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Friday, 3 August 2007

Religion and Public Life: A Response to Russell Brown and Paul Litterick

Paul Litterick was recently interviewed by Russell Brown on Public Address. The topic predictably is his criticism of conservative Christian groups whom Russell appears to have no time for. Here I will make to criticisms of this broadcast, first one of Russell Brown and the second of Litterick.

Turning first to Russell Brown; Brown mentioned in detail the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanist's (NZARH) exposure of Bruce Logan’s plagiarism, elaborated how this damaged Maxim’s credibility and meant they had little media respectability as a result. It was also stressed on the show that this incident showed that they were a bogus think tank.

However, Brown seemed almost silent about NZARH’s own apparent deception that both Litterick and I have discussed. Yet it is clear from what Brown does say that he does know about it but he omits to mention it - even in contexts where it is relevant.

For example, Brown mentions that there was an interesting story about Littericks falling out with NZARH but will not go into the details and he queried why Litterick even made the issues of the falling out public but he never ventures to state what they were.

There seems to me to be a clear double standard here. NZARH make media comment about religion and public issues, so do Maxim. If Logan’s deception is newsworthy and calls into question Maxim’s media credibility then why is this not equally true of NZARH?

Moreover, if Brown feels it is acceptable to make Logan’s alleged plagiarism public, which he does on his show, why then does he query the appropriateness of bringing up NZARH’s actions on air? Is privacy something that applies only to secularists perhaps?

Turning now to Litterick; Litterick states he has no issue with private faith but is opposed to religious values guiding public policy. This is because he is concerned that the views of one group of society (those with a religious faith) are being used to restrict the freedoms of everyone else in society, many of who do not accept the religious beliefs in question and may in fact openly reject them.

Now this is a common line of argument. However, despite its pervasiveness, this argument is erroneous. In the literature on Religion and Public Life Christian Philosophers like Nicholas Wolterstorff, Christopher Eblerle and Philip Quinn have published cogent rebuttals of it. Here I can summarise the issues.

The main problem with this criticism of using religious beliefs to guide public policy is that exactly the same thing can be said about secular, non-theological beliefs. Beliefs that Litterick and Brown hold to and would advocate public policy changes on the basis of. Phillip Quinn articulates this point,
... if the fact that religious reasons can not be shared by all in a religiously
pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for
advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in
fairness also be excluded on the same grounds.[1]

Quinn notes correctly that secular moral theories such as Utilitarianism or Kantianism, Intuitionism, Socialism, Libertarianism, can all be reasonably rejected in a philosophically-pluralistic society.

Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory,
including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the
grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a
pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can
be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic
democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours
very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified, a conclusion
that would, I suspect, be welcome only to anarchists.[2]
Quinn is substantially correct here. There is special pleading going on whereby theological beliefs are rejected on certain grounds while secular ones are not, even though the same grounds and reasons should lead to their rejection as well. If it’s unjust to restrict a person's freedom on the basis of beliefs held by only some members of the community and which are rejected by others then all laws are unjust.

It could be added that such arguments are frequently incoherent. After all, such beliefs propose a moral viewpoint that many reject, the view that theological beliefs are not to be appealed to in public. Given that many reject this view, some people think that they should be appealed to in public, it should not be appealed to in public debate about policy. Moreover, since this position is generally defended by appeals to normative principles about freedom or pluralism or conceptions of equality that many reject, many of the arguments for this conclusion should not be utilised in public debate either.

Perhaps, however, I am being uncharitable here, perhaps what Litterick means to assert is not that the religious beliefs can be reasonably rejected by some people - that would, as I note above, lead to anarchism - rather, his point is that a majority of people reject them. This too, however, is problematic.

Implicit in this argument is the claim that a necessary condition for any principle to be utilised in public debate is that the majority accepts it as true. However, this is subject to numerous counter-examples. Consider a culture where the majority believes that a husband has the right to beat his wife. Would an advocate of majoritarianism contend that in such a society criticism by a feminist minority of this practice and the advocacy of norms forbidding spousal abuse is an unacceptable imposition of a narrow, feminist perspective in a pluralistic society? Would it be true that in such a society public policy could not be based on the moral principle that it is wrong for a man to beat his wife?

Consider an Islamic society where the majority believe that conversion to a rival, trinitarian monotheistic religion is immoral and should be a capital offence. Not to execute converts to Judaism or Christianity in such a society would, by this reasoning, be unjust. In societies where a racial majority thinks a racial minority is sub-human, it would be unjust to grant equal human rights.

There is a further objection to this argument. Many normative positions that are currently supported by the majority or a wide section of the populace were once minority views. Over time, however, the minority has persuaded others and or converted them to its cause. If “narrow” views are to be excluded, this type of reform is not possible. A minority would never be able to propose its ideas until it was no longer a minority view. However, it cannot cease to be a minority view unless it is proposed in the first place. Consequently, this stance freezes societies in whatever popular prejudices currently exist. The reforming minority that critiques contemporary culture would be effectively silenced if we were to hold that only the views of the majority are the just ones.

So in sum: It seems to be that Russell Brown is inconsistent in his treatment of the issue and Litterick uses common but erroneous and, I think, discredited arguments to justify his secularist stance.




[1] Phillip Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. Paul Weithman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 144.

[2] Ibid.

Thursday, 2 August 2007

Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction

One argument I frequently hear is that opposition to feticide; the killing of a human fetus, is inconsistent with support for capital punishment. Some times this argument is pushed even further. It’s alleged that this inconsistency shows that what really motivates opponents of feticide is not opposition to killing, but good old fashioned misogyny. An example of this argument is Beverly Harrison. Harrison notes that, that zeal “for capital punishment more often than not thrives amongst legislators most eager to prevent all abortion”.[1] She infers from this,

Nothing makes clearer how little women count as full, valued persons or as
competent moral agents than this dramatic ideological inconsistency on the part
of so many anti-abortion advocates.[2]

Harrison is referring to contemporary legislators in the United States, many of whom are motivated by traditional, theological objections to feticide. However, what she says would apply with equal force to the many notable Theologians, such as Aquinas, Augustine, Calvin who in addition to condemning feticide, permitted and supported capital punishment in many contexts.

Harrison makes two points regarding this stance. Firstly, that support for capital punishment is inconsistent with opposition to abortion. Secondly, the fact that a person expresses such inconsistency is clear evidence that he or she believes that women do not “count as full, valued persons or as competent moral agents”; essentially, such people are really motivated by misogyny. I will examine each of these in turn.

Harrison contends that affirming that (a) judicial execution of a murderer is lawful and that (b) feticide is unlawful is inconsistent. To hold both (a) and (b) is to affirm a contradiction. However, this is simply incorrect. A contradiction occurs when two propositions are affirmed and one of them is the negation of the other. This is not the case with the two propositions mentioned above. The negation of (a) is the claim that it is not the case that judicial execution is just; (b) does not affirm this. It affirms quite a different proposition about the lawfulness of feticide. Similarly, the negation of (b) is the claim that it is not the case that feticide is unlawful. However, (a) does not affirm that feticide is unlawful. It makes no comment about feticide whatsoever. The affirmation of (a) and (b) is not a contradiction.

Perhaps what Harrison has in mind is that these propositions are either formally or implicitly contradictory.[3] The former occurs when two propositions are affirmed, though, in and of themselves, they are inconsistent, such that a contradiction can be deduced from them using only the rules of first order logic. The latter occurs when a contradiction can be deduced from the propositions when they are conjoined with another proposition that asserts a necessary truth.

If this is, in fact, what Harrison has in mind, then we need an argument to this effect. Take the claim that (a) and (b) are a formal contradiction. If this is to be more than just an unwarranted assertion then those who, like Harrison, make this claim must demonstrate that the derivation can be done. Yet nowhere in her book is such a deduction even attempted.
The idea that (a) and (b) are an implicit contradiction can be dealt with in the same way. If this claim is warranted then we require an argument that spells out what the necessarily true proposition in question is and how this proposition conjoined with (a) and (b) entails a contradiction.

What would such a proposition be? Harrison provides us with none. Perhaps what Harrison has in mind is something like the following. Christian theologians who oppose feticide do so because they believe it is unlawful to kill a person and capital punishment clearly violates this.[4]

Now I agree that if this were the basis on which a given theologian opposed feticide then support for capital punishment would be inconsistent with it. However, most theologians who historically did not oppose feticide on this ground feticide was judged wrong not merely because it is homicide. As the casuistry makes clear, many theologians held that killing was justified if done as defence or as a just retribution. Hence, they understood the law of God to forbid as homicide, killing that is aggressive where the victim is innocent. It is perfectly consistent to oppose feticide and not capital punishment as capital punishment kills people who are not innocent whereas feticide does not.

Of course, someone could argue that these theologians were mistaken in their understanding of the law of God and that it, in reality, prohibits all forms of homicide. This would require detailed argument addressing the hermeneutical and ethical arguments involved and Harrison has not even begun to attempt this. Moreover, even if she had provided compelling arguments for this claim it would not show these theologians to be inconsistent, rather it would show that one of a series of consistent propositions they hold is false.

There is a further point worth mentioning here. If a theologian opposed feticide because he or she believed it was unlawful to kill a person, then what would be problematic is not their opposition to feticide but their support of capital punishment. The correct conclusion would be to argue that both abortion and capital punishment are wrong. The inconsistency is not in their stance towards women who have abortions, but in their stance towards states that execute criminals.

***

Harrison’s contention, then, that those who oppose feticide and support capital punishment are inconsistent is unwarranted. However, even if this were the case, which it is not, it does not follow that the person who held such a view hates women. All it shows is that one of the two propositions is false. Harrison here appears to assume that anyone who holds to an inconsistent set of propositions denies that women “count as full, valued persons or as competent moral agents”. This is hard to take seriously. As will be seen below, Harrison herself affirms inconsistent propositions. Are we to conclude that she hates women?

In fact, not only would a successful charge of inconsistency not entail that opponents of feticide were misogynist, it would not even entail that they were mistaken in opposing feticide. All it would demonstrate was that one of the propositions held, either the one affirming the permissibility of capital punishment or the one denying the lawfulness of feticide, is false. It does not provide any grounds for asserting which of these propositions is mistaken. All the charge does is show opponents of feticide that they need to make modifications to their belief structure. It does not entail that they must give up their position on feticide.

It also should be noted that even if Harrison were correct, that inconsistency meant that one had a misogynist view of women, it still would not follow that feticide is permissible. All it would show was that the opponent of feticide hates women. A person can love women and have false beliefs and a person can hate women and have true beliefs. Here, as elsewhere, Harrison confuses attacking the characters of those who disagree with her with actually rebutting their positions.

Ironically, Harrison’s own position is inconsistent. Harrison herself rejects both propositions mentioned. She believes that feticide is permissible and opposes capital punishment. This creates a serious problem with her objection. Two propositions are contradictory only if one entails the negation (or rejection) of the other. It follows from this that they will have opposite truth-values; one will be true and the other false. If Harrison believes that capital punishment is unjust and believes that believing the contrary is inconsistent with opposition to feticide then it follows that feticide is wrong.

Further, a little reflection suggests that this inconsistency would afflict Harrison even if she did support capital punishment. Her argument is that because opposition to feticide is inconsistent with the stance many opponents of feticide take toward capital punishment, opposition to feticide is problematic. However, if these stances are inconsistent (which is what the objector must believe) then the position of many supporters of feticide is equally inconsistent with their stance against capital punishment. The same reasoning that suggests that opponents of feticide should drop such opposition suggests that supporters should drop their support.

Harrison’s argument is defective in numerous ways. It postulates contradiction where there is none and infers via a non sequitur an irrelevant conclusion that does not negate the proposition she is attacking. Moreover, her argument is incoherent and entails, if it were sound, that she should abandon her own position.


[1] Beverly Wildung Harrison, Our Right to Choose: Toward a New Ethic of Abortion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 35.
[2] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 35.
[3] In this discussion of formal and implicit contradictions I am influenced by Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1974) 14-16.
[4] This argument was suggested to me in private correspondence.


RELATED POSTS:
Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
Sentience Part 1
Sentience Part 2
Viability
Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
Abortion and Child Abuse: Another Response to Farrar
Imposing You Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence
Published: Boonin's Defense of the Sentience Criteria - A Critique
Published: Abortion and Capital Punishment - No Contradiction

Wednesday, 1 August 2007

Caricature at no god zone

As a person who studies theology and philosophy I have, over the years, read some brilliant skeptics; John Mackie and Paul Draper come to mind. I also have become reasonably informed about the debate over theism in the literature. Consquently, I have a good idea when the issues are being caricatured.

Unfortunately rebuttal of a theological position by caricature is all too common in New Zealand. A good example is the blog no god zone this claims to be a site devoted to critiquing theism. However, after briefly examining the site, there appeared to be no discussion of the arguments of Plantinga, Swinburne, Craig, Alston, Van Inwagen or any other representative proponents of theism. Instead what exists is mostly caricature and what’s worse the caricatures are usually responded to not by robust counter argument but by vitriolic abuse.

A good example of this is an attack on my wife, and fellow MnM blogger, Madeleine. Here is what the blogger godlesszone writes:
A Madeleine Flannagan repeats the same rot saying “Hell Pizza will never again
see a cent of my family’s money for their utter disregard of parental rights.”
Again the Christianists seem to think that there is a right which controls the
actions of others to prevent anything they find offensive. I’m sure people find
this woman offensive so would her waddling down the street violate the “parental
rights” of others? Of course not. Once again this moron has no idea as to what
it means to have a right.
Note godlesszone's argument here; he quotes a portion of what Madeleine said on a forum and then asserts, on the basis of this quote, that Madeleine believes there is a parental right to not be offended. He then offers an insulting counter example to the existence of this right, calls her a moron and then concludes that Madeleine, therefore, does not know what a right is.

Now even if Madeleine believed that there was a right to not be offended, this would not show she does not know what rights are, merely that she mistakenly believes in one that does not exist.

Moreover, even if Madeleine did not know what a right is that would not make her a moron. There is vigorous debate about the nature of rights and what exactly they are, if they exist, in contemporary philosophical literature. Many intelligent people disagree on this issue. Hence we have two clear non-sequiturs in this argument.

It is worth noting that this non-sequitur attacks a straw man, because nowhere did Madeleine claim that there is a right to not be offended. If one turns to the quote (to which godlesszone actually links). You will see what Madeleine actually said is in its entirety:
No one has the right to tell me how to educate my kids. Not the state, family
planning and not the local pizza company. I am not catholic, I am speaking as a
parent. Hell Pizza will never again see a cent of my family's money for their
utter disregard of parental rights. We used to buy their pizza, we never will
again. I encourage every person who believes in parental rights to boycott Hell
Pizza. We have a big enough Nanny State in New Zealand without them adding to
it. My kids reckon Pizza Hut tastes better than Hell Pizza anyway.

Nowhere in this citation does Madeleine claim that there is a right to not be offended. What Madeleine claims is that there is a parental right to educate ones children. Hell Pizza had attempted to educate people’s children’s about sex and contraception without parental consent. That was the basis of her complaint, a simple reading of what she actually wrote makes this clear. Now of course Madeleine was not claiming here that the state can never step in. In cases where there is clear evidence of abuse the state has a right and a duty to step in but nothing like that was involved in this situation being discussed.

Two things are worth noting here, first godlesszone is a Libertarian and hence actually believes in a parental right to educate ones children, in fact he probably holds to a stronger conception of parental right to educate one's children than Madeleine does. Hence nothing she actually said about the existence of such a right would be objectionable to him.

Second, by linking to this quote and citing it godlesszone shows he had in fact read this quote and hence knew what Madeleine actually said. And by snipping out the first few sentences, and asserting she was referring a parental right to not be offended, godlesszone deliberately attributes to Madeleine a thesis that he knows she did not assert.

So here the blogger at no god zone sees a person appeal to a principle he actually agrees with. However, because he dislikes the persons religion he lies about what they said, makes up something else and then ridicules them for making this made up claim, and finally make fallacious jumps to accuse them of ignorance of basic concepts in ethics.

I suspect that no god zone is not actually interested in rational critique. All we have is hatred of Christians, a hatred that burns to such an extent that simple basic prima facie moral obligations such as don’t lie about other people and don’t insult other people are considered not to apply when dealing with them.

There is an irony here the author of no god zone was until fairly recently a writer for a respected internet news outlet which claims to stand for tolerance. He also is a contributor to a liberal institute which proposes tolerance as one of its core values. Unfortunately this sort of thing is becoming far too common. We see the banner of tolerance and reason used as a vehicle by which to promote irrational intolerance of Christianity. Orwell parodied a world which stated “War is Peace” today, perhaps, the parody should be “irrational bigotry is tolerance”.

Tuesday, 31 July 2007

The Dawkins Delusion

A friend of mine sent me this this morning.

Its great, very witty satire. I particularly like the parody of Dawkin's "Who made God" argument. Dr Terry Tommyrot addresses the question of wether science can explain the existence of Dawkin's books with out postulating the existence of an intelligent author named Richard Dawkins. Tommyrot replies that , "If Dawkins designed this book who designed Dawkins, you tell me that". Exposing in a simple sentence the problem with this, common but mistaken, retort. A retort which, incidentally, constitutes one of Dawkins major arguments. For those interested in philosophical critiues of Dawkins. I recommend Alvin Plantinga's review in Books and Culture .


Monday, 30 July 2007

Not Madeleine Setchell

I wish to clarify that I am not Madeleine Setchell.

My maiden name is Richards.

Apparently, after I commented on kiwiblog the other day under my usual posting name which is simply 'Madeleine' a lot of people jumped to the conclusion that I must be the Madeleine in the story. Whilst there have been instances of David Benson-Pope lying about his staff doing things he in fact did involving me, I am not the Madeleine in the current instance of his fabrication.

It should have occurred to me to post as 'Madeleine Flannagan' in this instance as the leap is a rather obvious one to make - apologies for the confusion - its just that as a 'Madeleine', I am not used to being confused with other people, I have met very few Madeleine's in my life so it simply did not occur to me.

The Rationalists: Round Two

In an earlier post I mentioned the schism within The New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanists (NZARH) between former spokesperson Paul Litterick and current spokesperson Dr Bill Cooke. NZARH contend that Dr Cooke was a Professor at The State University of New York at Buffalo. Paul Litterick maintains this is false. Litterick claims Cooke was never on faculty at this University and hence was never a professor there.

A few days latter Dr Cooke wrote to me and complained that I had not checked his side of the story before I posted. On this point he was correct and for that I sincerely apologised. He then proceeded to take issue with two points I had made: (a) My claim that Cooke had not been a professor at this University and (b) My claim that Cooke’s PhD was not in philosophy at all. Seeing I was remiss in not addressing his side of the story I shall do so now.

Turning first to (b) Cooke sent me a copy of his PhD and noted that it had written on it the phrase “Doctor of Philosophy”. I agree. A PhD is a “Doctor of Philosophy” that is after all what PhD stands for. However, this really misses the point of what I said. I never said that Cooke did not have a Doctor of Philosophy. I in fact explicitly stated that he had a PhD. What I said was that his PhD was not in Philosophy. Although the word “Philosophy” appears in the phrase “Doctor of Philosophy” it doesn’t follow that any one who has a Doctor of Philosophy has a qualification in philosophy. This is like saying that a person who has a Master of Arts is qualified as an artist. A person can successfully complete a PhD in physics, or history, or one of any number of disciplines and have little or no training in Philosophy at all. I know many Theologians who have PhD’s in biblical studies and little or no understanding of Philosophy at all.

Dr Cooke’s PhD was in Religious Studies. Moreover his PhD thesis was on the history of secularism in New Zealand. Hence Cooke is best described as a religious historian. He may well be a good one, but that does not make him a qualified philosopher let alone qualified to hold a Professorship in a Philosophy department.

Turning then to (a) here Cooke sent me a letter he received from the Dean of Arts and Social Sciences at The State University of New York at Buffalo which states that he has been awarded a professorship. This letter has since been published on the NZARH web page. This intrigued me because Paul Litterick claimed to have a letter from which denied Cooke was ever on faculty. Not content to rely on ‘he says she says” I wrote to the University myself. Here is the answer I received.

Dear Dr. Flannagan,

As I told Paul Litterick, Bill Cooke was
resident in Buffalo for a time as a fellow at the nearby Center for Inquiry. He
was given a courtesy appointment in our Philosophy Department so he could use
the UB library and facilities. At that time, the title that the Dean's Office
used for such affiliations was "Visiting Professor." Because this caused
confusion, since such people were not appointed to the teaching faculty, we no
longer use that title for fellows of CFI.

There is not any question
of fraud or misrepresentation on Dr. Cooke's part. He refers to the title that
he in fact was given.

I hope this clears up the
matter.

Sincerely,
Carolyn Korsmeyer

This letter states that Cooke was given the title of “Visting Professor” so on this point NZARH and are correct. As Korsmeyer notes Cooke is not lying when he claims he was awarded such a title because this was the term used by the Deans office.

However, the letter also points out this was a professorship in name only. In most English-speaking countries, the term professor refers to a senior academic who holds a departmental chair, especially as head of the department, or a personal chair awarded specifically to that individual. In the US the term is often used of any University lecturer. However, in neither of these common senses of the term “professor” was Cooke a professor. In reality Cooke did not hold any faculty position at all. He was not a researcher, or a lecturer for the Philosophy Department. Cooke was merely a research fellow for a rationalist think tank in the same town. The title “Professor” was only a courteously title given to him so he could use the University Library.

Now when you hear that a person is a professor you normally assume that this means a lot more than that they have access to a University library. Korsmeyer appears to concede this. She notes that the name of the title was latter changed to avoid confusion. Apparently there was concern that people might mistakenly think that a person granted the title of professor was actually a professor in the normal sense of the word i.e. a senior member of faculty.

In light of this information I need to retract my earlier claim. Dr Cooke’s claim that he held a professorship at The State University of New York at Buffalo’s philosophy department is true provided one means by professorship an honorary title which gives you access to the University Library. Incidentally, by this definition I was a professor at the University of Otago last year. I was employed by the Theology department to do research and had access to University library and facilities. In fact by this definition of Professor I am arguably still a professor. Even though I am not on faculty, not teaching, nor studying at Otago, after I graduated I was given special rights to use the University library. Hence, provided this is all NZARH means to convey when it states it’s spokesperson held a professorship, there is clearly no deception on NZARH’s part in claiming this.

On the other hand if by claiming Cooke is a professor NZARH are attempting to suggest Dr Cooke actually had a professorship. i.e. he was a Philosophy lecturer or possibly a departmental chair then there comments are deceptive.

So the question is what does NZARH mean to convey when the claim Dr Cooke is was a Professor? Korsmeyer suggests he means only to refer to the position he was in fact given and suggests there is no deception. Litterick on the other hand thinks NZARH are trying to suggest Cooke held a faculty position in a philosophy department and is hence being dishonest.

I am not party to Cooke or NZARH’s intentions hence I will not comment on who I think is correct. Instead I’ll ask my readers, what do you think? When NZARH, an organization which promotes the philosophical critique of religion, claims that Dr Cooke was a philosophy professor do they intend to let us know that Cooke’s credentials include him being temporarily granted the right to use library at a state university? Or are they trying to pass their spokesperson of as having expertise in Philosophy of Religion which they know he does not?

A final thing, one of the main points in my previous posts was that NZARH have denounced Christian's for falsifying their credentials and hence if they were consistent should now denounce themselves. In light of this I want to ask another question: Suppose a Christian MP had claimed to have a doctorate when in reality it was merely an honourary doctorate, would NZARH consider him to be honest ?

See here and here for NZARH’s answer. A Dr Bill Cooke from NZARH seems to think it is not honest and calls into question the organization of which the Christian is a member.

I leave my readers to ponder the irony.

Sunday, 29 July 2007

Benson-Pope - Lousy Staff or Just a Liar?

Here is a list of the instances I can recall where Benson-Pope has blamed one of his staff members for something he did:
  • Leaked content of Police Report over Tennis Ball saga - staff member leaked it without his knowledge. (Later turned out it was with his permissison/instruction)
  • Having the police collect a $35 cleaning bill - staff member went to police and made request without his knowledge. (Official Information Act request showed his signature on the police forms)
  • Playing a part in ending Madeleine Setchell's employment - staff member made calls without his knowledge. (Turns out he forgot that he did intervene)
Are there any more?

Benson-Pope clearly has really crappy staff.

Friday, 27 July 2007

Some Questions for Dr. Michael Cullen

I saw Dr. Michael Cullen speaking in on TV3 last night. What he said was interesting because it highlights a tension I have often noted in liberal views of sexual morality . The issue was as follows: A school had hired a teacher. This teacher however had advertised on an internet adult site for a woman to have sex with him. He requested the women be 17 or adding that the younger the student was the better. His partner apparently consented to him doing this and offered to join in, apparently one of them “liked to watch”.

Now Cullen stated that he wanted to tighten up regulations so Schools could dismiss teachers like this. He stated it was unacceptable that a person like this should be teaching teenage girls. He seemed to take this latter claim as obvious and there was no apparent disagreement from anyone in the clip.

Let’s be clear what Cullen is saying here. He is suggesting that it should be permissible to refuse to employ someone on the basis of private sexual behaviour they engage in with other consenting adults (under NZ’s laws a 17 year old is not considered a minor when it comes to sex and hence is a consenting adult). Moreover, he is also suggesting that a person’s private consensual sexual behaviour can be grounds for considering them unfit to teach at public schools. Moreover Cullen appeared to think this was obvious and certainly no one appeared to disagree in this instance.

If this is so the question I have for Cullen and the Labour party is this. If you believe this, why have you repeatedly stated the opposite in the past? This is the party whose activists have repeatedly stated that it’s wrong to discriminate against people on the basis of their private consensual behaviour.

I also have another question. Suppose this teacher had instead of advertising for a member of the opposite sex on a website he had been cruising for causal sex with another man in a local gay bar. Would Cullen say this person was unfit to teach teenage children? Suppose he had advertised for causal in Express magazine? Would that be grounds to discriminate against him and to claim he is unfit to teach at public schools?

I suspect I know the answer to this question. If a person were to make this argument about a homosexual teacher Cullen and his supporters would denounce the person as a bigot and an intolerant homophobe. No doubt the person would be compared to the Nazis and to the Taliban (as though somehow saying that a person is unfit to teach at a school is the same as engaging in mass murder and genocide).

But this raises an obvious question; If it’s obvious that a heterosexual male is unfit to teach because he advertises for sex on the net. Why is a homosexual male who advertises for causal sex in a Gay bar or on the pages of express not also unfit? In both cases the sex is consensual in private. The only difference is the gender of his partner. I thought Labour believed it was wrong to treat same sex relationships differently to heterosexual ones?

If we are to believe what Labours activists have told us then either one of two things is true either (a) Cullen is a pro Taliban Nazi bigot or (b) much of what Labour has told us about consenting sex in private is false and much of the character assassination it has dished out to Conservatives is unjustified. Which is it?

A rational person should not prescribe a principle unless he is willing to also prescribe the logical implications of that principle. If you prescribe a rule but are unable to accept its implications because you find them intuitively absurd then you have good grounds for rejecting the rule. No amount of denouncing others as bigots can change this fact.

The claim that its wrong to discriminate against people on the basis of their private consensual sexual activities has counter intuitive implications. Hence in the absence of compelling arguments for this claim it should be rejected.

Benson-Pope

Benson-Pope is someone that the more closely you observe him the more his slimy, smarmy, bullying, bullet-dodging just pisses you off.

Until recently I used to live in Dunedin so I have had a few encounters with Mr Benson-Pope a.k.a. panty slut boy and have crossed swords with him politically and know other people who have too. I find him an unpleasant person and a liar.

The hit he has taken is well deserved. About time. But what annoys me is that he escaped just desserts over so many other issues. But oh well, at least this hit didn't bounce off.

The beehive website is not up with the play though cause they still have him on their site as a Minister.

Interestingly Ian Wishart has re-released his findings on Benson-Pope's involvement in the Dunedin Bondage and Discipline scene with the rather interesting addition:

"[Benson-Pope] went to the trouble of ringing a senior Otago Daily Times journalist at home that evening, expressly to ensure that the newspaper was not quoting him as denying the story. "

This was always a story I felt certain should have had a lot more air time by the media than it did.

It had the now familiar to us all ring of Benson-Pope's dodging the truth.

Add to that our own experience of Benson-Pope's lies. He told the media when he used the police to collect a $35 cleaning bill (the police were his first line of request for this bill - most people would use a 45c stamp first...) that it was not him who utilised police resources as his personal debt collection service but his secretary without his permission (sound familiar?). In fact when we used the official information act to get the files on this incident whose signature was on the request to the police to do the debt collecting? NOT his secretary's but his!

Wednesday, 18 July 2007

The Flat Earth Myth

A few days ago I got sent the following message from a high-school student in the US.
I've been studying Christopher Columbus in my history class and my history books say that prior to Columbus everyone did think the world was flat........I don't know if it was a mistake in the history book or your mistake.....but anyway....I guess i have some things to learn! god bless ~Katie Joy~
This was in response to a comment I made online, I had I criticised the popular claim that prior to the time of Columbus, the Church taught the world was flat. In another post on this blog I have criticised Victoria University for making a similar claim as part of it's advertising campaigns.

For our overseas visitors, last year Victoria University had a slick advertising campaign where it is stated that in the 14th century most people believed the world was flat. It then showed a picture of a boat sailing across the sea only to fall over the side of the earth.

We have all heard the story behind this; prior to Columbus, the Church and it’s theological scholars taught that the world was flat. For this reason they opposed Columbus' proposed voyage in 1492 as they believed he would sail off the edge of the earth.

Katie is correct; they do teach this in high school text books. I was taught it repeatedly at primary and high school. In fact not too long ago Pretence Hall published claims to this effect in a middle school textbook Prentice Hall Earth Science. I have heard the story repeated ad nauseam. Normally when I contest it’s veracity I get an incredulous stare (as if I were, in fact, asserting that the earth was flat) “Come on Matt, everyone knows this story is true, didn’t you learn this at school?”

Well, yes I did learn it but I also took the time to research the history of theology when I was at university. What they don’t tell you in high school is that this claim is false. It is a slanderous fabrication invented by opponents of Christianity in the 19th century and has been thoroughly debunked by contemporary historians of science.

The definitive study is undoubtedly that of Jeffrey Burton Russell, he summarises his findings here. However, the same thing is uttered in many studies on medieval science. For example, Edward Grant in his work notes that “there is no mention of a flat earth in any medieval writings, except for a few references to refute it.”

Even Wikipedia, not known for its ability to rise above popular anti-religious prejudice, concedes,
Today essentially all professional medievalists agree with Russell that the "medieval flat Earth" is a nineteenth-century fabrication, and that the few verifiable "flat Earthers" were the exception.
Interestingly, Wikipedia does not point to a medieval scholar who was one of these “verifiable "flat earthers" and its section on the Middle ages ends with the following conclusion.

A recent study of medieval concepts of the sphericity of the Earth noted that "since the eighth century, no cosmographer worthy of note has called into question the sphericity of the Earth. Of course it was probably not the few noted intellectuals who defined public opinion. It is difficult to tell what the wider population may have thought of the shape of the Earth – if they considered the question at all.

Yes, what the school textbooks teach is wrong. In fact the kinds of textbooks Katie mentions have been subject to scathing criticism in the literature. Lawrence S. Lerner a professor in the Department of Physics and Astronomy at California State and director of The Textbook League University and a member of the panel that wrote the 1990 framework for science education in California's public schools criticised Pretence Halls text denouncing it as “ignorant fakery.” He goes on state,

The flat-Earth story quickly became a popular piece of pseudo historical folklore, and it remains popular today among people who have had little education. These evidently include the people who produce "science" books for Prentice Hall.” [we kiwis can add that it includes the advertising staff at Victoria university]

The facts are very different. Here are just a few: during the so called dark ages Boethius (480-525) in the Consolidation of Philosophy cited a well known and accepted ancient Greek cosmological model which affirmed the sphericity of the earth. Isidore of Serville, (560-636) published in the Etymologies, affirmed a round earth. Bede (672-735) in his, The Reckoning of Time, taught the earth is round; as did Rabanus Marcus in the ninth century.

The late middle ages are no different. Hemannus Contractus (1013-155), in fact, measured the circumference of the world. Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179) taught the world was round. As did John of Sacrbosco (1200-1256) and Peire d’Ailly (1350-1420). Dante’s Divine Comedy portrays the earth as a sphere. In the Summa Theologicae Thomas Aquinas in wrote,

The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth.

In fact, medieval textbooks taught the world was round. The Elucidarium of Honorius Augustodunensis a twelfth century manual for educating clergy and On the Sphere of the World the standard cosmological textbook of medieval universities in the thirteenth century both taught that the world was round.

When I began studying philosophy and theology at University I was literally shocked to discover this. One of the reasons I despise public schools is because they repeated lied to me about things like this. This is not the first or only instance where I was fed false propaganda about Christianity at high school. I could document several other instances; the flat earth story will suffice for now. The point is that state institutions affirm falsehoods about the history of religion and teach propaganda for history.

The fact that a state University, like Victoria, should perpetuate discredited slander as part of its advertising campaign to obtain higher learning about the arts is appalling. One would have thought this institution imparts knowledge, not fraudulent anti-Christian propaganda.

RELATED POSTS:
The "Dark Ages" and Other Propaganda
More on the "Dark Ages" and Other Propaganda
Things They Don't Teach you in Public Schools...

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