In a widely-anthologised essay Morality: Religious and Secular. Patrickl Nowell Smith offers a influential criticism of “religious morality” It is clear from his definition of religious morality that it is Voluntarism ( or a Divine Command Theory of Ethics) he has in mind. Smith states that the religious moralist has “assumed that just as the legal propriety of an action is established by showing it to emanates from an authoritative source, so also the moral propriety of an action must be established in the same way; the legal rightness has the same form as moral rightness, and may therefore be used to shed light on it.” He goes on to state “ ... Morality, on this view, is an affair of being commanded to behave in certain ways by some person who has a right to issue such commands; and once this premise is granted, it is said with some reason that only God has such a right” Smith’s critique then should be interpreted as a critique of Voluntarism.

Readers of this blog will know I have considerable sympathy for Voluntarism. I have defended it against some common objections in previous posts. So it will not suprise anyone that, despite the popularity of Smith’s essay, I think his criticisms fail. Here I wish to comment on two lines of argument he proposes.

1. One major contention Smith makes is that “religious morality is infantile” Smith’s thesis is that a Voluntarist possesses an ethical consciousness that is frozen or arrested at the pre-critical stage of a child. A mature adult whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly would have outgrown it.

In arguing for this thesis, Smith draws upon the theories of moral development proposed by Piaget. According to Piaget, children start out with a view of morality that Smith labels deontological, heteronomous and realist. Children view morality as obedience to certain rules (deontology) which hold because an authority figure, usually the parent, has promulgated them (heteronomous) and wrongdoing is perceived as any external action that violates these rules (realism). This view of ethics is appropriate for small children; however, as they mature and become more rational their consciousness changes. They begin to see the point of certain rules and understand the reasons behind them and the function of such rules. This is the stage where ethics become in Smith’s words “autonomous”. Instead of just accepting a parent’s word for it the child learns to figure these things out for him/herself.

Smith goes on to argue that these same features of heteronomy, realism and deontology are present in “religious morality” or, more specifically, Voluntarism. Consequently, Voluntarism reflects a childish way of viewing ethics, one not worthy of a grown-up, educated adult.

Smith’s analogy between Voluntarism and childish morality ignores a fundamental dis-analogy between the case Piaget describes and that of the divine/human relationship. As Richard Mouw has pointed out, Piaget views the transition from heteronomy to autonomy as corresponding to the time when a child begins to be on an increasingly-equal footing with his or her parents. The infantile stage of morality is appropriate while the child is in infancy because of its limited rationality and knowledge. In this state the child is unable to make decisions as competently as the adult, hence it relies on and defers to the judgement of adults. However, as the child grows equal to the parent in these respects he or she ceases to rely on parental judgement. He or she is now just as competent to answer these questions as his or her parent is and so his or her thinking becomes autonomous.

Consequently, Piaget’s model of development applies to situations where the subordinate is temporarily in a stage of inferiority to the authority but is undergoing a process of growth towards equality. It is when this equality is reached that the authority relationship is no longer appropriate. However, the relationship between adult humans and God is fundamentally different. Adults are not growing into divinity so that when mature they will equal God in rationality and knowledge. Rather, they are permanently in a state where they are inferior to God in these respects. In this context the failure to reach a moral consciousness that is equal to God’s is not a sign of arrested development and the infantile charge loses its sting. It is inappropriate for adults to behave like children but not inappropriate for them to fail to think like God.


2.Another argument Smith utilises appeals to the epistemic priority of moral principles over theological ones. Smith offers an argument that is “familiar to philosophers but of which the force is not always appreciated”. The argument essentially points out,

[W]e must be persuaded independently of his goodness before we admit his right
to command. We must judge for ourselves whether the Bible is the inspired word
of a kind and benevolent God or a curious amalgam of profound wisdom and gross
superstition. To judge this is to make a moral decision, so that in the end, so
far from morality being based upon religion, religion is based upon morality.

In Philosophical Problems and Arguments. James Cornman and Keith Lehrer express the same argument.

Consider what we would do if we read that Moses had returned with such
commandments as ‘make love to thy neighbor’s wife,’ ‘steal thy neighbor’s
goods,’ and ‘take advantage of thy parents.’ We would decide that what-ever was
revealed to Moses, it was not the will of God, because these are immoral
commandments. We do not justify that something is moral by showing it is God’s
will, because the only available way to evaluate conflicting claims about what
God wills is by finding which one is in accordance with what is moral.

This objection notes that in order to know whether a given action is, in fact, the type of thing God has commanded, one first needs to know whether the act is wrong. Therefore, ethics is prior to, and independent of, theology.

This objection again confuses the question of epistemological priority with the question of metaphysical independence. What these examples show is that we can know certain ethical truths prior to and independently of our knowledge of theological truths. However, it does not follow from this that deontic principles are metaphysically independent of, or non-identical to, theological ones. Consider the following analogy. In order to know that a clear liquid in front of me is water I need to examine its atomic structure to see if it is H20. It would not follow from this that water is not H20. Similarly, the fact that in certain contexts one needs to examine the moral appropriateness of commands to ascertain whether they are from God or not does not make it follow that wrongness is not the property of being contrary to God’s commands.

On my way from work to Uni Madeleine was stopped at traffic lights today and another driver drove into the back of her. She was taken to hospital and her car looks like a write off.

David Farrar of Kiwiblog weighs in on the abortion debate. I have met David a couple of times and worked with him on several issues. However, on this issue we disagree. Seeing Farrar’s blog is widely read, and seeing the ethics of killing a fetus was my PhD topic. I will endeavour to spell out why I think he is mistaken.

David Farrar writes:

Now my personal position on abortion is it should be legal, safe and preferably
rare. As cessation of brain activity is what effectively marks death, I tend to
regard life as the start of such brain activity (as measured by ECG, not just
electrical activity) which is at around 20 weeks.

Farrar’s argument here appears to consist of two premises (some which are more implicit than explicit). They are [1] If the loss of a property results in something going out of existence then the acquiring of the same property results in it coming into existence [2] the loss of a functioning brain (measured by an EEG) results in living human being to go out of existence and [3] A fetus aquires functioning human brain (measured by a EEG) at 20 weeks. Now [1] and [2] entails that a living human being comes into existence when it receives a functioning brain measured by EEG, and this conjoined with [3] entails that a living human being comes into existence at 20 weeks

I think Farrar’s argument is unsound because [1] is clearly false. Consider a functioning car. A functioning car ceases to exist as a functioning car when it looses a motor. Does it follow that then that all a car needs to become a functioning car is a motor? No, More than just a motor is needed to get a car to function, one needs petrol, a driver, wheels etc. The loss of a motor will stop it functioning but the presence of a motor is not enough to make it function. The point is that often there can be a series of properties each of which is necessary for something to exist but none by themselves enough to make the object exist. Something can be necessary for X but not in and of itself sufficient for X. Farrar’s argument confuses these separate things, it assumes that if something is necessary for X ( its absence causes X to not exist) then its sufficient for X (its presence causes it to exist) and this is simply an error.

There is however an analogue of Farrar’s argument which has more promise and it has been proposed by ethicists such as Goldenring and Hans Martin Sass. This argument suggests that we already have criteria which we use after birth to determine whether a human body on a life support system is a living human being or merely human tissue (a corpse). This is the famous “Brain Death criteria”. According to this criteria if a human body posses a functioning human brain then it is a living human being and killing it (by harvesting its organs for example) constitutes homicide. On the other hand if it does not have a functioning human brain then it is dead, it is not a living human being and one does not commit homicide if one slices it up.

Goldenring, Sass and others suggest we apply this criteria to pre born situations. Early in the pregnancy a rudimentary human body emerges. The uterine environment is moreover analogous to a life support system. We want to know whether this body constitutes a living human being or a mere tissue. They suggest we apply the Brain death criteria. If the fetus posses a functioning human brain then it is a living human being and killing it is homicide. If it does not then abortion only destroys human tissue.

So, suppose I be charitable and reconstruct Farrar’s arguments along these lines. Do we have an argument that a fetus is not human until 20 weeks gestation?

No, the reason is that Farrar appears to not understand the brain death criteria. According to this criteria a human body is dead (as opposed to alive) if it posses a brain that has irreversibly ceased to function. It’s not enough that there be no brain function it must also be the case that such function will not come into being in the future. For reasons like this, many ethicists like Goldenring, Sass and Brody who appeal to the Brain death criteria conclude that a fetus is a human being from very early in the pregnancy around 6-8 weeks gestation. The reason is simple, around this time a fetus has developed a rudimentary brain, it posses some function and full function will come about in the future through natural brain development. Hence the fetus cannot be said to have irreversible lack of brain function.

The application of brain death criteria then in fact brings about precisely the opposite result to what Farrar contends. It leads to the conclusion that at the time most abortions occur a fetus is a living human being and abortion is homicide.


RELATED POSTS:
Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
Sentience Part 1
Sentience Part 2
Viability
Abortion and Child Abuse: Another Response to Farrar
Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
Imposing You Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence
Published: Boonin's Defense of the Sentience Criteria - A Critique
Published: Abortion and Capital Punishment - No Contradiction

Way back in 1993 I began an LLB (Bachelor of Law) part-time. I took a break from it 8 years ago following the death of our first child but now we are settled in Auckland I am ready to pick it up again.

My employer has given me a bonding agreement to complete it so I get time and financial assistance which is really good as I am already giving the company legal support anyway so I get to put the relevant bits into practice as I learn.

Auckland University has accepted my application to transfer from Waikato so here I am about to re-start my studies. I am just going to do two papers this year, the finaly level 3 ones I am missing and then I will start knocking off the level 4 papers I don't yet have too.

Madeleine

In wake of the return of the stolen victoria crosses and the Police claiming they are “honour bound” to pay the thieves the promised reward not PC argues that it is permissible to lie to an agressor. The standard example in the literature (which PC utilises) goes something like this: You are hiding someone fleeing for their life (modern examples use Jews in Nazi occupied territory). A murderer (modern examples usually use the Gestapo) come knocking on your door. They ask you if you know the whereabouts of their prey. Do you tell the truth?

I agree with not PC that the correct answer to this question is no. I agree that the rule to not lie is restricted in scope, prohibiting lying to competent adults who are not violating our rights or threatening such a violation.

Interestingly, not PC seems to think I am committed to rejecting this conclusion. He insinuates that Kantian and Divine Command approaches to ethics entail that one can never lie under any circumstances. He writes for example “that moral principles are neither "divine commandments" nor "categorical imperatives" -- they are guides to action applying within a certain framework of conditions;”and latter he is more explict

Unlike the ethics of religionists, Objectivism derives its moral principles not from stone tablets or burning bushes or caliphate commandments -- not on what's needed to live in heaven or paradise in some supernatural realm -- but from from the needs of man's survival and flourishing right here on this earth. The contrast with religious morality could not be greater: for the Objectivist, moral principles are guides to action intended to enhance and sustain one's life. For the religionist however, moral principles are divine commandments that act like a ball and chain -- a dogmatic straitjacket commanding one's obedience, even if when talking to a Gestapo officer it could lead to your own death or that of a loved one. For the Objectivist, the answer to a Gestapo chief is outside the bounds of morality altogether: morality ends when the Gestapo chief's gun begins. But for the religionist, telling the truth is an absolute necessity even if it entails the sacrifice of your life and that of your loved ones.

Here PC is just plain wrong. While it is correct that many Catholic moral theologians support an unqualified prohibition on lying PC misunderstands the rationale they propose for this verdict. Catholic teaching on natural law as (expounded by people like Thomas Aquinas) is precisely that the moral law is derived from what conduces to human flourishing. Lying is prohibited because it is believed to be conducive to human flourishing. It is not prohibited because such a rule makes one fit for heaven or because its set down in tablets of stone promulgated by burning bush (apart from slander lying is not mentioned in the ten commandments) nor is it held to be correct because a priest or caliphate says so. Catholic theologians argue for this thesis from Aristotelian understandings of human flourishing. I think they are incorrect, but thats not an excuse for misrepresenting their position.

Similar things can be said about Divine Command Theories (and contrary to PC not all "religionists" are divine command theorists) . Divine command theories (DCT) as propounded by Locke, Berkley, Paley, Suarez etc typically affirm that right and wrong are determined by God’s prescriptive will. However these thinkers go on to stress that God is a rational being who wills the flourishing of human beings and hence what God’s will is rational and God commands what promotes or leads or respects human flourishing in some way.

But to the more substantive point.

A DC theorist is committed to claiming that it is never wrong to lie in any circumstance, only if believes God has commanded this. Such a claim is often attributed to the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, but this is debatable to say the least. The Hebrew scriptures contain several passages where God approves of lying in certain contexts. One obvious example is the case of the Hebrew midwives in the book of Exodus. In the narrative Pharaoh orders that all Hebrew male children are to be killed at birth. The midwives respond by lying to Pharaoh about the births in order to protect them and are commended by God for their actions. There has been a huge amount of discussion of these passages and their application to moral theology on lying within Christian casuistry. So it is surprising people so often attribute naïve absolutism to moral theologians who take scripture seriously.

Nor does a person sympathetic (as I am) to Kantian understandings of morality have to embrace the conclusion that’s its never wrong to lie. According to some Kantian’s (such as Alan Donagan) ethical principles have a logic such that one person cannot appeal to a principle for protection as a shield for breaking that principle or another equally as grave. Self defence is perhaps the clearest paradigm: a person cannot rationally appeal to an absolute right to not be killed if he uses that right as a shield to cover his killing of someone else. Such a position involves a contradiction of the will. And it rejects the universalizability of moral principles; the idea that what rules one lays down for others must, if they are moral principles, also apply to oneself.

I am inclined to think that without something like this condition ethical principles would become incoherent. If one cannot justifiably use force to repel an attacker when the only way the attacker can be repelled is by force then the attacker has a freedom right to attack his victim. But surely if the claim it’s wrong to kill entails anything it entails that people do not have a freedom right to do kill others. Now, if one can use force against a person to protect ourselves and others from their attacks it seems hard to see why we can’t lie or deceive them to do so.

What does this mean in the present context? It means that not PC is correct that the police are not bound by a promise to pay the reward to those who stole the Victoria Crosses. The Police would be acting licitly if they refused to pay. And nothing about being a divine command theorist or Kantian precludes one drawing this conclusion

Let me add a final point in defence of PC’s conclusion. The standard argument against lying in this context takes a rule consquentialist line. It’s contended that accepting a rule that permits the police to renege on paying such rewards has bad consequences. Criminals in future cases may not divulge information necessary to solve crimes and hence peoples property will not be returned. The problem here, as with many appeals to consquentialism, is that there are other consequences of accepting this rule which point the other way. A rule where criminals get paid for returning what they steal makes stealing and ransoming pay and hence encourage stealing, kidnapping, ransoming etc.

Consequently, if one is to appeal to positive consequences in a plausible way one needs to examine the total consequences of accepting the rule. One need’s to examine both how many crimes will be solved by accepting this rule and how much crime will be encouraged if we don’t and it needs to be shown that former good results outweigh the latter. To the best of my knowledge no one has ever done this calculation. Until they have the claim that consequences justify honouring agreements to thieves is unsubstantiated.

We got an email earlier today alerting us to the return of Jim Peron to prominence. This was not the first email expressing this concern that we have had in the past few months, in fact the number we have received is surprisingly high given we thought the issue had gone away back in 2005 when Jim Peron had his work permit revoked on the grounds of bad character due to his paedophilia apologist days back in San Francisco.

What made this email different was that in addition to the claims that he is back in favour and increasing in influence was that it pointed to a new website with our Locke Foundation Report on it and a copy of Unbound (hosted overseas). It invited people to make sure its existence got out there in cyberland.

We were not sure that we wanted to go there again. We certainly do not want to re-litigate this issue it was stressful enough the first time round but we see the point.

Since leaving New Zealand, Jim Peron continues to be published, has had invitations to speak and host conferences, is hailed as an authority and with the demise of the evidence from the world wide web that we unearthed, along with others, some are claiming he was framed, that we, along with Lindsay Perigo, made made the whole thing up because we hate gays. These latter claims are ludicrous - not only is our alledged co-conspiritor gay himself but so was one of the researchers (our flatmate) who worked with us, to write the report! A huge deal was made of Peron's sexual orientation and our faith at the time and to this day. The reality is that these things have no bearing on the issue at hand.

The fact is, that what Jim Peron did was disturbing. I think Joseph Rowlands sums it up well:

A few years ago, a prominent libertarian (Jim Peron) in Objectivist circles was outed as a supporter of pedophilia. Some investigators in New Zealand found copies of a magazine he published on the topic, including an article in his own name.

The responses at the time were very curious. I would have expected libertarians and Objectivists to try to distance themselves from his viewpoint, or to condemn that ideas he had promoted, or to distance themselves from him. Instead, their was an outpouring of sympathy for him. He has a right to free speech, they said. This is just a witch-hunt, they said. He claims no knowledge of any of it, despite the article penned in his name, they said. That was decades ago, they offered. Age of consent laws are arbitrary(!) they began to argue...

On and on, people who had already supported him found ways to dismiss this significant information about him. They determined that there was no significant loss with having libertarian or Objectivist ideas falsely connected to child-rape.

It was shocking to me at the time for a few reasons. One, because the hatred and disgust that most people felt was for those who brought out the facts. Two, because while the issue should have been about someone promoting pedophilia, people tried to ignore that and hide behind the freedom of speech principle. And three, because when these didn't seem enough, people actually started making arguments to try to make it seem more respectable, starting with age of consent laws being arbitrary.

Generally I am not a fan of Post Modern ways of thinking; frequently what I see propagated under that banner is irrational and incoherent but made to look profound through the use of sophisticated sounding intellectualised language. However, one idea often touted as “post modern” I find plausible, at least in some contexts. This is the notion that appeals to objectivity (in the sense of neutrality) are not neutral at all. They are rather concealed attempts to ensure hegemony of ones own position.

I was reminded of this recently when I was reading the webpage of the New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists (NZARH). The latest press realise on this page is as follows:

Ms McKenzie said that while NZARH would not oppose charitable work that directly
eases poverty in Melanesia, it is inappropriate for the Government of New Zealand to allow tax exemptions for that part of the Trust's work which is purely missionary or purely commercial. She said the politicians cited in today's New Zealand Herald report of the Trust's activities should understand that Parliament is not a church and elected politicians are not elected to advance the cause of any particular religion's missionary activities."Even the poorest people in New Zealand pay tax, yet this multi-million dollar trust doesn't want to pay tax like the rest of us. If religious trusts such as these paid tax and property rates like the rest of us, it would reduce the individual tax burden considerably. Tax privileges based on religion should be a thing of the past.""If Parliament was passing a Bill advantaging the Scientologists
or the Destiny Church in this way there would be uproar.

Elizabeth McKenzie is NZARH’s president and in this release she speaks on speaking on behalf of NZARH. Here argument is worth noting she maintains [1] that government should not advance the cause of “any particular religion's missionary activities” [2] to grant tax exemption to an organisation whose work is missionary is to give it a privilege not granted to “the rest of us” and constitutes advancing its causes. The appeal seems to be to some concept of impartiality or equality. Religious groups should not get tax relief that everyone else does not get unless their work is purely charitable.

What I found interesting about this is that a some months ago I picked up NZARH’s journal The Open Society (former called The New Zealand Rationalist Humanist) and on the back page where addresses of various “Humanist organisations” are listed there is reference to a “New Zealand Humanist Charitable Trust’. NZARH’s 2001 journal has an entire article on this charitable trust. It states that “The named beneficiaries in the Trust deed are HSNZ and the New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists (NZARH)” [emphasis mine] This article also tells us that the trusts purpose is not purely charitable, one of its functions is to “Provide funding for seminars and other educational activities to promote public understanding and discussion of ethics and Humanism;” and the article tells us that NZARH could use it to fund visiting speakers.

So, NZARH apparently have no problem with Humanist Charitable Trusts, will gladly promote them and be the beneficiaries of them, and will use these trusts for promoting their own “particular secular missionary activities”. Despite the fact that “Even the poorest people in New Zealand pay tax,” despite the fact that “If humanist trusts such as these paid tax and property rates like the rest of us, it would reduce the individual tax burden considerably”. It’s interesting two that for all the rampant condemnation of religious charities on their site. NZARH is oddly silent about the New Zealand Humanist Society which, according to the March 2004 issue of the New Zealand Humanist, has tax exempt status and which had an article explaining what they needed to do to maintain this status. In fact NZARH appear on their site to promote the NZ Humanist Society.

The key phrase word in NZARH’s release is the word “religious trusts”. It apparently has no problem with the state giving tax credits to (and hence by their logic advancing and privileging) humanist organisations. It therefore appears to advocate a situationthe state advances the agendas of opponents of religious belief get state assistance but religious groups get no such assistance and are prohibited from getting it. Ironically it does this in the name of equality. However this is not equality it is rigging the deck in their favour. NZARH is advancing economic discrimination by the state in its favour and against its ideological opponents.

I am supposed to be online surfing trade me for summer horse covers but I am mad so I came here instead.

I am mad because I don't want to spend money on a horse cover our horse does not need and, well probably mostly, I resent being made to do so by some idiot who is contemporaneously wielding power and ignorance and has our pony club and all its members backed into a corner.



You see our horse, Trogdor (that is Trogdor the Burninator or Troggy for short - thats him above), does not need a summer cover. He is a well covered, thick skinned, healthy horse with a coat in good condition meaning he naturally has everything he needs that horses for centuries have used to stay cool in summer and warm in winter - and besides he lives in Auckland where it just doesn't get cold (well compared to Dunedin where we recently vacated - I would have to daily break the ice on my horse's water trough through winter down there!) and add to this is he is an Arab cross bred - gee I wonder how the horses in Arabia survived all that desert... so he only gets covered when it is the middle of winter and it is wet and frosty and even then mostly because we are sooks.

This is best practice equine care.

I could bore you stupid linking to endless sites advocating "the natural horse" approach to equine care but basically the gist is that if a horse is in good health and is not too old or too young then they coat will aerate or sit flat to let heat in or out depending on the conditions and only in extreme conditions do you intervene with nature - most of the time if you spend mega bucks building your horse a shelter he or she can stand under you will find him happily out in the blinding rain (or snow as in Dunedin) or sweltering sun ignoring your shelter in much the same manner he is ignoring the weather.

Enter the stupid, moronic animal activist.

He has decided that all the pony club horses are being neglected because they don't have/won't stay under "adequate shelter". He will report us to the council for animal abuse if we do not immediately ensure our horses have cover from the sun and have pony club shut down. (Did I mention the pony club occupies several acres of prime waterfront Auckland real estate which seriously GRATES the council?)

As the horses will not stay in the shade and move around the paddock as they graze (anyone would think they were coping perfectly fine with the sun) our only option to prevent the wrath of the council and to get this idiot of our backs is to put covers on them. This will make the horses hot, sweaty and miserable and will cost us money and will increase the risk of the horses coming to harm in the paddock by way of cover strap breakage or getting themselves hooked on fences and trees, etc. But hey, what would the two vets who wrote opinions on our behalf and us experienced horse owners know compared to some jumped up idiotic animal rights activist?

He actually rejected the vets opinion on the grounds that he "did not consider one of them to be credible." When asked which vet was not credible his response was, "I don't want to name him because I don't want to risk being sued for slander." Hello! You are only at risk of slander if you are talking crap, if it is true you have a defence.

So here I am looking at forking out at least $30 (for the crappiest option on the market - yeah I know, its not that much but its the principle!) for an item I don't need that will make my horse uncomfortable because of some nut-job who knows he has us all over a barrel because he knows the council will leap at the chance to get us off the land we lease from them but still dares to call himself the advocate for animal rights.

GRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR

Madeleine