. What exactly does the objector mean by proof? If all things need to be proved to be sensibly believed then what is the proof that all things require proof? Further, what is the proof for the claim that there is no proof? Finally, if some things can be believed without proof, why is God in the “must be proved” category?

There is however another question. If the absence of proof for a thesis provides rational grounds for claiming the thesis is false then wouldn’t absence of proof for atheism provide grounds for claiming that atheism is false? The person who is an atheist on the basis of this objection seems, on the face of it, to work with a double standard here. He claims that theism requires proof and that the absence of such proof requires us to reject theism as false. However, he thinks that atheism can be believed in the absence of proof for it.

What is the basis for this distinction on the atheist's part? To avoid this prima facie inconsistency the atheist needs to provide some reason why theism requires proof but atheism does not. In the absence of any good reason his position seems simply arbitrary.

This brings me to the issue I want to address. One common reason, one I often hear expounded is that theism asserts a positive claim, it affirms the existence of something. Atheism, however, makes a negative claim, it denies the existence of something. According to the line of argument I want to address negative statements cannot by their nature be proven. The objector argues that it is impossible to prove a universal negative; however, positive claims can be proven. Hence, for this reason, positive claims need to be proved and negative ones do not. We can assume the denial of somethings existence in the absence of proof but we cannot affirm the existence of something without proof.

I have heard this claim repeated in cyber space over and over. I think it’s a very bad argument for three reasons.

First, the claim that “you cannot prove a negative” is false. Here are some examples of negatives which can be proved:

a) there is no 1,000,000 mile high pile of African elephants in New Zealand
b) there are no promiscuous virgins
c) there are no married bachelors
d) there is no planet between earth and the mars
e) there is no such thing as a square triangle

One can prove a negative statement in several ways. One can show that an existential statement would, if true, entail a contradiction or metaphysical absurdity or the denial of things which we know are the case.

Second, if one claims that positive existential statements always need to be proved, one is lead into a fairly radical skepticism about everything. Take the claim that there exists a physical world independent of my senses. Or that other people (with thoughts and feelings) exist. Or that there exists a world that is more than six seconds old. There are well known problems with being able to prove these things and yet each one is a positive existential statement. On the view sketched above we are committed to denying these things exist.

In fact I think a little reflection shows that it would, on the assumption that positive existential always need to be proved, be almost impossible to prove everything. If I prove the existence of something I do so by appealing to other premises which assert facts. But facts are things that exist in the world. Consequently, I would need to prove these facts exist before I can appeal to them but I can't prove these facst unless I appeal to them as proof.

It follows that if I cannot prove anything, and one should deny the existence of whatever cannot be proven, then the only option is to deny the existence of everything.

Let me turn to my third reason for thinking this line of argument is flawed. Suppose one grants [a] that it is impossible to prove negatives; and also that for this reason, [b] one should deny a positive existential statement unless proof is provided. Both [a] and [b] create problems for an atheist. Consider the following claim, there exist some material objects that were not created by God. This claim is a positive existential statement. Hence, until the atheist can provide proof that it is true, until he can prove that some material objects were not created by God, he must deny that such objects exist. However to deny this statement is to affirm that every material object was created by God and hence that God exists.

In conclusion, the claim that theists bear the burden of proof because they are making a positive claim and that the denial of positive claims is the default position until proven is a problematic claim.

Matt

In a previous post I mentioned Professor Raymond Bradley’s (Bradley) contention that,

[3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs.

In his article he cites several scriptural passages in support of this contention. I think his exegesis is problematic; I cannot go into huge detail in a blog post but I will endeavour to address the main arguments he offers.

In essence, Bradley cites from three sections of the New Testament: Matthew, Acts and the Epistles, and Revelation. I will examine each in turn.

Matthew
Bradley writes:

In the Gospel of Matthew alone he characterizes it in terms which evangelists adore: "unquenchable fire," "fiery hell" (twice), "torment," "burned with fire," "furnace of fire" (twice), "weeping and gnashing of teeth" (five times), "eternal fire," and "eternal fire which has been prepared for the devil and his angels. [Emphasis Original]

Bradley refers to references to “fire,” “torment” and “weeping and gnashing of teeth.” He assumes, without argument, that each of these phrases refer to torturing people. However, an examination of the relevant passages shows this to be false.

Unquenchable Fire
The phrase “unquenchable fire” occurs Matt 5:12 and does not refer to torture.

His winnowing fork is in his hand, and he will clear his threshing floor, gathering his wheat into the barn and burning up the chaff with unquenchable fire. [Emphasis Added]

The phrase originates in the Old Testament. There it refers not to a fire that tortures but one that consumes what it devours, because it is never put out. (see Isa 1:311, 34:10, 11; Jer 4:4, 7:20, 17:27, 21:12; Ezek 20:47, 48; Amos 5:6). The context bears this out; Matt 5:12 states “burning up the chaff with unquenchable fire” [emphasis added]. The metaphor here is a farmer burning chaff. Now when burned, chaff is consumed and destroyed by fire and not tortured (unless Bradley is asserting that Chaff has consciousness). The picture then is of separation and annihilation, not everlasting torture.

It is worth noting that not only does this passage not support Bradley’s contention (a), it does not support (b) either. In v 10-11 the reason people might be subject to judgement is not because of what they believe, but because of unrepentant wrongdoing. Moreover, the earlier context alludes to “lack of fruit,” an Old Testament idiom for lack of virtuous conduct.

Fiery Hell
The references to “hell fire” do not bear Bradley’s point out either. The Greek word for hell is Ge-Hinnom. Ge-Hinnom was a valley outside of Jerusalem. In the time of Manasseh, this valley was used for human sacrifices to the Canaanite God Molech. For this reason the area became a euphemism for disgrace, shame and contempt. Later after the Assyrian invasion, it was a place where dead bodies were piled up and cremated. Isaiah used metaphors of mass cremation as a metaphor for future judgement. This imagery became a metaphor for final judgment in Jewish Apocalyptic writings.

The term “fiery hell” does not necessitate a picture of everlasting torture; again the references to hell in Matthew bear this out. In 5:29-30 the contrast is drawn between cutting off your hand and throwing it into hell or throwing your whole body into hell. This again is not an allusion to torture (unless severed hands have consciousness?). In Matt 10:28, the contrast is between a person who kills a body and God who kills body and soul in hell. The picture is, again, not of torture but of being discarded and destroyed. Moreover, in all these references things are thrown into hell not because of what they believe but because of what they do.

Burned with Fire
Again when one looks at the actual passages in context, one sees they do not say what Bradley alleges. The repeated picture is of a tree being cut down and burned due to its lack of fruit (Matt 3:11 and Matt 7:19). The imagery is again of throwing something away and destroying it and not of torture (trees are not conscious). Moreover, fruitlessness is standard apocalyptic imagery for unjust conduct, not for mistaken belief.

Furnace of Fire
The references to a “furnace of fire” in Matt 13 do not convey endless torture. In 13:40 the explicit metaphor is of weeds which are pulled out and burned. Moreover in v 47, the furnace stands in a Semitic parallel to fish that are already dead but are thrown away as rubbish. Moreover, in both passages it is clear that judgement is inflicted upon people because they “do evil” or are “wicked”; it is again actions not beliefs.

Gnashing of Teeth
Similarly Bradley appears to interpret the phrase “weeping and gnashing of teeth” as referring to the agony of torture. This again is unlikely. The phrase occurs many times in the Old Testament (Job 16:9; Ps 35:16, 36:16, 37:12; Lam. 2:16) and in the New Testament, and in almost every instance signifies hatred or rage at God or the righteous. Not the agony of pain and torture.

Eternal Fire
It is equally doubtful that the phrase “eternal fire” means eternal torture. Jude v7, for example, uses the term “eternal fire” to describe the judgment that befell Sodom and Gomorrah, towns that were reduced to rubble and not tortured forever.

The passages in Matthew referred to are firstly symbolic, and secondly, do not support Bradley’s contention that they teach that God will torture people forever because of their beliefs. Its also worth noting Bradley’s citations from Matthew are selective. He cites the “fire” metaphor but ignores the metaphors for judgement of being incarcerated or of being expelled from a party which also occur in Matthew, etc and in each case it is the person’s deeds and not their beliefs, which are the basis for judgment.

Epistles and Acts
Bradley’s citations from Acts and the Epistles similarly do not back up his point. He notes,

According to Luke, the reputed author of The Acts, there is salvation in no one else; for there is no other name under heaven that has been given among men, by which we must be saved." (Acts 4:12). And St. Paul makes it clearer still when he tells us that "the Lord Jesus Christ shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels in flaming fire, dealing out retribution to those who do not know God [my emphasis]and to those who do not obey the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. And these will pay the penalty of eternal destruction" (II Thess. 1:7-9). [Emphasis Original]

The problem is that neither passage affirms that people are tortured for ever because of what they believe. The passage in Acts asserts that people are saved in Jesus’ name and does not state that people will be tortured because of their beliefs. Similarly, the passage in Paul does not state that people will be tortured but that they will be destroyed and the basis is not that they do not have certain beliefs but that they “do not know God” and “do not obey the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.”

Revelation
At the Auckland Craig v Cooke debate Bradley cited a further passage from the Book of Revelation,

If anyone worships the beast and his image and receives his mark on the forehead or on the hand, 10 he, too, will drink of the wine of God's fury, which has been poured full strength into the cup of his wrath. He will be tormented with burning sulfur in the presence of the holy angels and of the Lamb. 11 And the smoke of their torment rises for ever and ever. There is no rest day or night for those who worship the beast and his image, or for anyone who receives the mark of his name." 12 This calls for patient endurance on the part of the saints who obey God's commandments and remain faithful to Jesus.

There are several metaphors in this passage, a reference to the “wine of God’s fury” the picture of torment in burning sulphur and the picture of rising smoke. Bradley appears to have attached on to the latter two and interpreted them rather literally. The problem here is that the genre of Revelation is Apocalyptic literature. Such literature is highly metaphorical and uses stock symbols (common symbols repeatedly used in this type of literature). Careful note should be taken when reading Revelation of the metaphors in it and also the Old Testament background of these metaphors. The position is far more nuanced than Bradley appears to think.

The picture of fire and sulphur followed by rising smoke is drawn from the account of Sodom and Gomorrah’s destruction by “burning sulphur.” Gen 19 adds,

27 Early the next morning Abraham got up and returned to the place where he had stood before the LORD. 28 He looked down toward Sodom and Gomorrah, toward all the land of the plain, and he saw dense smoke rising from the land,

This imagery of sulphur being poured upon people and smoke rising was later used in the Old Testament to symbolise the destruction of various nations. (Deut 29:23; Job 18:15-17; Ps 11:6; Isa 30:33). Perhaps one of the clearest uses of this imagery is seen in Isaiah 34

9 Edom's streams will be turned into pitch, her dust into burning sulfur; her land will become blazing pitch! 10 It will not be quenched night and day; its smoke will rise forever. From generation to generation it will lie desolate; no one will ever pass through it again.

Now Edom did not literally burn forever in sulphur. In fact, taken literally, the differing metaphors in Isa 34 for Edom’s destruction would contradict each other. But Apocalyptic literature is not supposed to be taken this literally (just as many of the phrases we use today are not meant to be taken literally). What Apocalyptic literature does in this instance is use various differing, dramatic, visual images to describe total the destruction of Edom. Similar imagery to this passage is used thought the book of Revelation. In fact, in Rev 18 when the destruction of a city, named Babylon but probably a reference to Rome or Jerusalem, the city is said to be tormented by fire and onlookers watch the rising smoke. The message is that Babylon has been judged and destroyed.
In essence, then, [3] is mistaken. It is based on an excessively literalistic reading of Apocalyptic literature. Bradley’s argument is not an argument for atheism. It can only succeed as an argument for atheism if one accepts both the infallibility of scripture and an excessively literalistic reading of the text, one that fails to take into account the genre of Jewish Apocalyptic writings. The correct response to this objection is not to become an atheist but to reject poor hermeneutics.

Matt

RELATED POSTS:
William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two
The Battle of the Bill’s: A Review of the Craig - Cooke Debate

Dr William Lane Craig and Dr Bill Cooke debated the moot “Is God a Delusion?” at Auckland University on 17 June 2008. The debate was chaired by Professor John Bishop and was organised by New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists (NZRAH) and Tertiary Students Christian Fellowship (TSCF) with MandM.

High quality DVD copies of the debate are available from John Welch for $39.95 NZD + P&P.

Our review of the debate is here. Enjoy :-)

During the Q & A at the recent Auckland Cooke - Craig debate, Professor Raymond Bradley (Bradley), Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Auckland University, offered an argument, which he has laid out in more detail in his article A Moral Argument for Atheism, as follows:

Christians accept that:

[1] Any act that God commits, causes, commands or condones is morally permissible;
[2] It is morally wrong to torture people endlessly for their beliefs;
[3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs;

From this he inferred that:

[4] God does not exist.

Dr William Lane Craig (Craig) responded that the conclusion does not follow from the premises unless one assumes that the Bible is infallible. [1] and [2] entail that God will not endlessly torture people for their beliefs. However, [3] entails the negation of this only if one adds the further premise, that whatever the bible teaches about God is true. If one does not grant this assumption, the fact that the bible records that God will do something does not entail that he actually will do this. Hence, even if Bradley’s argument is sound it is really an argument against theism conjoined with biblical infallibility, not against theism per se.

In his article, Bradley argues that this option is unavailable to the Christian theist. He writes:

this would be to be to abandon the chief foundation of religious and moral epistemology (ways of obtaining religious and moral knowledge) … the question arises as to how we are supposed to know of God's existence let alone look to him for moral guidance. After all, it is a distinguishing feature of theism, as opposed to deism, to hold that God reveals himself to us and, from time to time, intervenes in human history. And the Bible, according to theists, is the principal record of his revelatory interventions. If the Bible, with its stories of Moses and Jesus, is not his revealed and presumptively true word, then how are we to know of him? If God doesn't reveal himself through the Old Testament Moses and the New Testament Jesus, then through whom does he reveal himself? To be sure, a theist could well claim that God also reveals himself through other channels in addition to the Bible: reason, tradition, and religious experience all being cases in point. But to deny that the Bible is his main mode of communication would be to deny that the principal figures in Judaism and Christianity can really be known at all. Apart from the scriptural records, we would know little, if anything, of Moses or Jesus, it being doubtful that secular history has anything reliable to say about either. Apart from the scriptural records we would know nothing of the so-called Ten Commandments that God supposedly delivered to Moses, or of the ethical principles that Jesus supposedly delivered in his sermons and parables.

Bradley is mistaken. He confuses the claim (i) that scripture is reliable, with the claim (ii) that scripture is infallible. In order for the Bible to give us reliable, trust-worthy information about God, (i) needs to be the case. However, (i) is compatible with admitting that on some issues scripture is mistaken.

Therefore, Bradley’s argument does not have the bite he (and some members of the audience on Tuesday) thought it did. Nether-the-less as an evangelical, Craig is committed to some form of scriptural infallibility and I share this commitment with him. So it is best to see if another line of attack is available.

Craig’s second point alluded to an ambiguity in [2]. [2] states it is wrong to endlessly torture people for their beliefs. However, this could be interpreted two possible ways, it could be interpreted as:

[2a] It is wrong for human persons to endlessly torture people for their beliefs;
[2b] It is wrong for any person including God to endlessly torture people for their beliefs.

Now in order for Bradley’s argument to follow, [2b] needs to be the case. It needs to be the case that God is engaging in wrongdoing if he tortures people for their beliefs. However, in the article Bradley cites in support of this argument, he provides reasons only for [2a]. He argues that to deny principles such as do not torture people endlessly for their beliefs,

... would be to ally oneself with moral monsters like Ghenghis Khan, Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot. It would be to abandon all pretense to a belief in objective moral values. Indeed, if it is permissible to violate the above principles, then it isn't easy to see what sorts of acts would not be permissible. .. [It] would be tantamount to an embrace of moral nihilism. And no theist who believes in the Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount could assent to that.

What Bradley fails to appreciate is that these absurd consequences follow from the rejection of (2a) and not from the rejection of (2b). Moreover, as Craig noted there are good reasons for thinking that it is (2a) and not (2b) that is true. This is because (2b) assumes that God has duties. Both, Craig and I believe in a meta-ethical view known as the Divine Command Theory (DCT). According to this position, it is wrong for a person to perform an action, if and only if, God commands them to not perform this action. It follows from a DCT that God has duties only if he issues commands to himself. Given he does not issue commands to himself, it follows that God cannot have duties.

God does issue commands to human beings. One command is to not torture people for their beliefs. It follows that (2a) is true and (2a) prevents us allying ourselves with moral monsters such as Pol Pot, Stalin, Hitler, etc.

Craig’s response, then, is correct. I am inclined to think, however, that Bradley’s argument can be recast without presupposing that God has duties. It is essential to theism and to the defensibility of a divine command theory to maintain that:

[1’] God is good (where good is referred to in terms of virtues as opposed to (duties).

And a person, following Bradley’s lead, could argue that:

[2’] A good person does not torture people for their beliefs.
[3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs.

And [1’], [2’] and [3’], when conjoined to a commitment to biblical infallibility, entail a contradiction.

The best response to Bradley is to attack [3]. Now note that [3] asserts at least two things; first: (a) scripture states that God will torture people forever; second, (b) God does so because of what such people believe. The crucial question then is what reasons Bradley offers for the truth of (a) and (b)? In my next post I will examine some of these reasons and argue that they are mistaken.

Matt

RELATED POSTS:
William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two
The Battle of the Bill’s: A Review of the Craig - Cooke Debate

Despite holding to a somewhat contrary viewpoint and despite having had more than one clash of viewpoints it appears that our critics accord us some praise. I just now stumbled accross this thread on GayNZ.com's forum discussing Christian blogs and websites and was pleasantly surprised by the comments on our blog.

Kay writes: "The M & M blog is scarier because their posts almost make sense ... over the top hatred like www.godhatesfags.com is so extreme that its hard to take it seriously. M&M sound plausible & reasonable ..."

Kaiwai agrees: "... some of the things I agree with ... don't dismiss everything he [Matt] says."

Kind Kit adds: "Yes, Matt and Mads are certainly cogent, and even logical after a fashion. Dr Flannagan wears his philosophical training rather well. They are not frothing lunatics by any means... "

Cale concludes: "I do know what you mean though about them being persuasive, they managed to gather enough people together to block the Otago campus support for the CUB bill and Madeleine spoke dangerously well."

We would like to clear up a couple of things though:

1. The MandM blog is NOT "sponsored by the Elusive Brethren & Right Wing American Fundamentalists" but if either of the afore mentioned wish to sponsor us please send cheques to Private Bag 93119, Henderson, Waitakere City....


2. Kaiwai wrote of us: "I don't set out to impose my views by way of legislation - if I want to 'change the world', I'd sooner set an example by living the life I preach, then hope that it'll rub off on others."

Holding to classical liberal and libertarian political views respectively and being evangelical Christians means we believe in less State and in changing the world in precisely the manner Kaiwai expressed. For example we don't just oppose the Civil Unions Act but also the Marriage Act because both are outside the legitimate functions of the State.


3. Depraved claimed: "The problem with Matt - they're pro-life and yet, anti-sex education and anti-condom. They're against the very things which would drastically reduce unwanted pregnancies. An example, someone is in an accident, they're killed - the autopsy says that the individual could have survived had they worn a seat belt. Matt's solution is 'ban the car' when the common sense approach would be to make safety belts compulsory and improve driver training."

We are not Catholic, we have no problem with condoms beyond the fact that using them is like having a shower wearing a raincoat (we use other forms of contraception). Our children's knowledge of sex education is more than thorough and they could give a family planning sex educator a run for their money. But I suspect what Depraved is alluding to is our opposition to the State teaching sex education at all, and, in the amoral, relativistic manner they do.

Further, I am not in favour of banning cars but I do believe that it should be illegal for people to use cars to kill other people with. Nothing strikes me as more absurd as a pro-choice social policy that says let's legalise dangerous driving and allow people to freely and deliberately smash their cars into pedestrians on demand and when the body count for this practice (suprisingly) gets rather high, respond to this by increasing education on seatbelt use in schools.

Matt

I was absolutely horrified to wake up this morning to hear that Parliament had passed the Criminal Procedure Bill last night.

While there were some good things in the Bill (as there usually are) such as the district courts being able to hear P cases, I am most appalled at the attack on double jeopardy; the rule that a defendant cannot be tried more than once on the same set of facts (note: we are not talking new facts, new evidence). This law was laid down in section 26 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act:

"No one who has been finally acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned for, an offence shall be tried or punished for it again."

The doctrines autrefois acquit and autrefois convict (the defendant has already been acquitted or convicted on these facts) have long been established within common law and find their place in human rights charters around the world so for the government to erode them in this manner is yet another example of their disregard for rights and freedoms.

In the system of law we use in New Zealand a person is innocent until proven guilty. This system means inevitably that sometimes the guilty will get off and the innocent will be convicted. Whilst no one likes or condones these negative connotations the alternative is worse because the solution to ensuring that the guilty always get convicted is to imprison every accused and likewise, the solution to ensuring the innocent never get convicted is to never convict anyone. The system is balanced to make it difficult to convict because it is generally deemed worse to send an innocent person to jail than to fail to punish the guilty.

So we are left having to accept that once a court has heard a case, weighed the evidence and ruled, that's that. Allowing the state to keep having a go because despite the court's assessment, the state "know" this person is guilty (or worse because of trial by media, the public "know") is to give the state far too much power and to give society far too much uncertainty in the justice system. Whilst it may succeed in increasing the chances of nailing the guilty it equally runs the risk of allowing the state to run trial after trial after trial with its vast resources against the innocent.

Labour undid hundreds of years of jurisprudence on human rights formulated by far greater legal and ethical minds than any of them possess in one sitting last night. Just remember that next time you decide that someone guilty got off after listening to the 8 second soundbite on the news or reading the 600 word article in the Herald; if a judge and 12 of your peers who heard all of the evidence, got to see the body-language and hear the tone of voice of the witnesses ruled the other way, maybe they were in a better position to assess the case. If the police failed to build their case then tough. If anything, knowing they can have a second crack will encourage them proceed with a lower standard of evidence.

Of course with the passage of this Bill the government have not completely removed Double Jeopardy but have only removed it in certain circumstances which the Herald reports as:

"when compelling evidence has been presented that is likely to lead to conviction, and when an acquittal is found to have been tainted."

However, the common law already allowed this following Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254, which allowed exceptions on the grounds of special circumstances such as so called tainted trials and new evidence but this law goes further than that.

When you put together:

The Doonegate affair
The repeat failure to rosecute politicians who commit crimes
The abolition of the Privy Council replaced with a unilateral state appointment of judges
The passing of the Terrorism Suppression Act
The Electoral Finance Act
The illegitamcy of retroactive legislation
The placing of what consistutes reaonable force in the hands of the police rather than a court
The personal use of police resources
The public commitment to marginalise critical viewpoints from society
The increased presence of trial by media
The increased growth and intrusion of the state into daily life
(and probably more than I can think of just now)

alongside a series of reforms, the common thread of which makes it easier for the state to successfully prosecute we realise just how scary New Zealand has become in the few short years of this Labour government.

Madeleine

UPDATE:

I discovered on reading Don't Vote Labour "The bill passed its third reading 108-11, with the Greens, the Maori Party and independent MP Gordon Copeland opposing it."

While I am not surprised to find myself in the same company as the Greens and the Maori Party on this one as the Greens do occaisionaly stand on the right side of these types of ethical issues (though often the reasons they give are completely bizarre) and the Maori Party I have a lot of time for on some issues of this nature such as the Seabed and Foreshore, but what was with ACT voting for it?