Currently we have Say Hello to my Little Friend's Glenn (plus wife and kids) staying with us which is very cool because we are all old friends. They normally live in the south island so catching up since we left has been rare.

Anyway, Glenn does a lot of podcast's on his blog and he did a very cool one on what politically correct leftyness might do to Christmas, which he played for us last night - complete with funny voices and background sound and music effects (all done by Glenn). It is quite a departure from his usual, philosophical podcast fare but none the less it is very funny.

It is available on his blog here (as I have no idea how to insert a podcast into blogger). Glenn does link to a script of what is basically on his podcast but reading it is nowhere near as funny so if you are able to play the podcast, don't spoil it, just play the podcast and enjoy!

In part 1, I outlined Rawls's position and now I will offer some critical comments on this postion drawing from Nicholas Wolterstorff.

There are numerous problems with Rawls's contention here. Wolterstorff sums some of them up.

Suppose, then, that someone has followed that strategy; she has analyzed our political mentality into its constituent ideas and has elaborated these ideas into principles of justice. I submit that no matter what those resultant principles of justice may be, the reasonable thing for her to expect is not that all reasonable people who use their common human reason will agree with her results, but that not all reasonable people will agree. It would be utterly unreasonable for her to expect anything else than disagreement. The contested fate of Rawls’ own principles of justice is an illustrative case in point. There’s no more hope that all those among us who are reasonable and rational will arrive, in the way Rawls recommends, at consensus on principles of justice, than that we will all in the foreseeable future, agree on some comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrine.[1] [Emphasis original]

Here Wolterstorff emphasises two points. Firstly, he suggests that the contents of public reason are such that it is to be expected that reasonable people will disagree over them. Secondly, Wolterstorff hints that this renders Rawls's position incoherent. Rawls rejects appeals to comprehensive doctrines because people can reasonably reject them and there is a duty to not decide questions of basic justice this way.[2] If this is true then we should reject appeals to public reason as well; in fact, we have a duty to not follow public reason. However, if we cannot follow public reason and we cannot follow comprehensive doctrines, we are left with nothing; few restrictive laws or policies could be morally justified. This is precisely the implication that Quinn suggested.

Wolterstorff's argument depends on his claim that it is reasonable to expect disagreement over the contents of public reason. He cites Rawls's own theory of justice in support of this. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to develop an account of basic justice based on public reason.[3] However, there is widespread disagreement amongst reasonable people not only over the conclusions reached but the methods and implicit principles themselves.

Of course, merely appealing to one case is unpersuasive; it is possible this is a single anomaly. However, in an earlier work Wolterstorff cited other examples where public reason appeared unable to be used in a manner that would be agreed upon by reasonable people.[4] In “The Role of Religion in Political Issues,” Wolterstorff cites the work of Kent Greenawalt to illustrate that not only is public reason incapable of resolving questions of contentious political issues but also on many issues it is “simply irrelevant”,[5] public reason has “nothing to say”.[6]

For example, Wolterstorff refers to the debate about whether the state has a duty to provide social welfare.[7] In this debate not only is there disagreement about the conclusions but also debate about the very basic principles or concepts involved. Both supporters and opponents of state welfare appeal to such things as ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ but have radically different conceptions as to what freedom and equality are. Also involved in this debate are different assumptions about whether there are property rights and if there are, how such rights are weighed against social utility. It is unlikely that the consensus populi, common sense and uncontroversial science provide answers to these questions that all reasonable people would accept.

Wolterstorff is not alone in these observations. Christopher Eberle makes similar observations about such things as abortion and freedom of religion.[8] De Marneffe argues that on contentious moral and social issues public reason will fail to offer any substantive answer.[9] Jean Hampton suggests that public reason cannot provide an answer to the question of abortion.[10] Quinn makes similar observations.[11] The point is, that if we genuinely limit ourselves to principles upon which no reasonable person can be expected to reject, what we are left with is inadequate to provide answers to many, if any, substantive questions. Only if we supplement these with premises drawn from some comprehensive doctrine will answers be adequate.

The case of abortion that these authors refer to is particularly instructive. Rawls’s own comments on this issue unwittingly confirm this. When discussing how public reason would address the question Rawls simply asserts that reasonable people will agree that in the early stages of pregnancy the right to equality overrides our due concern for human life. However, he seems to countenance the idea that reasonable people may limit abortion in the second trimester in certain circumstances. Now this, clearly, is not an obvious intuition shared by all reasonable people - unless one wishes to stipulate ‘reasonableness’ to rule out anyone who does not hold Rawls’s substantive normative views on abortion.

Moreover, it appears that one cannot adjudicate any dispute between Rawls and a critic on this issue without appealing to a comprehensive doctrine. Suppose, for example, that a fetus is a person in the first trimester of pregnancy then Rawls’s suggestion that the value of equality overrides in the first trimester but may not always in the second is false. Why would it be acceptable in the name of equality for a woman to kill a person in one trimester and not the other in otherwise identical circumstances? It seems that Rawls’s intuition is justified only if one assumes that a first trimester fetus is not human. On the other hand, if one assumes that a fetus is human at this point then Rawls’s position is erroneous. Hence, only by addressing this issue can such a debate be settled.

However, addressing this issue by appealing to public reason or common sense can hardly provide an answer. As Quinn notes, “common sense is divided on or simply perplexed on the question of abortion”.[12] Uncontroversial science can tell us facts of fetal development but it cannot tell us the moral significance of those facts or what facts are important for determining personhood. In addition, there is no consensus populi on this issue; the political culture of many countries is divided on this question. It seems impossible to offer any argument one way or the other without utilising a premise drawn from some comprehensive doctrine over which reasonable people do not agree.

Similar points apply to Rawls's claim that a right to abortion is necessary so as to give the right to equality “substance and force”. This follows only if one assumes a particular understanding of equality yet neither the consensus populi nor common sense will produce this conclusion. In fact, it is arguable that much of the popular appeals to equality are confused and ambiguous.[13] Moreover, even if such a consensus on the nature of equality were available, it does not follow that a right to abortion is necessary for giving it force unless one supplements this concept with understandings of sexuality and gender drawn from some comprehensive perspective.[14]

I do not think abortion is an isolated case. The same would apply to other substantive questions such as homosexual marriage, affirmative action, capital punishment, welfare, etc. Wolterstorff’s contention that public reason will not, un-supplemented with comprehensive doctrines, provide information that all rational people can be reasonably expected to accept or even provide an adequate base for deciding many substantive issues appears justified. If this is so, Rawls’s position is incoherent or ad hoc.

[1] Wolterstorff, “Why We Should Reject What Liberalism Tells Us,” 174.
[2] I am grateful for discussions with Dr Glenn Peoples for helping me to develop this argument.
[3] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
[4] Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Political Issues,” 102-104.
[5] Ibid., 102.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid., 103-104.
[8] Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, 217-222.
[9] de Marneffe, “Rawls’s Idea Of Public Reason,” 232-250.
[10] Jean Hampton, “The Common Faith of Liberalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994), 208-209.
[11] Quinn, “Liberalism and Their Exclusions of the Religious,” 149-150.
[12] Ibid.,150.
[13] See Louis Pojman, “Theories of Equality: A Critical Analysis,” Behavior and Philosophy 23:2 (1995): 1-27, and his “Equal Human Worth: A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism.” http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:CvaEU_1lw5IJ:www.louispojman.com/equalworth.pdf+Equal+Human+Worth+Pojman&hl=en&gl=nz&ct=clnk&cd=8.
[14] See de Marneffe, “Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason,” 234-235.

RELATED POSTS:
Rawls on Religion and Public Life Part 1
Some More Thoughts on Religion and Public Life: Robert Audi’s Critique of Wolterstorff

In a two part series I will reflect on John Rawls' widely celebrated discussion on religion and public life. In part 1, I will outline Rawls's position and then in part 2 I will offer some critical comments on this postion drawing from Nicholas Wolterstorff.

One common line of argument for excluding theological premises from public debate is that not everyone accepts the truth of such premises. Any policy decisions based on such a purported divine law would be binding upon these people in spite of the fact they do not accept such theological doctrines.

One obvious problem with this line of argument is that exactly the same thing can be said about many secular, non-theological, beliefs. Phillip Quinn articulates this point,

... if the fact that religious reasons can not be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also be excluded on the same grounds.[1]

Quinn notes correctly that secular moral theories such as Utilitarianism or Kantianism, Intuitionism, Socialism, Libertarianism, can all be reasonably rejected in a philosophically-pluralistic society.

Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcome only to anarchists.[2]

One influential attempt to avoid these problems is proposed by John Rawls in Political Liberalism.[3] Rawls defends the thesis that it is wrong to appeal to religious or theological beliefs in debates pertaining to “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice”.[4] Rawls does this on the same grounds that Quinn refers to above; such beliefs can be “reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy”.[5] Rawls states,

Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.[6]

On the other hand, Rawls concedes Quinn’s point; “it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy”.[7] Rawls acknowledges this and argues that it is not just wrong to appeal to theological premises but also, “no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception”.[8] [Emphasis added] Rawls maintains that contemporary society,

[I]s always marked by a diversity of opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. Some of these are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity among reasonable doctrines political liberalism sees as the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human reason at work within the background of enduring free institutions.[9]

In summary, Rawls states there is a plurality of comprehensive doctrines that are irreconcilable with each other. Each doctrine is reasonably held by some people and reasonably rejected by others. Yet, respect for others forbids us to appeal to premises that we can expect reasonable people to reject.[10] It follows then, that in questions of “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice” that no one should appeal to premises that require the truth of a comprehensive doctrine that some people can and/or do reasonably reject.[11]

However unlike Quinn, Rawls denies that this has anarchistic implications. He rejects Quinn’s claim, as cited above, that this rationale entails that “in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified”. Instead, Rawls maintains that one can construct answers to “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice” by utilising what he calls “public reason” the basic idea is that if a people will address basic questions of "constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice” by appealing only to ideas implicit in the shared political culture of society. Nicholas Wolterstorff calls this the “consensus populi”.[12] Rawls explains this process:

[B]y looking to the public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles. We hope to formulate these ideas and principles clearly enough to be combined into a political conception of justice congenial to our most firmly held convictions. We express this by saying that a political conception of justice, to be acceptable, must accord with our considered convictions, at all levels of generality, or in what I have called elsewhere, ‘reflective equilibrium.’[13]

In addition to appealing to the consensus populi, public reason can utilise “presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial”.[14] However, in using public reason people, “are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines”.[15]

[1] Phillip Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. Paul Weithman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 144.
[2] Ibid.
[3] John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
[4] Ibid., 214.
[5] Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious”, 144.
[6] Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217.
[7] Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious”, 144.
[8] Rawls, Political Liberalism, 135.
[9] Ibid., 3-4.
[10] Christopher J Eberle argues that Rawls's rationale here is incoherent as it conflicts with the method that purports to justify it. See Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 140-150.
[11] I am grateful for discussions with Dr Glenn Peoples for helping me to develop this argument.
[12] Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” in Religion in the Public Square; The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, ed. Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1997), 91.
[13] Rawls, Political Liberalism, 8.
[14] Ibid., 224.
[15] Ibid.

RELATED POSTS:
Rawls on Religion and Public Life Part 2
Some More Thoughts on Religion and Public Life: Robert Audi’s Critique of Wolterstorff

Merry Christmas everyone :-)

Extrapolating from Tumeke's November 2008 stats, the top 10 Christian Blogs on Public Discourse in New Zealand are:

1. NZ Conservative (23 + 0)
2. The Briefing Room (31 + 4)
3. Something Should Go Here, Maybe Later (33 + 1)
4. MandM (46 + 4)
5. Samuel Dennis (62 + 17)
6. Kiwi Polemicist (72 + 20)
7. Contra Celsum (95 + 30)
8. Say Hello to my Little Friend (a.k.a Beretta Blog) (97 + 29)
9. Put up Thy Sword (98 + 16)
10. Gavin Knight (112 - 17)

Of Note:

• Again, no change in the number 1 spot, well done NZ Conservative.
• Contra Celsum and Beretta are the big climbers this time; well done, two excellent blogs that deserve more readership.
• The top 9 are all within the top 100.

Other Christian blogs making the top 200 NZ blogs on Public Discourse are:

• NZ Debate (151 + 5)
• Section 59 Blog (166 - 0)
• Definitive (167 + 14)
• The Voice of Reason NZ (194 - 10)

(Numbers in brackets show the overall NZ ranking of each blog)

Note: This list does not include Christians who blog but whose blogs are not identifiably Christian and is based on Tumeke's classification and ranking methods.

If you think your blog should be on the rankings click here.

Tim has finally published the November blog rankings for NZ blogs on public discourse - just in time for Christmas.

November of course the was frenzied election month so naturally blogs with a strong political bent, delivering what the punters want, did well and others saw their traffic drop off. Many bloggers hung up their keyboards shortly into the month as their sole reason for existing was complete at the close of the election, new blogs were birthed, some of which debuted very high. As such, it was always going to be interesting to see how the stats came out.

MandM, of course, are not affiliated with any political party but we do have a classical liberal/libertarian leaning. Our political blog entries were naturally geared in that direction so when parties and candidates that fit our political viewpoint deviated from it we said so and those blog posts, particularly, were very widely read.

John Key on Religion and Public Life, although written in September, had massive readership through November, peaking in the week after the election as many people came to it on search terms such as John Key Religion or John Key Homosexuality.

Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1, also saw high traffic with Matt's critique of ACT's inconsistent liberal application of the harm principle when it came to feticide.

Of course entries critiquing the left were also popular, most read was Fisking Grant Robertson; Matt unpacked the propaganda put out by his old student union comrade, turned professional politician, against National's Wellington Central candidate.

Finally our political framework or voting lens posts for Christians, such as A Voting Guide, Voting, the Role of the State..., What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined also brought in high traffic given the confusion prevalent amongst Christians as to what their faith actually teaches them about the role of the state.

It appears we did enough in November as we climbed 4 spots to rank 46th in the country.

The numbers are fairly close through the top 40's and 30's we think if we work hard we should be able to crack 30-something in the New Year. We know December has been a bit stop and start for us but you all know why and it is Christmas.

Thanks everyone for your support, your visits, your comments and your links.

Some of the discussion on yesterday's post on bullying has gotten me thinking; not just the things people said in the comments but the sorts of things people often say on the subject of bullying and in general, to my call for zero tolerance to it.

I recognise that with a policy of zero tolerance the black and white components - what is and is not bullying - are easy to identify and apply the policy to but the grey is where it gets messy. Is name calling bullying? How much name calling? At what point does it move from within the realm of the sort of negative social discourse one has to get over to bullying? People claim that the grey renders a policy of zero tolerance hopeless to interpret and enforce.

I submit that this problem is not a reason to reject a policy of zero tolerance; far from it. This objection would pretty much apply to any type of behaviour we might want to form a hard line policy around. What is and is not harassment? What is and is not stalking? What is and is not assault? What is and is not drunk driving? What is the point the line is crossed in each variation and form that these types of offence come in? Like bullying, these issues have complex grey areas yet this problem does not prevent us forming policies to answer these questions.

A general framework, of what bullying is and what sort of zero tolerance response should apply accordingly, can be laid down as a lens and common sense and consistency in how the behaviour to hand is viewed in accord with the lens can provide a workable policy for a school's management to administer. Central records could be kept, defences to bullying formed and precedents could be created and followed. You could even go so far as to set up a bullying tribunal or court run by the ministry to ensure consistency and fairness and prevent arbitrariness. There are all sorts of ways around the problem. Zero tolerance to bullying could be implemented and nothing would send a clearer message and act as a better deterrent than knowing if you crossed that line you would face serious consequences.

Bullying in the real world is assault, is harassment/stalking, is theft. In the real world these things have real consequences. Why do adults get proper protection from them but not our children? This inequality in the most basic of civil rights the state owes all is not ok. [trying hard to not sound like Sue Bradford]

I am not talking jail or periodic detention or hefty fines for these kids or even criminal records, simply remove them from the situation. Make them be the ones that have to deal with making new friends and adjusting to new schools instead of the victims. Make them have to face up to what they are doing by the social ostracisation that comes with being stood down, suspended or expelled. Then maybe they will reflect on why they do what they do, why they think it is ok to treat people like that.

That latter point is another thing that bugs me about the standard approach to the bullying problem. If I was subjected to the kinds of things my son has gone through this year at my place of work my employers would not stand for it and would not call me in to meetings to talk about strategies or commission reports as to why my co-workers were acting that way.

If someone got a group of their friends together and pulled my pants down at work and someone else filmed it on their cellphone camera, those responsible would be immediately suspended pending investigation and on investigation would be fired; even in this politically correct employment environment where it is virtually impossible to fire anyone.

We expect children to put up with things that adults would never tolerate in their equivalent social setting; things that society deems abhorrent; things that are often far more hurtful to them at their age than they are to a grownup. I really don't care if the cool people at work don't like my haircut or my handbag; I don't go to work to make friends. Provided they don't get in my face, I can happily work in an environment where I am not that popular or even that liked. For a teenager, however, that sort of thing is much harder to handle because they are going through the very process of separating their identity from their family's and working out who they are. They are in the process of learning self-acceptance whereas I, in my mid 30's, worked that out years ago.

Worse, we send children back into environments where they are treated like this, where they have to face their abuser before they are ready to. Matt was assaulted a few months back by a nut-bar parent of one of our other kids friends (the guy turned out to be being investigated by CYFS). The assault was really minor but it took Matt some months to stop freaking out that he might run into the guy if we happened to be in situations where he might be - a pretty normal response from someone who does not regularly engage in violence. Kids who get assaulted at school are regularly sent back to classes where the people who have hurt and humiliated them are sitting in the next row, usually the next day. Any time off to allow the victim to get over the bullying and prepare for seeing the bully again is truancy or even if the school graciously permits this time off, it is the victim getting behind in the school work. The injustice is outrageous.

The final objection offered to the zero tolerance approach is that even bullies need an education and if you kick them out of school you are denying them this basic right. While this is true, I don't get the problem. Everyone is entitled to liberty yet if an adult commits assault, theft or serially and criminally harasses someone they voluntarily risk their liberty. That's their problem. They knew the consequences, they chose to engage in the action. Ditto with the bully. If you have to choose who gets an education then the guilty part loses over the innocent.

There are other schools and if they mess that up by bullying some more there is correspondence, boarding schools for bad kids, home education. It is not like removing them from one school is going to ensure they don't ever get an education but it sure is hell going to bring it home to them that if they want one they better not wreck another kid's.

Bullying is something so pervasive in our society that almost everyone has some experience with it. As such, I was not surprised to read a Family First release claiming that New Zealand kids almost top the world in the most bullied stats, suffering bullying at a rate of almost 50 per cent above the international average. The release refers to a Herald article on the report at the source of the stats and touches on some of the strategies schools are adopting to overcome bullying and the criticisms the new government minister, Anne Tolley, has made of them;

The previous Government has made half-hearted attempts at addressing the issue, with a series of checklist cards released last year. But it's action we need. And holding up a card while you're being bullied - well, that's not going to work.

All year we have battled bullying as our 13 year old son, Christian, has completed his first year in high school. Christian has Aspergers Syndrome and has a very high IQ when it comes to analytical and spatial reasoning, genius level - he is amazing, but struggles with what he calls "the irrational and inconsistent way adults relate to each other." The textbooks say he has a 'social disability so struggles with social issues' but having raised Christian I am not sure that "disability" is the right term, I would say he is just more perceptive than most of us.

When he was 4 he asked me why adults lie to each other so often. I asked him what he meant and he said that they say they like someone's dress or their cooking but they don't really. He explained, that when someone gives him a present for Christmas and they ask him if he likes it he gets in trouble if he tells them he doesn't, that it is a dumb present.

Further, when you go to someone's house for dinner you always ask what you can bring even though you know that they will answer they don't want you to bring anything. When you get to dinner you offer to clear away the dishes and to wash them but you know when you offer that they will tell you not to. Your offers are token gestures that you don't really mean and worse than that, every adult you say them to also knows you don't really mean them because they know that you know that the correct answer is to refuse the offers of help but if you don't offer you are not a good guest. Why is it good manners to lie and pretend to be sincere? Isn't telling the truth more important than hurting someone's feelings or not being a good guest?

Christian gets bullied because he is different and at times annoying to the other teenage boys he goes to school with; he finds teenagers as frustrating to understand as most adults do and often says things deliberately designed to expose the stupidity of their reasoning and he still has not mastered a good way to express frustration publicly, so he can make irritating noises at times when he is not sure how to respond appropriately.

His take on the anti-bullying strategies the ministry has in place is perceptive. During children's programming after school there are TV commercials about bullying put out by whichever government Anne Tolley was referring to. Christian says of them:

The ads on TV tell you what bullying is and that you should not have to put up with it, but what they should be doing is telling people not to bully in the first place. Their focus is wrong.

Christian has made the same observation and criticism of his school's attempts to manage the bullying he has suffered all year. The school's focus was all about what Christian could do to minimise the bullying. Yes, he is annoying and he should work on that and yes strategies should cut both ways; Christian accepted all this but he still felt that the primary focus should be on the unacceptability of the behaviour.

Christian was not bullied as horrifically as the cases that make the news but this year he has been hit, shoved, knocked to the ground, attacked with a screw driver, shoved into a wall, been surrounded by a group of kids unable to escape, had his property taken, been made the butt of school jokes and filmed on someone's cell phone camera having his pants pulled down which led him to weeks of internet searching after school for the footage. He has come home with cuts, bruises and has lived in fear of returning to school and with self-doubt. Yet no one got stood down or expelled for hurting him all year and to our knowledge, no one's parents were contacted over their treatment of him. There were very few repeat offenders over the year, it was more there was a culture of bullying that many kids engaged in.

The school, following the ministry's guidelines, instead had multiple meetings with us and worked hard with their staff putting strategies to protect Christian in place - they even waived their policy of waiting for a year of knowing the child and put him in one of the top streams mid-year after I suggested that the brighter kids might not respond with their fists so readily. The kids did get detentions, were talked to and told off and made to apologise and most did not re-offend against Christian but none of these, we and Christian felt, were sufficient consequences as none of them countered the culture problem the school and Christian faced.

What we want is an end to the focus on what the victim should be doing and the need to understand the bully and a return to the message that bullying is unnaceptable and will not be tolerated. Zero tolerance sends a very loud and clear message but zero tolerance is not govt approved. Let's hope that that changes under National.

The picketers outside Pak'n'Save are at it again. Horns began tooting and shouts began infiltrating our home so I popped my head out the door and sure enough there they all are.

So far no siren or chanting or megaphone though. Thanks for that guys :-)

UPDATE: I take that back. The chanting just began and someone has a megaphone.

UPDATE: The siren has been let off too but not as continually as last time.

Chants include:

Whose got the power?

We've got the power?

What power do you have?

[Something something something]

Whose got the power?...

And

When I say Power you say?

Union

When I say power you say?

Union

[over and over] then:

What do we have?

Union Power

When I say power you say?

Then of course there is the tried and true:

What do we want?

[Something something]

When do we want it?

[Something something - presumably 'now']

After a rather intense 10 days or so following my surgery I am today going to attempt a return to the blogosphere.

Thanks everyone who left messages, sent emails and prayed for us and those who didn't because they don't but like PC, sent well wishes instead; the support was really appreciated. Matt read me your comments when I was in hospital and it was really cool.


My head feels a lot clearer now but it is still not 100%. I am still in a lot of pain though and I think that's going to take a while but the drugs do their thing so it is manageable. Apparently I am supposed to feel well enough to return to full time work in 3 weeks time. It seems hard to believe but if I could be pain free soon that would be great.

[Written from my laptop after being infuriated by an article in the Herald - not really back yet] [No, neither should you be - Matt]

He's only been Prime Minister for a month but John Key is already putting up with multiple protests at his home; most of which occur when he is away so his wife, children and neighbours bear the brunt.

According to the Herald, Unite Union are the main culprits with the Father's Union doing the weekends outside his Auckland residence. Though the Workers Party Blog seems to be taking the credit for the most recent protest - see here for their own pictures and report of the protest outside Key’s house where they gloat about the fact that they were asked to keep their protest away from neighborhood children but instead allowed the children, too young too understand the issues, to participate.

I have little respect for unions. In my experience those running them are all about the power they wield. They get off on all the attention they gather from disgruntled workers, media, the public; very little of their motivation seems to be about compassion for other people and they have no regard for other people’s civil rights (or other people’s children).

We have had to endure protesting outside our home for the last few weeks led by unionists and they are largely a bunch of rude, inconsiderate pricks.

We live opposite a Pak'N'Save supermarket on a fairly busy road; immediately opposite our lounge and living areas is apparently the ideal spot to attract attention from passing traffic. Every few days we have had to endure chants of "What do we want?” "Better pay." "When do we want it?" "In time for Christmas." "What do we want..." etc. Then all the passing cars honk their horns in response to the "toot to show your support" placards. But worst of all is the guy with the megaphone and the wailing siren. At the close of each round of the chant we have to endure the siren being let off through the megaphone. You can read all about it on the Workers Party blog [yep, them again], see Pay up Pak'n'Save.

Now I have some sympathy for the Pak'N'Save workers. Foodstuffs are not known for their rank at the top of the best places to work list and when Matt had a brief stint as a merchandiser it was the Pak'N'Save stores he most hated having to work in because of how they treated their staff (and the merchandisers). We shop at the Pak'N'Save over the road and the staff there are by and large helpful and friendly and I have no doubt that they are paid pretty lousily so I feel for them.

That said, striking and protesting is akin to throwing a tantrum and is certainly not how I conduct myself if I am asking for a pay rise.

Anyway, last week, going insane from the chanting, tooting and sirens, I mean, I was trying to blog and I couldn't think straight, I kept typing the same words over and over, the kids were getting frustrated trying to read and play and at that point, I was still waiting for surgery on my neck and needed to rest, so I finally walked up my driveway towards the protesters, a couple of my kids in tow.

Smiling nicely I called across the road, in a pleasant tone of voice, "I get wanting to be paid more and I wish you all the best with that, but is there any chance you could tone the megaphone and the siren down? This is a family home [our house used to be a vintner's so people understandably mistake it for a shop] we have kids, the noise is really getting irritating day after day and its kind of wrecking our Saturday afternoon."

The guy with the megaphone and the siren began mocking me. He rolled his eyes, and put his hand on his hip and made a quacking motion at me with his hands and then let three rounds of the siren off laughing at me. I wondered if he had misunderstood, so I pointed out that I was not suggesting they cease protesting or that they put up with lousy pay, just asking if they could keep it down just a little, particularly the megaphone and the siren which really did come right into our home. The megaphone guy continued his mockery and laughing and got a couple of other flunkies to join in and let the siren off repeatedly. I gave up in disgust.

See, inconsiderate pricks.

They were not for one minute concerned that innocent people, children, were caught in the cross fire of their protest. They have no clue about appropriate boundaries or where to draw the line or how to conduct themselves like normal people when confronted with a reasonable request at all.

Their protesting of John Key's private residence exemplifies this. If they really feel the need why not protest his office? Why go after his wife and kids and neighbours?

Simple, if these people go after innocent third parties it’s all the better for them trying to blackmail other people into meeting their demands. There is a word for this; at its extreme end it is called terrorism. In principle, what they are doing is the same as a person who high-jacks a train and makes demands.

I picked Madeleine up from hospital this morning. She is doing ok but has had severe migraines from a combination of the drugs and the stiffness in her neck.

Her neck wound is healing well and appears to be smaller than we thought it would be which is good. None-the-less she wants to send me scarf shopping anyway (she wants to cover up the dressing/scar on her neck from the surgery) .... where does a man go scarf shopping without anyone noticing?

Madeleine has had her surgery. It appears to have gone well though we don’t see the surgeon until latter today to hear the official verdict. Thanks for all the supportive comments and e-mails.

UPDATE: The surgeon informed us yesturday that the proceedure was 'text book' Madeleine is already feeling some improvement in her neck. She is however very tired and will be in hospital recovering for the next couple of days.

This is my last post before Cervical Arthroplasty surgery tomorrow to remove two discs in my neck and replace them with artificial metal ones. My surgeon says it is a straight-forward procedure and there is nothing to worry about; he also said "We make an incision in the front of your neck and we cut the damaged discs away from your spinal cord, possible side effects include death, nerve damage and paralysis." Easy for him to say don't worry.

Whilst I am not looking forward to tomorrow at all I am looking forward to the hope that by this time tomorrow the corner will have been turned on the pain, the drugs and all the hassles I have lived with since my car accident back in March; I will finally be able to begin moving forward.

Going on the log flume ride at Rainbow's end last week and being struck with pain and feeling like bone was scraping on bone in my neck, as the boat jerked after the ride pulled it up to the next level (I was fine on the slides), reinforced that I have to do this; the log flume ride is hardly adventurous and yet when I got off it I was shaken, I had an instant headache and my neck was mad at me.

I do not know when I will be up to blogging again, it will all depend on the success of the surgery and my pain levels post-op. I do intend to take the laptop with me into hospital but it has no internet connection and who knows if I will be able to type or think - mostly I am taking it to be able to watch DVD's.

I do not know how much blogging Matt will be able to do since I won't be able to edit his posts (he has a typing impairment) and he will be holding the fort at home but rest assured we will be back.

I have been involved in a discussion over at MacDoctor Moments on various aspects of the abortion debate, though in this post I don't want to talk about that issue. In the course of this discussion Chuck advocated for a policy of direct democracy to decide moral issues and it is this that I want to explore.

Before addressing direct democracy I want to look at the term "moral issue." Which issues are moral issues and which are not? What do people mean when they say this? Every piece of legislation is a moral issue to some extent. When legislators pass laws they have the power to restrict people's freedoms or impose obligations and they have the state to back up these expectations with force for non-compliance. The question as to whether or not they should pass such laws is always a moral one because prima facie it is wrong to coerce others by force. Of course there may be instances were the state is justified in making a particular legislative move but to say that the state is justified is to make a moral claim.

Those who refer to some issues as moral ones and others not, tacitly assume that unless one is talking about sex or something typically associated with moral conservatism the legislation the state passes is not moral. This is a very truncated view of what a person's moral obligations are.

Parliament has a standing practice of not using whips and allowing conscience votes on matters of "moral legislation." There is something almost machiavellian about this because it suggests that governing is an a-moral exercise; that on most issues either an MP's conscience has nothing to say or that an MP has no duty to do what is right but is rather obligatied to follow their peers. Proof positive that MP's have a lot in common with teenagers.

The arbitrary nature of this distinction can be seen in Chuck's examples, he cites the "anti-smacking bill" and "abortion" as moral issues. However, why is smacking a moral issue and assault not? Why is abortion a moral issue and not homicide (or appendectomies if you are pro-abortion)?

I think it is outrageous that any militant group can force legislation that is opposed by 80% of the people whether it is to do with smacking or abortion.
...
If we had direct democracy on moral issues instead of allowing these issues to be determined by fanatical pressure groups we would have better law.

...

If they [MP's] had a conscience they would support direct democracy and not be so arrogant.

Note the assumption that if the majority support something then it is unjust for any government to pass a law contrary to it. This is clearly false. If the majority supported looting Asian stores on Thursdays the legislature would have an obligation to refuse to legalise this. The government owes a duty to protect the property and liberty of Asian store owners, even if they are a minority, even if the majority demand it. However, Chuck says that it is arrogant for people to suggest that the majority might be wrong.

Now Chuck may seem like a colourful example who takes the whole concept slightly further than most but I think he is a good example of the inherent flaws in the binding referendum movement and his reasoning follows from their basic line of argument. Those who support binding referenda believe that if 51% of the population vote for something then the state is obligated to pass that directive into law. Further, the fact they want it binding is evidence that they think that any legislator who does not do what the majority wants is arrogant and above the people, they just don't phrase it like Chuck but the assumption remains.

However, the whole point of having a legislature is to ensure that justice prevails, not popularity or mob rule. The state has an obligation to protect the rights of all citizens, even unpopular minorities.

Democracy has its problems but it remains the best option. As Wolff argued in his adaptation of Plato's Republic (Plato was much more familiar with direct democracy than any of us are) if you had a medical problem you would consult someone with a degree of expertise in medicine, a doctor; you would not organise a vote on what the public think the appropriate diagnosis is. Likewise, why should those without a degree of expertise, the general populace, vote on matters of state when they are as ill informed about them as they are about medicine?

Of course power corrupts and anyone in a position of power must be subject to checks and balances. The doctor has to answer to the medical council and is ultimately answerable to the Minister of Health. In the same way the MP has to answer to the public and the public has the power to vote them out of office. However, one must be careful to not confuse the right to participate in choosing who will govern with a right to choose which specific acts of government will be passed.

Arguments against Relativism
In the previous post I argued that the common arguments for relativism fail. In this post I want to go one step further and suggest there are good reasons for rejecting relativism. Many reasons could be mustered here; I will limit myself to three.

Counter Examples
Both cultural and individual ethical relativism are subject to several, straight-forward, counter examples.

Take cultural ethical relativism first. Consider a culture where it is accepted that that a husband has the right to beat his wife. Would an advocate of cultural relativism contend that in such a society criticism by a Christian minority of this practice and the advocacy of norms forbidding spousal abuse is an unacceptable imposition of a narrow, religious perspective? Would it be true that in such a society public policy could not be based on the ethical principle that it is wrong for a man to beat his wife?

Consider an Islamic society where the majority believe that conversion to a rival, mono-theistic religion is immoral and should be a capital offence. To not execute converts to Judaism or Christianity in such a society would, according to cultural relativism, be wrong.

In a society where a racial majority believes a racial minority is sub-human and this belief is widely accepted throughout the culture, it would be unjust to grant equal human rights according to cultural relativism.

The same line of argument applies against individual ethical relativism. Suppose an individual believes that it is permissible to rape, torture and kill women. If individual relativism is true it follows that this person is right to do these things and anyone who utters condemnation because they believe rape, torture and murder are wrong are mistaken.

You may think this is a hypothetical example but it’s not. In his discussion of relativism, Pojman recounts an interview with serial killer Ted Bundy,

Then I learned that all moral judgments are “value judgments,” that all value judgments are subjective, and that none can be proved to be either ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ I even read somewhere that the Chief Justice of the United States had written that the American Constitution expressed nothing more than collective value judgments. Believe it or not, I figured it out for myself – what apparently the Chief Justice couldn’t figure out for himself – that if the rationality of one value judgment was zero, multiplying it by millions would not make it one whit more rational. Nor is there any ‘reason’ to obey the law for anyone, like myself, who has the boldness and daring – the strength of character – to throw off its shackles…. I discovered that to become truly free, truly unfettered, I had to become truly uninhibited. And I quickly discovered that the greatest obstacle to my freedom, the greatest block and limitation to it, consists in the insupportable ‘value judgment’ that I was bound to respect the rights of others. I asked myself, who were these ‘others’? Other human beings, with human rights? Why is it more wrong to kill a human animal than any other animal, a pig or a sheep or a steer? Is your life more to you than a high’s life to a hog? Why should I be willing to sacrifice my pleasure more for the one than for the other? Surely you would not, in this age of scientific enlightenment, declare that God or nature has marked some pleasures as ‘moral’ or ‘good’ and others as ‘immoral’ or ‘bad’? In any case, let me assure you, my dear young lady, that there is absolutely no comparison between the pleasure I might take in eating ham and the pleasure I anticipate in raping and murdering you. That is the honest conclusion to which my education has led me – after the most conscientious examination of my spontaneous and uninhibited self.[1]

Moral Reform and Moral Progress
A second reason for rejecting relativism is that it implies that social reform is mistaken and those who engage in it are always wrong. Consider two historical examples; the first is Martin Luther King Jnr. Dr King campaigned against the racism and racial segregation that was practised in the southern states of the US.

Now if cultural relativism is correct, Dr King was wrong to do this; segregation was accepted by the society he was in at the time, hence, it was permissible for members of that society. Moreover Dr King’s own practices, which involved civil disobedience, were contrary to the laws of his day. In fact contemporaries of Dr King criticised his actions on this point. In his letter from Birmingham Jail, Dr King answered his critics by stating that above the laws and mores of one’s society was the law of God and that any law which contradicted this was unjust.

Now if we accept relativism, we have to conclude that Dr King was mistaken here. Dr King, in fact, was an intolerant bigot who imposed his private religious beliefs about racism onto others. The society he lived in accepted racism, hence racism is right for members of that society. But surely this analysis is completely lopsided? Dr King was right and his society was wrong; he was the opponent of bigotry and his society was perpetuating it.

Similarly, William Wilberforce’s campaign to end slavery would have to be considered unjust and mistaken if we take seriously the cultural relativist’s position. Slavery was, after all, accepted in the British Empire at the time. Wilberforce’s efforts were defeated by a majority of parliament on many occasions. Hence, if relativism is true, slavery was actually right and Wilberforce was wrong to oppose it.

Similar things can be said for the idea of moral progress. Normally we think that certain reforms such as women’s suffrage, the abolition of cruel and unusual punishment, ending child labour, etc are marks of progress, historical points where a society improves and gets better. However, if relativism is correct this is not the case.

Reform or progress is impossible; whatever a society believes is right, is right for members of that society. If something is right if a culture thinks its right, then it is impossible for a society’s mores to ever be wrong. Societal mores are in essence infallible.

But then it seems there is nothing to improve upon and hence, progress cannot occur. All that can happen is that societies can change one perfectly valid system for another and those who advocate the change are always mistaken when they do.

Further, a minority would never be justified in proposing its ideas until it was no longer a minority view. However, it cannot cease to be a minority view unless it is proposed in the first place. Consequently, this requires all societies to be frozen in whatever popular prejudices currently exist. The reforming minority that critiques contemporary culture would be effectively silenced.

This problem does not only apply to cultural relativism. An analogous argument can be applied to individual relativism. Reform does not just happen within societies; individuals can reform and make moral progress.

Consider a member of the Ku Klux Klan who thinks that lynching African Americans is justified or a Nazi who fervently believes in the extermination of Jews. If these people came to see the error of their ways and reformed their characters so that they came to view other races as people with equal dignity, made in the image of God, then it is plausible to say they have undergone moral reform and have progressed. However, individual relativism entails this is not the case.

The Klan member and the Nazi were right to engage in bigoted behaviour, because neither believed there was anything wrong with it. Moreover, the basis of this change, seeing ‘the error of their ways,’ is, in fact, hugely mistaken. According to individual relativism, there was no ‘error of ways’ at all and anyone suggesting there was is an intolerant bigot.

Equality of Cultural and Individual Practises
My final argument against relativism is to note that if cultural relativism is true then no practiced widely accepted by a culture is better than a practice accepted by another culture. According to individual relativism, no practice sincerely believed in by one person is better than another’s.

For individual relativism, if Ted Bundy believes it is permissible to rape women and kill them, then that is right for him and there is nothing wrong with him doing it. Similarly, if Mother Teresa believes helping the poor is permissible then she is permitted morally to do this. However, any suggestion that Bundy’s practises are worse than Mother Teresa’s and he should change and be more like her is mistaken. To do so is to suggest that the views of one person (Teresa) can be legitimately applied to another (Bundy) who does not believe in them.

Similarly, with cultural relativism; if a culture institutionalises and accepts the persecution of ethnic minorities then its members are justified in engaging in such persecution. If another culture grants equal dignity to all races on the basis of its beliefs then it too is justified in this. However, it is mistaken to think that one is correct and the other wrong. Both are correct and neither is wrong as there is no trans-cultural standard that one can appeal to, to claim one is better than the other.

Conclusion
I submit then that relativism has little going for it. When one unpacks the contemporary slogans one finds a position supported by bad and often incoherent arguments. A position that if correct, entails horrific and bigoted practices are as justified as any other practice and any attempts to change or reform people from engaging in such practices is wrong. Relativism essentially renders morality and ethics into pointless concepts.

[1] Louis P. Pojman The Moral Life: An Introductory Reader in Ethics and Literature (Oxford University Press: 2003).

RELATED POSTS:
Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism I
Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism II

In my previous post, I set out the differences between relativist and objectivist views of ethics. I noted that objectivist views were widely disparaged in our culture in favour of relativist ones. I now want to raise what, I think, is an obvious question, why should we accept the relativism assumed in much cultural ethical discourse? The fact it is popular shows it is fashionable but what reasons are there for thinking it is true?

Arguments for Ethical Relativism
There appear to be two main arguments for relativism. The first appeals to the existence of diverse mores and traditions amongst cultures on particular issues. The second is a cluster of ethical concerns about such things as tolerance, avoiding bigotry, open mindedness, etc. I will examine both below.

Argument from Diversity
One argument for relativism, going back to the time of Herodotus, is based on the fact that different cultures and groups often appear to have radically different ethical norms and values. In some cultures, for example, homosexual conduct is permitted even mandated, in others it is condemned.[1] Some cultures practice polygamy, others monogamy. Many cultures have practiced infanticide allowing the parents a choice whether to kill a child after birth,[2] other cultures strongly disapprove of this. I could go on.

Further, within the same societies ethical judgments can appear to change over time. Fifty years ago abortion was illegal in New Zealand, now it is paraded as a woman’s choice. Four hundred years ago people were executed for witchcraft in Europe, now we watch “Sensing Murder” and “The Ghost Whisperer” for entertainment.

It is not uncommon to find some cross-cultural anthropological studies making claims such as the following,

[1] Ethical principles differ from culture to culture and from age to age.

Given that [1] is essentially the thesis of ethical relativism, it is suggested that cross-cultural studies demonstrate relativism. [This is clearly an argument for cultural ethical relativism. However it is clear that an analogous argument could be constructed for individual ethical relativism; it would not be hard to show that individuals often differ radically on moral issues, particularly in highly pluralistic societies.]

Two things can be noted in response. First, while it is true that different cultures come to different ethical conclusions, in and of itself, this does not mean they disagree over ethical principles. Sometimes this outcome is due to factual or non-ethical disagreements.

Consider witchcraft. Rodney Stark notes that one reason the execution of witches occurred was because of certain non-ethical beliefs that were prevalent at the time. In the 14th century, many educated people believed in the existence of witches. It was believed witches met together secretly and sacrificed children to the devil and then ate these sacrifices in a ritual feast. After this feast these people bound themselves by oath to the devil to use supernatural powers to inflict harm and kill innocent people.[3]

Now given these beliefs, it is quite understandable why some in that society felt this way. If, in our culture, people randomly killed and ate babies and then conspired to arbitrary kill, harm and maim innocent people, many would support their actions being subject to the death penalty. The point is that it is factual, not ethical claims, which are the major source of disagreement between cultures.[4]

The second and more important point, is that the argument is invalid. Frances Howard-Snyder notes[5] that [1] is ambiguous it can mean,

[1a] Beliefs about what is right and wrong differ from culture to culture and age to age.

Or it could mean,

[1b] What really is right and wrong differs from culture to culture and age to age.

To provide grounds for affirming relativism, anthropological studies would need to establish [1b] but they do not. At most, they establish [1a]. To get [1b] from [1a] one would need to assume that what a society believed was right was really right for that society. This, however, would be to assume relativism was correct. The argument would then be circular; one would assume relativism as a premise in order to establish it as a conclusion.

Argument from Tolerance
The second major argument proposed in favour of relativism appeals to virtues such as tolerance, absence of bigotry, open mindedness, etc. The idea is that if you apply your ethical standards to other people or other cultures, you are arrogantly assuming that they are wrong and you are right. In claiming that other people are mistaken or wrong you are failing to show them tolerance and are rather, imposing your morality upon them. This is, arguably, the major driver behind the appeal of relativism in culture today. This argument has the following structure.

[1] It is intolerant to claim that other people’s opinions are mistaken or wrong.

[2] People should not be intolerant.

From which it follows,

[3] People should not claim that other people’s opinions are mistaken or wrong.

Let me examine each of these claims.

Is it intolerant to claim that other people’s opinions are mistaken or wrong?
Contrary to [1], it is not intolerant to claim others are mistaken or wrong. Two line of argument show this.

First the person who proposes this claim seems to misunderstand the meaning of the word tolerance. Suppose you asked me what I thought about my wife’s cooking and I responded that I “tolerated it.” This would entail that my wife is not a good cook (and would probably make her mad). If she were a good cook, I would not say I tolerate her cooking, I would say she is a great cook. In the same way I can only tolerate other people’s behaviour and or opinions if I think there is something wrong or bad about them. If I do not think this, I would not tolerate their behaviour or opinions, I would endorse them.

Second, [1] is itself refuting. Note that the person who makes this claim is criticising the behaviour of objectivist. The claimant is asserting that the objectivist in “telling other people that they are wrong or incorrect” is doing something wrong or incorrect. Can you see the problem?

If [1] is true then the person who utters this argument is themselves intolerant by their own definition. It would also entail that any position based upon or committed to this view is also intolerant. However, [2] entails that the relativist should not utter this argument and if uttered, we should reject any view based upon this argument and any position committed to castigating others as intolerant.

Do people have a duty to be tolerant?
Turning to the second premise [2], despite often being expounded in contemporary society as a self-evident truth, [2] is clearly false.

First, in many contexts, intolerance is appropriate and is a virtue. Imagine a society that tolerated rape, child molestation, infant sacrifice or spouse beating. Such a society would be “tolerating other people,” after all, rapists, paedophiles, child killers and wife beaters are people… However, this society would be wrong to do this. Hence, tolerance is not always a duty, sometimes it is a vice. Secondly, if unqualified, the assertion that people have a duty to be tolerant entails that one should tolerate intolerance, something deeply paradoxical.

Third, in the context of an argument for relativism, [2] seems to put the proponent of this argument into a contradiction. Remember that according to relativism there are no objective ethical principles. On cultural ethical relativism, an action is wrong for a person only if that person’s culture condemns that action. On individual ethical relativism, an action is wrong for a person only if he or she believes the action is wrong. However, it follows that, if relativism is true, there is no objective duty to be tolerant. Any culture that accepts and practises intolerant and bigoted practises is permitted to do so. Any individual who believes that certain intolerant practises are permissible is justified in being intolerant. The relativist, then, cannot consistently ask the objectivist to give up the intolerant position that they believe on the basis that doing so is wrong. If relativism is true then the fact that objectivists believe in an intolerant position means tolerance is not wrong for them but in fact permissible.

Many of the arguments behind relativism are thoroughly confused. In my next post I will argue that there are good reasons against accepting it.

[1] David Greenberg The Construction of Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
[2] Lalia Williamson “Infanticide: An Anthropological Analysis” in Infanticide and the Value of Life ed. M. Kohl (New York: Prometheus Books, 1978) 61-73.
[3] Rodney Stark, For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witch-Hunts, and the End of Slavery (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 201.
[4] The witchcraft example comes from C S Lewis’ discussion of relativism in Mere Christianity.
[5] Frances Howard-Snyder “Christianity and Ethics” in Reason for the Hope Within ed Michael J Murray (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1999) 378; see also James Rachels Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1986) 19.

RELATED POSTS:
Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism I
Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism III

I just stumbled across this from Kiwipolemicist; it seems that if you were born in New Zealand from 1969 onwards, chances are that the New Zealand government is holding a sample of your blood. Some 2.1 million blood samples taken from newborns via the 'heel-prick' test are still on file today stored on "Guthrie cards."

This is basically an inchoate genetic database; if the government wanted to, it could easily tap into this info and have the means get a substantial head-start on creating a DNA profile of all its citizens. The Hon Peter Dunne is quoted in a report by the Privacy Commissioner, at para 7.4, arguing that the database has the potential to be “a powerful weapon in the fight against crime.

But hang on a minute, this powerful weapon would be obtained without probable cause; in this instance, evidence that a reasonable person would deem sufficient to conclude that a particular person will or has committed a crime. There are strong arguments to justify the New Zealand DNA Data-Bank's holding of two crime based DNA databases, the National DNA Database (containing DNA profiles from those convicted of serious offences) and the Crime Sample Database (containing DNA profiles from crime scene samples). However, to talk of creating one from every citizen is to consider a serious breach of civil liberties; such liberties as the right for innocent people to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures on the part of the State.

One might argue that if the State has not made this move having had this database since 1969 it is not likely to. In addition to being, not the point, I think this is naive and KP agrees with me:

[T]rusting the state to properly use personal information is like putting a dog and a steak in a closed room and expecting to find the steak untouched the next day.

A Memorandum of Understanding regulating requests from the Police for access to the Guthrie Cards is already in existence and has been put to use, more than once. Further, we are all familiar with NZ governments, from both camps, being too loose with civil liberties when they have an end in mind.

As Franklin said, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, so while I still can, I am going to apply to have mine and my children's DNA returned.

I had hoped to have part 2 in my relativism series online by now and I am aware I said it would be, but editing has taken longer than anticipated and now we have to leave for Madeleine's work Christmas do.

Provided we do not get back too late we will get it online tonight, otherwise expect it tomorrow morning - I think Madeleine has set up an auto post on something else which will be online shortly.

UPDATE: Madeleine's word do was excellent - she works for such a generous company. The company booked out Rainbow's End, gave really good Christmas presents to every child of an employee, had Santa on hand, put on a massive buffet dinner and then after enjoying all the rides finished the evening with a massive, professional fireworks display. Who said New Zealand was in a recession?

Every lefty who said that the right were over-reacting and being hysterical about the potential reach of the controversial Electoral Finance Act are today eating their words.

The Electoral Commission have decided that there were 4 instances of illegal campaigning under the Act in the recent election; 3 of which are worthy of police investigation. Most noteworthy, was ACT's Rodney Hide's yellow jacket which was deemed an election advertisement meaning it had to have an appropriate authorisation statement and written authorisation from the Party Financial Agent had to be obtained.

UPDATE: The Electoral Commission has referred my query to the Chief Electoral Office.